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UNRAVELLING THE RULE AGAINST THE DISCRIMINATION OF 
FIELDS OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE PATENT RULES OF THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT 
 




The rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in TRIPS Article 27.1 has the 
potential to contradict the very technology-specific nature of patent law and to disallow the 
WTO membership from specifically addressing public interest and right-holder related 
concerns in a given field of technology. However, in Canada- Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceuticals (DS114), the only report by a WTO tribunal to have substantively dealt with 
this obligation to date, the Panel indicated that this rule is not absolute by formulating the 
concept of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 as the ‘unjustified imposition of differentially 
disadvantageous treatment’.   
 
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the Panel left some vital elements of its formulation open-
ended, thereby making it difficult for a member to comprehend the circumstances in which the 
‘differential treatment’ of field of technology constitutes ‘discrimination’. To bring clarity to 
this ambiguity, this thesis interprets this obligation afresh and identifies some fundamental 
rationales that should have, and in fact appear to have influenced the Panel in its formulation. 
To this end, this thesis draws some vital influences from the context relating to WTO’s 
substantive non-discrimination norms (National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation 
Treatment) under its covered agreements that deal with goods and services and explores the 
type and extent of autonomy that has been preserved within TRIPS’s Objectives and Principles. 
Whilst this thesis argues that an ambiguous obligation such the prohibition of ‘discrimination’ 
of fields of technology found in TRIPS Article 27.1 should be interpreted in a manner that 
seeks a balance between the obligation and the autonomy of the WTO membership, it also 
sheds light on the future of TRIPS’s own National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation 
treatment obligations for which WTO tribunals have not yet recognized the applicability of any 
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A. THE BACKGROUND, RESEARCH QUESTION AND THE 
CONTRIBUTION 
 
The rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in TRIPS Article 27.1 applies in 
the context of availability and enjoyment of patent rights. Given the apparent breadth of the 
notion of ‘discrimination’ in this provision that has not been defined in the Agreement, the 
academic commentary rightly pointed out its potential to impede the ability of the WTO 
Members to tailor patent protection to address public interest and industry-specific concerns in 
any given field of technology. However, in Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products that is the only Report of a WTO tribunal to have substantively dealt with this non-
discrimination obligation to date, the Panel noted that ‘discrimination’ in the context of Article 
27.1 is the ‘unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment’.1 Consequently, 
the academic commentaries recognized that the Panel acknowledged a degree of autonomy on 
the part of the WTO Members to subject fields of technology to differential treatment in the 
sphere of their patent laws without violating this obligation.2  
 
So far, however, this autonomy has remained unexplored. This thesis argues that any such 
autonomy on the part of the Member States rests of the concept of justification that the Panel 
introduced into its formulation. The lack of any examination in the Report as to why it created 
this concept or how it should operate in this context continues to be vital gap in the 
comprehension of this obligation that has not been scrutinized in the academic literature or 
elsewhere. Hence, in the process of unravelling the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of 
technology in TRIPS Article 27.1, the most vital research question this thesis addresses is as to 
what constitutes a legitimate justification in the context of this obligation. In order to explore 
this, the thesis entails a comprehensive analysis of the concept of justification. The practical 
aim is to provide insights to national policy makers who may wish to tailor patent protection to 
address important societal interests without violating this obligation. Accordingly, this thesis 
attempts to provide a comprehensive, comparative and better understanding of the scope of the 
                                               
1 Panel Report, Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, para. 7.94. 
2 See for e.g G. Dinwoodie and R. Dreyfuss, ‘Diversifying without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandate 
of the TRIPS Agreement’, Mich. Telecomm. & Tech L. Rev. vol. 13, no. 2, p. 445. 
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non-discrimination obligation relating to fields of technology than currently found in the 
literature.  
 
Further, this thesis offers an important contribution to our understanding of the TRIPS 
Agreement more generally- as it demonstrates how its obligations can be interpreted and 
applied in a manner that acknowledges the autonomy of the Member States to pursue other vital 
public policy interests that have been recognized in its Objectives and Principles. The 
importance of a balance between TRIPS obligations and such autonomy on the part of the WTO 
Members has been acknowledged by the WTO Panel in its Report in Australia- Plain 
Packaging.3 In this dispute, Australia was alleged to have violated, inter alia, TRIPS Article 20 
by adopting its Tobacco Plain Packaging measures that affected the use of trade marks. 
Interpreting the notion of ‘unjustified’ in Article 20, the Panel noted the that the obligation not 
to encumber the use of a trade mark must be balanced against the right of the Members to adopt 
measures to protect public health that has been recognized in Article 8 (Principles) of the 
Agreement.4 The need for such a balance would similarly resurface in an allegation based on 
the non-discrimination obligation in Article 27.1 as Members are likely to rely on some form 
of autonomy to defend allegations of inconsistency. Thus, the contribution made in this thesis 
as to how the concept of justification could be used to achieve an appropriate balance in the 
context of this non-discrimination obligation adds to the more general understanding of the 
requisite balance between TRIPS obligations and the autonomy of the Member States. 
 
B. THE RESEARCH METHOD AND ORDER OF ANALYSIS 
 
This thesis adopts a doctrinal approach to scrutinize this concept of justification as it argues 
that the Panel was influenced by the presence of similar legal concepts in the WTO’s 
substantive non-discrimination obligations (National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation) 
under the other covered agreements dealing with trade in goods and services that balance those 
obligations with a degree of autonomy on the part of the Member States. It is this trade context 
that influenced the Panel to reason that non-discrimination norms are not absolute in the WTO 
- which it appears to have rightly perceived as vital context when formulating the broad notion 
of ‘discrimination’ in TRIPS Article 27.1 as it is in fact a specie of trade.  
                                               
3 Panel Report, Australia- Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, 
WT/DS456/R and WT/DS467/R. 
4 Ibid., para. 7.2403. 
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Accordingly, Chapter Two of this thesis scrutinizes the negotiation history specifically relating 
to this non-discrimination norm to demonstrate how this ‘trade concept’ was used to achieve a 
compromise when the negotiations concerning the patent section of TRIPS were at a deadlock, 
signaling that it is capable of acknowledging some autonomy on the part of the Member States. 
It also discusses the potential concerns surrounding the ambiguity of this obligation, which is 
followed by Chapter Three that examines the current lack of understanding in the WTO 
jurisprudence and the academic literature as to the concept of justification in the context of this 
obligation. Chapter Four adopts an interpretational approach to rationalize the reasons for the 
Panel’s concept of justification by examining the balance that the substantive non-
discrimination obligations under the WTO’s covered agreements relating to trade in goods and 
services and their jurisprudence have sought to achieve with the autonomy of the Member 
States, and shows that the need for such a balance between the non-discrimination obligation 
in TRIPS Article 27.1 and the autonomy of the WTO Members preserved under the TRIPS 
Agreement led the Panel to create this concept in TRIPS Article 27.1. With a detailed analysis 
of the interplay between the TRIPS’s Objectives and Principles, Chapter Four also identifies 
the constitutive elements of this concept under this provision. Chapter Five discusses the 
objectives, scope and application of three national measures currently found among the 
Members of the WTO that explicitly subject pharmaceutical inventions to special treatment in 
the sphere of patent law, followed by Chapter Six that examines their potential consistency with 
the developed understanding of the non-discrimination obligation. Chapter Seven entails a 
discussion of the implications flowing from Chapter Six to highlight the pragmatic lessons that 
are potentially relevant to policy makers who might intend to tailor patent protection 
consistently with this obligation and other theoretical implications that this could have on the 
other grounds of discrimination in Article 27.1 and TRIPS Agreement more generally. It 
concludes by highlighting the broader implications of this ‘unravelling’ of the non-
discrimination obligation that shows the significance of a balance between WTO obligations 
and the autonomy of the Member States to protect national interests.
 8 
CHAPTER 2 
THE ORIGINS OF THE RULE AGAINT DISCRIMINATION 
AND ITS CONCERNS 
 
The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
1994 (TRIPS) that specifies substantive norms and standards relating to copyrights, trade 
marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents and undisclosed information is 
undoubtedly an exceptional multilateral agreement in the field of international intellectual 
property law. For the first time an international treaty specified, inter alia, the patent law 
obligations of the Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in relation to matters that 
were previously left unregulated multilaterally. It even ensured the effectiveness of its 
obligations by sanctioning trade retaliation through its unique Dispute Settlement mechanism 
in the event of non-compliance.  
 
Of the many patent rules that TRIPS succeeded in setting-out is the general obligation in Article 
27.1 to grant patents to inventions in all fields of technology, whether products or processes, 
provided they are new, inventive and capable of industrial application or utility. The same 
TRIPS provision also proceeds to state that patent rights shall be available and enjoyable 
without discrimination as to the place of invention, field of technology, and whether the 
products are imported or locally produced. This rule against discrimination was a novel 
creation by the TRIPS Agreement as such a concept was non-existent in the patent laws of any 
country at the time TRIPS was being negotiated. Accordingly, this Chapter demonstrates the 
trade origins of this obligation by examining the negotiation history that specifically relates to 
this obligation in a manner that has not been fully appreciated in the current commentaries of 
the Agreement. It also examines the concerns that have been raised in relation to this obligation 
to highlight the need for clarity with regards to its scope. 
 
Thus, Part A begins with an examination of how intellectual property law standards entered the 
GATT/WTO framework. Part B examines the negotiation history that led to the creation of the 
rule against discrimination in Article 27.1. Part C discusses the concerns raised in the existing 
literature relating to the impact that this obligation could have on the TRIPS Agreement, which 
is followed by a conclusion in Part D that identifies the reasons why this thesis focuses on the 
particular facet of this obligation that prohibits ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology.  
 9 
A. THE ‘GATT-ABILITY’ OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
STANDARDS 
 
TRIPS was not the first treaty that had the ambition of standardizing national intellectual 
property laws. It was preceded by the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(1883) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) that 
still hold good through their various revisions even to date. This is particularly so as they have 
been incorporated into TRIPS to a large extent by reference. In fact, Thomas Cottier states that 
the Paris and Berne conventions were the humble beginnings of the ever-expanding field of 
international economic law.1 These conventions, together with certain other treaties that had 
existed up until the GATT Ministerial mandate in Punta del Este, had several drawbacks that 
were aptly highlighted by the note prepared by the International Bureau of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for the TRIPS Negotiation Group.2 The main 
concerns for the industrialized nations in the field of patent law were the lack of harmonization 
relating to patentable subject matter and patentability criteria, the varied durations of patent 
protection and the broad discretion on the part of the signatory states to grant non-voluntary 
licences. The only standardization of patent law rules, if any, were between a few signatory 
states caused by the National Treatment obligations in Paris and Berne that required the equal 
treatment between nationals and foreigners. The lack of patent protection in the pharmaceutical, 
chemical, food and agricultural sectors and the discrimination of those fields for reasons of 
public health and nutrition were detrimental to the technology-intensive developed nations. The 
varying levels protection in the field of patents and other forms of intellectual property affected 
the market access of these developed nations, causing a loss to the derivable profits. These 
sentiments were evident in a submission made by Japan, United States and the then European 
Communities to the TRIPS Negotiation Group.3 The fear of free-riding on the technologies and 
products of these developed nations created the trade-related impact of intellectual property 
that was deemed sufficient to bring it within GATT’s trade-based framework. Accordingly, the 
Ministers of GATT declared at Punta del Este in 1986 that the Uruguay trade negotiations 
                                               
1 T. Cottier, ‘Working Together Towards TRIPS’, in J. Watal and A. Taubman (eds.), The Making of the TRIPS 
Agreement: Personal Insights from the Uruguay Round Negotiations, World Trade Organization, 2015, p. 79. 
2 GATT document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods- Existence, Scope and Form of Generally Internationally Accepted 
and Applied Standards/Norms for the Protection of Intellectual Property- Note Prepared by The International 
Bureau of WIPO, 5 May 1988. 
3 GATT document MTN.GONG/NE11/W/7, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods- Submissions from Participant on Trade Problems Encountered in 
Connection with Intellectual Property Rights- Submission by the European Communities, Japan and the United 
States, 29 May 1987. 
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should include the subject of ‘Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, including 
trade in counterfeit goods’ that must, inter alia, seek to promote effective and adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights.4 The contour of this mandate was to reduce the 
distortions and impediments caused to trade by the lack of or insufficient protection of 
intellectual property on the one hand, and to ensure that the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights do not by themselves constitute barriers to legitimate trade on the other. This was an 
indication that the minimum standards of intellectual property protection that was to be 
mandated by the Agreement had to meet this balance. 
 
It took almost two years after the Punta del Este mandate for the TRIPS Negotiation Group to 
decide if its negotiations were to concern trade in counterfeit goods or if it should also address 
substantive norms concerning intellectual property law standards. Addressing the latter was the 
ambition of the United States from the very beginning. Consequent to the mid-term review in 
1989, the Negotiation Group decided in favour of this broader mandate. Adrian Otten notes that 
there was still much disagreement as to whether the results of such negotiations should be 
implemented by GATT, which came to be known as the ‘GATTability’ problem of intellectual 
property.5 The developing nations led by the ‘Group of 14’ that included India, Brazil and 
Argentina, agreed that GATT could tackle rules concerning counterfeit goods. However, they 
contended that substantive intellectual property law standards could not fall within the ambit of 
GATT/WTO as these had a significant impact on the developmental, technological and public 
interest objectives of those countries that made them more sensitive issues than mere trade. 
Therefore, they noted that substantive intellectual property law measures should come under 
the purview of a distinct international organization such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). In a move that was to have significant implications for the future of the 
TRIPS negotiations and the final version of the Agreement itself, the Group of 14 developing 
countries presented a proposal in 1990 that consisted of two Parts. Part One entitled ‘Intellectual 
Property and International Trade’ that dealt with counterfeit goods, which in their opinion could 
come within the purview of GATT, and Part Two dealing with standards and principles relating 
to intellectual property, which was ultra vires the GATT.6  
                                               
4 GATT document MIN.DEC, Multilateral Trade Negotiations- The Uruguay Round- Ministerial Declaration on 
the Uruguay Round, 20 September 1986.  
5 A. Otten, ‘The TRIPS Negotiations: An Overview’, in Watal and Taubman (eds.), n. 1, p. 55 at p. 64. 
6 GATT document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, 
Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, 14 May 1990. 
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Since the presentation of this proposal, this dualistic position of the developing countries 
continued even beyond the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in December 1990. However, after 
a few months following the Brussels Ministerial Meeting, many negotiators representing these 
developing countries repeatedly complained to the Chair of the Negotiation Group that 
unilateral pressure was being exerted upon them to agree to the ‘GATTabiliy’ of intellectual 
property. This is particularly evident in the GATT Secretarial Notes on the TRIPS Negotiation 
Group meetings held on the 27th and 28th June 1991.7 Notwithstanding such complaints, they 
eventually ‘agreed’ to the inclusion of substantive intellectual property law norms into the trade 
discipline that materialized with the Dunkel Draft of the Agreement in late 1991,8  which 
continued into the final version of the Agreement. 
 
Much has been written about the pressure exerted by the North in the final phases of the TRIPS 
negotiations, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis.9 However, it is pertinent 
to note that notwithstanding such pressure to bring substantive intellectual property norms 
within the ambit of TRIPS and WTO, it is too simplistic and inaccurate to state that the 
Agreement is purely a device of the North. Conversely, as Antony Taubman notes, the TRIPS 
Agreement has:  
… proven to be a nuanced and balanced instrument and an expression of sound 
policy thinking, and it can still today enable fair and balanced public policy 
and defend against the excessive influence of sectoral interests and specific 
actors in domestic policy-making.10  
Taubman states that the reason for this is that for the first time in the history of international 
intellectual property law, negotiators from the developing nations were able to build public 
policy safeguards into the text of an international treaty.11 The safeguards that he speaks of are 
the Objectives and Principles respectively enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Agreement.  
                                               
7 GATT document MTN.GNG/TRIPS/1, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 27 and 28 June 1991, Note by 
Secretariat, 25 July 1991, para. 4, 5. 
8 GATT document, MTN.TNC/W/FA, Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 20 December 1991, Annex. 3, [hereinafter referred to as 
‘Dunkel Draft’]. 
9 For a detailed analysis of the North-South and North-North debates relating to TRIPS negotiations see C. Correa, 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, pp. 1-18; D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, Fourth edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell/Thomson Reuters, 2012, pp. 3-31; N.P. de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patents and Test Data, 
Second edition, Kluwer Law International, 2014, pp. 1-29. 
10 A. Taubman, ‘Thematic Review: Negotiating “trade-related aspects” of Intellectual Property Rights’, in Watal 
and Taubman (eds.), n. 1, p. 15 at p. 23. 
11 Ibid. 
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Article 7 provides as follows: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.12  
 Article 8.1 provides as follows: 
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement.13  
Moreover, the Preamble of TRIPS, inter alia, states as follows: 
Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the 
protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological 
objectives;  
Emphasizing the importance of reducing tensions by reaching strengthened 
commitments to resolve disputes on trade-related intellectual property issues 
through multilateral procedures;  
The inclusion of these provisions demonstrated a significant accomplishment on the part of the 
developing world. The very body of the Agreement spells out the objectives of protecting 
intellectual property rights and preserves the autonomy on the part of the WTO Members to 
address other vital policies such as public health and nutrition that are potentially affected by 
intellectual property law rules. The growing significance of these provisions in the 
interpretation and implementation of the Agreement will be examined later in thesis, but it 
suffices to note at this juncture that although the ‘GATTability’ of substantive intellectual 
property rules were seen apprehensively by the developing world, the inclusion of these 
provisions alleviated their fears. As Taubman notes, it is probably the presence of these 
provisions that indicate the balance sought by the Agreement that have, save in the case of the 
                                               
12 Emphasis added. 
13 Emphasis added. 
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HIV/AIDS epidemic and the problem of access to medicine, worked to ensure that the severe 
consequences that were expected by many opponents of the Agreement have not materialized. 
 
B. INTRODUCING THE NON-DISCRIMINATION OBLIGATION TO THE 
PATENT LAW RULES 
 
The principal objective of establishing the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 
1947 was to promote global economic prosperity, inter alia, by eliminating discriminatory 
treatment in international trade. The type of discrimination that initially caught the attention of 
the GATT negotiators was that caused by trade restrictive practices of certain countries that 
disadvantaged foreign products. Such practices came to be referred to as ‘distortions and 
impediments to international trade’. The reason for international intervention to eradicate such 
practices is succinctly explained by Peter Van der Bossche and Werner Zdouc in the following 
manner: 
… discrimination in matters relating to trade breeds resentment and poisons 
the economic and political relations between countries. Moreover, 
discrimination makes scant economic sense as, generally speaking, it distorts 
the market in favour of goods and services that are more expensive and/or of 
lower quality.14 
With the expansion of GATT/WTO influence to embrace services, investments and intellectual 
property, the principle of non-discrimination had to operate as one of the basic principles of 
WTO law that applied to all areas. Thus, it was included to the Preamble to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) which identifies ‘the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations’ as one of the means by 
which the WTO is meant to achieve trade liberalization. Accordingly, the substantive non-
discrimination norms of National Treatment (NT) and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment 
(MFN) were adapted to the contexts of all the Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, 
and TRIPS was no exception. While the NT obligation was not novel to international 
intellectual property law at the time, as the Paris and Berne Conventions contained similar 
provisions, the introduction of the MFN obligation was a maiden accomplishment. However, 
these were insufficient in the field of intellectual property in the light of the concerns of the 
proponents of TRIPS. Firstly, rarely did countries offer preferential treatment to foreigners that 
                                               
14 P. Bossche and W. Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 
Third edition, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 315. Footnote omitted. 
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triggered the MFN obligation. Secondly and more significantly, many countries did not 
recognize certain types of intellectual property rights even of their own nationals rendering the 
NT obligation to be insufficient. These reasons justified the inclusion of substantive intellectual 
property law standards into TRIPS that must be adhered to by the members of the WTO.  
 
Daniel Gervais observes that the negotiation of the patent section was the most difficult.15 
Detailed commentaries on the negotiations of TRIPS’s patent rules have already been presented 
by many academics,16 and therefore, this section does not aim to repeat such analyses. However, 
it attempts to provide a glimpse of the much-tangled context in which the non-discrimination 
rule in TRIPS Article 27.1 found its legislative footing in the Dunkel Draft of the Agreement, 
which is still very much an area of the negotiations that has not yet been fully understood.  
 
A sense of how the GATT/WTO proponents perceived the inordinate state of international 
patent law in the pre-TRIPS era is accurately described by Nuno Pires de Carvalho, who states 
that the most serious obstacle against trade in goods was: 
…the discriminatory treatment of certain fields of technology as regards 
patents and, in particular, non-availability of patent protection in the chemical 
and pharmaceutical fields.17 
The TRIPS Negotiation Group encountered the concept of ‘discrimination’ in intellectual 
property law soon after the Punta del Este mandate when it was assembling factual information 
concerning the then state of international intellectual property law. According to Adrian Otten,18 
it was during these meetings that the Group first received contributions from the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Consequent to these meetings, the GATT 
Secretariat compiled a paper19 which condensed the WIPO’s contributions and the various 
concerns raised by the delegates. Although this compilation paper was not made available to 
the public, Otten describes that it had four distinct headings, the second of which was ‘Issues 
in Connection with the Availability and Scope of Intellectual Property Rights’. Sub-section (c) 
                                               
15 Gervais, n. 9, p. 428. 
16 See generally Carvalho, n. 9; Correa, n. 9; Gervais, n. 9; Also see J. Malbon, C. Lawson and M. Davison, The 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary, Edward Elgar, 2014, 
pp. 405- 565. 
17 Carvalho, n. 9, p. 245. Emphasis added. 
18 Otten, n. 5, p. 60. 
19 GATT document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/12, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods- Compilation of Written Submissions and Oral Statements- Prepared 
by the Secretariat, 11 August 1987.  
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of this heading was entitled ‘Discrimination in the Availability and Scope of Intellectual 
Property Rights’. 
 
With specific regard to the state of international patent law at that time, WIPO indicated to the 
TRIPS Negotiation Group that certain fields of technology were completely excluded from 
patent protection in certain national jurisdictions.20 The most notable of such fields were 
pharmaceuticals, food and agrochemicals. WIPO also highlighted that there were several 
divergences between countries with regard to the scope of patent rights and the duration of 
patent protection. Nevertheless, WIPO did not refer to such exclusions or limitations as being 
‘discriminatory’. On the contrary, it showed that the signatory states were entitled to make such 
exclusions and limitations under the Paris Convention that governed international patent law at 
that time as they had a substantial level of discretion to decide what was patentable, the 
patentability criteria, the scope of patent rights and their duration. Such a state of international 
patent law was a serious source of concern to the proponents of TRIPS. As Catherine Field 
states in her account of the negotiations, TRIPS was aimed to address: 
 …the lack of consistency in the level of protection, weak standards and 
uncertainty over the protection of new technologies.21  
These concerns were particularly evident in the submissions made to the Negotiation Group by 
the EC, Japan and US. For example, the EC noted: 
Specific exclusions from patentable subject matter, in particular, those relating 
to food, chemical and pharmaceutical products have exposed Community 
firms to unfair competition in certain important export markets. The fact that 
certain countries grant only process, as opposed to product, patents in the 
chemical sector can give rise to "counterfeiting" which often cannot be the 
subject of judicial proceedings.22  
Further: 
National laws limiting the lifetime of patents to sometimes wholly inadequate 
periods, such as periods of only five years, have likewise had a negative impact 
on certain exports.23  
                                               
20 Note prepared by the International Bureau of WIPO, n. 2, pp. 2-11. 
21 C. Field, ‘Negotiating for the United States’, in Watal and Taubman (eds.), n. 1, p. 129 at p. 131. 
22 Submission by the European Communities and Others, n. 3, p. 3. 
23 Ibid. 
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Similarly, Japan stated that: 
Inventions made by Japanese enterprises are used freely by third parties due to 
the impossibility of their protection by patents. Problems of "unpatentable 
subjects" (exceptions from patent protection) are especially serious, as there 
are many countries which do not grant any patents at all or grant patents only 
or the manufacturing process in such fields as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc. 
Which require a vast amount of funds for research and development.24 
Particularly with regard to the scope of patent rights, the US submitted that: 
Many countries put limitations on the rights that are offered.  For example, 
certain countries do not allow: 
(i)  Patents for new uses of known products or compounds;  
(ii)  Patents for chemical compounds or compositions. Patents are sometimes 
issued for the latter but not the former.25  
Evidently, securing patent protection for pharmaceuticals was of utmost importance to Japan, 
EC and US. Carlos Correa states that this was so important that the very existence of TRIPS is 
probably attributable to securing patent protection for pharmaceutical products.26 These patent 
law related concerns of these industrialized countries were subsequently addressed by many 
provisions in the final version of the Agreement, but most notably by Article 27. TRIPS Article 
27 substantially limited the discretion that countries had enjoyed under the Paris Convention, 
which is why Carvalho refers to it as ‘the core provision’.27 The first sentence of Article 27.1 
provides as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application.  
The general rule is that patents shall be available to inventions in all fields of technology, 
provided they are new, inventive and capable of industrial application. The two provisos 
mentioned in this provision relate to certain specific permissible exclusions. Article 27.2 
                                               
24 Ibid., p. 8. 
25 Ibid., p. 18. 
26 Correa, n. 9, p. 271. 
27 Carvalho, n. 9, p. 245 
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permits exclusions on the ground of public ordre or morality, for the protection of human, 
animal, plant life or health and the preservation of the environment. Article 27.3 allows 
exclusions for methods of treatment and inventions concerning plants, animals and micro-
organisms. Thus, no longer were WTO Members entitled to deny patents for pharmaceuticals 
or agrochemicals. This was a ‘major concession’28 made by the developing members given that 
they firmly insisted on preserving their right to exclude certain inventions in the light of vital 
public interests. This is evident from the very first Anell Draft29 and up until the Brussels Draft30 
of the Agreement, although they subsequently let go of their position between the Brussels 
Ministerial meetings and the Dunkel Draft in late 1991. Together with a uniformed patent term 
mandated by TRIPS Article 33 that requires WTO Members to provide a twenty-year term of 
patent protection and the standardized scope of rights for patented products and processes in 
Article 28, the first sentence of Article 27.1 addressed many of the apprehensions of the 
industrialized countries. 
 
Naturally, this victory on the part of the proponents of TRIPS makes one question the reason 
for including the rule against ‘discrimination’ found in the second sentence of Article 27.1 
which can now be introduced as follows: 
Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 
3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether 
products are imported or locally produced.31  
Articles 65 and 70 provide for certain transitional arrangements for developing WTO members, 
and paragraph 3 of Article 27, as explained before, specifies certain permissible patent 
exclusions for methods of treatment and other animal, plant and micro-organism related 
inventions. Subject to these specific exceptions, the second sentence of Article 27.1 lays down 
a unique non-discrimination obligation that requires patent rights to be available and enjoyable 
without ‘discrimination’ on three grounds: place of invention, field of technology and place of 
production. The ‘availability’ of patent rights refers to the patent eligibility and patentability 
                                               
28 Correa, n. 9, p. 275. 
29 GATT document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods- Status of Work in the Negotiating Group- Chairman’s Report to 
the GNG, 23 July 1990, Section 5, Article 1.5B, [hereinafter referred to as ‘Anell Draft’]. 
30 GATT document MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1, Trade Negotiations Committee- Draft Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 3 December 1990, Article 30.3.b, [hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Brussels Draft’]. 
31 Emphasis added. 
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criteria, whereas the ‘enjoyment’ of patent rights refers to the enforcement and scope of rights 
that are conferred. 
 
One cannot deny the fact that this seems strange as the patentability criteria, scope of rights and 
duration of patents have already been standardized by the other provisions of TRIPS. Those 
provisions already serve to ensure that the patentability criteria, scope of rights and the duration 
of patent protection cannot be applied differently to different fields of technology. On the other 
hand, one cannot also ignore the fact that this non-discrimination rule does not only speak of 
discrimination based on ‘fields of technology’. It even prohibits ‘discrimination’ based on the 
‘place of invention’ and ‘place of production’. This signals the fact that this non-discrimination 
norm in which the concept of ‘discrimination’ has been left completely undefined in the 
Agreement was not merely meant to reinforce the other provisions of the Agreement, but to 
address something that could not be resolved by any one of them. This is where the negotiations 
that specifically relate to the non-discrimination obligation becomes vital to comprehend. 
 
In WIPO’s communication to the Negotiation Group it had noted that in addition to the 
exclusion of certain fields of technology from the patents systems and the limitations imposed 
on the patent rights of certain fields of technology, several countries at that time had adopted 
broad mechanisms relating to compulsory licences of patented inventions. WIPO had noted that 
such mechanisms were consistent with the Paris Convention. The Paris Convention in its 
Stockholm Revision stated that: 
Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which 
might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, 
for example, failure to work.32  
Thus, there were no limitations on the right of countries to determine the grounds on which 
compulsory licences could be issued, save in the case of those issued in the event of ‘failure to 
work or insufficient working’. The Stockholm Revision of the Paris Conventions introduced 
that in such cases a licence cannot be applied for until the expiration of four years from the 
filing date, or three years from the grant of a patent, whichever is later, and should not be 
granted in any event if the patentee could justify his inaction by legitimate reasons.33 
                                               
32 Section 5A(2), The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 (as revised in Stockholm and 
amended in 1979). 
33 Ibid., Section 5A(4). 
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Nevertheless, the concept of ‘legitimate reasons’ had not been defined in the Convention and 
some countries did not accept technological and commercial obstacles as being sufficient to 
justify non-working. Accordingly, WIPO highlighted that non-voluntary licences for non-
working were provided for by the laws of ‘a vast majority’ of countries that were parties to the 
Paris Convention with the US being a ‘notable exception’.34 Additionally, WIPO highlighted 
that several countries permitted such non-voluntary licences for the following reasons: 
 
o In the public interest, 
o On grounds such as abuse of monopoly, the satisfaction of the reasonable 
requirements of the public, economic development, the development of 
international trade, the needs of export markets, the violation of antitrust 
laws, 
o In the interest of public health, or in the case of inventions relating to food 
or to medicines, 
o In the interest of national defence, 
o State use.35 
 
Such broad compulsory licences were considered to be akin to ‘distortions and impediments’ 
to trade for the more industrialized Members during the TRIPS negotiations. The most pressing 
concerns for the EC, Japan and US were the grant of non-voluntary licences due to the lack of 
or insufficient local working, which many developing Members synonymized for local 
manufacture, and the practice of automatic compulsory licences in certain jurisdictions that 
applied to certain types of products. Jayashree Watal, a representative of India, states that a 
measure that these three industrialized Members repeatedly flaunted as an example of the latter 
was India’s automatic licence of right system that applied to food and pharmaceuticals.36 These 
industrialized Members perceived such broad compulsory licencing mechanisms to be 
detrimental to their pharmaceutical industry. In its submissions to the Negotiation Group 
together with Japan and US, the EC even included a separate section titled ‘Compulsory 
Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents’, which stated as follows: 
Compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents before products have enjoyed 
the necessary minimum period of exclusivity in the market have also depressed 
sales of the patented product and had a negative impact on the recovery of the 
                                               
34 Note prepared by the International Bureau of WIPO, n. 2, p. 10. 
35 Ibid. 
36 J. Watal, ‘Patents: An Indian Perspective’, in Watal and Taubman (eds.), n. 1, p. 295 at p. 306. 
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considerable investment needed to sustain innovation in the pharmaceutical 
sector. In addition in the case of compulsory licensing the level of royalty 
obtained is often significantly lower than that which would have been 
negotiated in the context of contractual licensing. In certain countries 
compulsory licences are granted systematically without having regard to 
whether the invention is worked or not. 37  
In a similar vein, US submitted: 
Some countries issue compulsory licenses while at the same time excluding 
the foreign patent holder from importing goods covered by the patent. This can 
be particularly burdensome when the country also controls investments, so the 
foreign patentee is unable to establish a subsidiary in the country to produce 
its products. 
Compulsory licensing provisions allow a foreign government to legally revoke 
the patent holder's exclusive rights to produce the licensed product. United 
States pharmaceutical manufactures find that some countries allow 
compulsory licensing two years after the patent is granted. Other countries' 
laws actively foster compulsory licensing agreements and allow for a patent to 
lapse after two years from issue… 
…In at least one country, compulsory licenses are sometimes issued to local 
nationals despite local working by multinationals.38 
Given this detrimental impact allegedly caused by compulsory licences particularly to their 
pharmaceutical industries, limiting the availability of compulsory licences under the TRIPS 
Agreement became another significant objective for US, Japan and EC. In this context, Watal 
notes that they initially wanted to ensure that the Members adhere to the Stockholm Revision 
of the Paris Convention. She states: 
It seems that, for all three, the level of ambition on the working requirements 
and compulsory licences in 1987-8 was only to get all countries to adhere to 
the Paris Convention 1967 standard of time limits before issuing a compulsory 
licence or direct non-revocation of patents on grounds of non-working. Even 
in later submissions, when the United States wanted to limit the grounds for 
                                               
37 Submission by the European Communities and Others, n. 3, p. 4. Emphasis added. 
38 Ibid., pp. 18-19. Emphasis added. 
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compulsory licences to declared national emergency and adjudicated violation 
of antitrust laws, while not accepting such limitations for government use, the 
only prohibition the United States sought for non-working of patents was 
against revocation.39  
Subsequently, they were even more discontented with compulsory licences, perhaps 
attributable to the active lobbying by the pharmaceutical industry. This persuaded the 
industrialized Members to attempt to regulate compulsory licences even further than the Paris 
Convention by proposing provisions to explicitly recognize the ability of patentees to justify 
non-working due to ‘legal, technical or commercial reasons’.40 However, the more radical 
proposals came from US. As reflected in one of the alternative texts proposed in the Anell Draft, 
US sought to limit the grounds of issuing compulsory licences to two circumstances: to remedy 
an adjudicated violation of competition law and to address a declared national emergency.41 
 
On the other hand, the developing countries did not want their right to issue compulsory 
licences to be restricted in any manner and submitted that they should be able to issue licences 
even in the event of non-working which meant the lack of local manufacture.42 This stance that 
was traceable to the original proposal of the Group of 14 developing countries43 was even 
reflected in their proposal to the Anell Draft that provided as follows: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any PARTY from 
taking any action necessary: (i) for the working or use of a patent for 
governmental purposes; or (ii) where a patent has been granted for an invention 
capable of being used for the preparation or production of food or medicine, 
for granting to any person applying for the same a licence limited to the use of 
the invention for the purposes of the preparation or production and distribution 
of food and medicines.44  
The conflict in the proposals relating to compulsory licences is a fine example of how TRIPS 
negotiations did not only concern North-South debates, but also those between North-North. In 
relation to the endeavor of US in this context, Watal states that after the Anell Draft, the US 
                                               
39 Watal, n. 36, p. 302. 
40 Anell Draft, n. 29, Section 5A.3.2. 
41 Ibid., Section 5A.2. 
42 See for example GATT document MTN.GNG/NG11/27, Negotiating Group on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods- Meetings of Negotiating Group, 1 November 
1990- Note by the Secretariat, 14 November 1990, para. 4. 
43 See Communication from Argentina and Others, n. 6, Part II, Article 6. 
44 Anell Draft, n. 29, Section 5B. 
 22 
managed to secure the support of a number of Commonwealth countries to limit the grounds 
on which compulsory licences could be issued. She states:  
Almost overnight, India became isolated in its opposition to limiting the 
grounds for compulsory licences to remedy a declared national emergency or 
adjudicated cases of anti-competitive practices.45  
Nevertheless, this setback for countries like India was temporary. Around March 1990 India 
submitted a room document that renamed the compulsory licensing provision ‘Use Without 
Authorization of the Right Holder’, which combined provisions on compulsory licences and 
government use. The government use provision that influenced this proposal was of the US that 
recognized a significant level of power on the part of the US government to use a patented 
invention. By coupling such government use with compulsory licences, this room document 
recognized a significant level of discretion on the part of the Members to determine the grounds 
on which such licences could be issued. This proposal gained support from many countries 
including Japan, EC and Canada, as Watal notes, because the US government use provision 
was hurting their industries.46 This resulted in the US delegation failing in its attempt to limit 
the grounds for the issuance of compulsory licences. This was a major victory for the 
developing countries. However, it did not mean that measures like India’s licence of right 
system were going to survive the TRIPS Agreement as this was when the rule against 
‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 started to raise its head in the negotiations. 
 
In the days that followed, industrialized country Members continued in their attempt to 
introduce the time limits in the Stockholm Revision of the Paris Convention and to specify the 
legitimate reasons for the non-working of patented inventions. This is reflected in the Brussels 
Draft of December 1990.47 It was during this period that the concept of non-discrimination was 
first introduced into the draft texts of the Agreement. For the first time in the history of the 
negotiations, the Brussels Draft included the language of non-discrimination in the following 
manner: 
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 below, patents shall be 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
                                               
45 Watal, n. 36, p. 304. 
46 Ibid., pp. 304-306. 
47 Brussels Draft, n. 30, Article 34(n). 
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capable of industrial application.' [Patents shall be available without 
discrimination as to where the inventions were made.]48  
Non-discrimination based on the place of invention at this stage of the negotiations was to 
ensure that foreign inventors were not discriminated vis-à-vis local inventors. It was broader 
than the National Treatment obligation as it required patents to be available to both locals and 
foreigners, irrespective of where the ‘invention’ took place. However, the fact that this was 
bracketed, together with the comments accompanying the draft, demonstrated that this was not 
yet finalized. The same draft contained yet another and a more detailed non-discrimination 
provision in the section on compulsory licences. Although India’s successful intervention 
ensured that the grounds were not limited, one of the conditions for such licences in the Brussels 
Draft was as follows: 
Laws, regulations and requirements relating to such use may [not] discriminate 
between fields of technology or activity [in areas of public health, nutrition or 
environmental protection orwhere necessary for the purpose of ensuring the 
availability of a product to the public at the lowest possible price consistent 
with giving due reward for the research leading to the invention].49  
The fact that such compulsory licences should not be discriminatory was still an active issue, 
and it is strange that the commentary in the Brussels Draft did not make any mention of this. 
The second bracketed section is also interesting as it set-out the reasons why some Members 
might seek to ‘discriminate’ fields of technology in the issuance of compulsory licences. In the 
meantime, the negotiations for the more streamlined Stockholm type compulsory licensing 
mechanism for non-working was at a deadlock as the developing country Members were not 
willing to make any more compromises at this stage of the negotiations. As Piragibe dos Santos 
Tarrago, a then negotiator for Brazil explains, preserving the liberty that Brazil enjoyed under 
the Paris Convention to grant licences for non-working was vital to ensure that patent owners 
did not justify their patent monopoly by mere importation.50 As the developing country Members 
were not agreeable to the inclusion of the Stockholm criteria, nor to the softening of the 
‘legitimate reasons’ to justify non-working, Catherine Field notes that the Chair of the 
Negotiating Group proposed a compromise that was based on the trade concept of non-
discrimination. She states: 
                                               
48 Ibid., Article 30.1. Emphasis added. 
49 Ibid., Article 34(k). 
50 P. Tarragô, ‘Negotiating for Brazil’, in Watal and Taubman (eds.), n.1, p. 239 at p. 247. 
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Building on the trade concept of non-discrimination, the Chair of the 
Negotiating Group proposed compromise language that, subject to the 
transitional provisions in the agreement, “patents shall be available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field 
of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced”. 
Delegations were asked if they could live with this compromise, taking into 
account the provisions on limitations and exceptions and compulsory licences. 
This language now appears in the TRIPS Agreement.51  
As she states, this trade concept of non-discrimination found in Article 27.1 first manifested 
itself in the Dunkel Draft of the Agreement52 to reach a compromise when the negotiations were 
at a deadlock. However, its wording was such that the concept of ‘discrimination’ was given a 
very broad scope. Its manifestation in the Dunkel Draft deleted the previous draft non-
discrimination obligations found in two provisions of the Brussels Draft which specified that 
‘Patents shall be available without discrimination as to where the inventions were made’ and 
that compulsory licences should not be ‘discriminating between fields of technology or 
activity’. Those deleted provisions were subsumed into this non-discrimination norm, which 
simultaneously widened their scope. Hence, compared to the Brussels Draft, patents should not 
only be available without discrimination as to the place of invention, but ‘available and 
enjoyable’ without ‘discrimination’ on the grounds of field of technology, place of production 
and place of invention. The ground of ‘place of production’ was a completely new addition. 
More significantly, the prohibition of discrimination of ‘fields of technology’ went beyond the 
context of compulsory licences, which was originally intended under the Brussels Draft. Thus, 
as Watal notes, this wide-ranging norm ended the Indian licence of right system that applied to 
food and medicine.53 
It is in this manner that this broad concept of ‘discrimination’ found its footing in Article 27.1 
of the TRIPS Agreement. The preceding discussion shows that while specific forms of non-
discrimination were initially introduced during the negotiations to address certain issues 
concerning compulsory licences and local working requirements, its scope was abruptly 
widened by a broad concept that prohibits ‘discrimination’ with regard to the availability and 
enjoyment patent rights based on three grounds mentioned in Article 27.1. As Catherine Field 
notes, this trade concept was introduced to the field of patent law to serve as a compromise 
solution when the parties could not agree on certain rules relating to compulsory licences. This 
                                               
51 Field, n. 21, p. 142. Emphasis added. 
52 Dunkel Draft, n. 8, Article 27.1. 
53 Watal, n. 36, p. 307. 
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thesis will later show that in the absence of any similar non-discrimination norm in any other 
multilateral treaty dealing with patent law, these origins of the obligation have influenced the 
current formulation of this obligation at the WTO level in the hope of identifying the type of 
compromise that was meant to be struck by this norm. 
 
C. ‘DISCRIMINATION’ AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 
 
• POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PROHIBITING ‘DISCRIMINATION’ BASED ON 
‘FIELDS OF TECHNOLOGY’ AND ‘PLACE OF PRODUCTION’ 
 
The prohibited grounds of discrimination in Article 27.1 that have received most attention in 
the academic literature are ‘fields of technology’ and ‘place of production’. This is because the 
meaning attributable to the concept of ‘discrimination’ in these contexts has the potential to 
impede the ability of the WTO Members to utilize the policy spaces preserved under the 
Agreement and implement TRIPS’s minimum patent law standards in a manner that best fits 
their individual circumstances. The following paragraphs show that some of those policy spaces 
threatened in this manner concern a WTO Member’s ability to determine the substantive 
content of the patentability criteria, to grant compulsory licences of patented inventions and to 
permit limited exceptions to patent rights.  
 
With the patentability criteria being set-out in the first sentence of Article 27.1, the prohibition 
of ‘discrimination’ of ‘fields of technology’ with regard to the ‘availability’ of patent rights 
prevents a WTO Member from applying different patentability criteria to different fields of 
technology. Gervais notes that it prohibits the treatment of different inventions in a different 
manner when examining their patentability.54 Thus, a WTO Member cannot, for example, use 
different patentability criteria to inventions in the field of biotechnology. However, many 
academics including Gervais himself notes that this does not prevent a member from applying 
the patentability criteria set-out in Article 27.1 in a way that accords differential treatment to 
fields of technology as the concepts of novelty, inventive step and industrial application are by 
themselves left undefined under the Agreement.55 As Carlos Correa states: 
                                               
54 Gervais, n. 9, p. 430. 
55 Ibid. 
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 …the determination of the ways in which these patentability standards are 
interpreted and applied is one of the most important flexibilities left by the 
TRIPS Agreement.56  
Similarly, the UNCTAD- ICTSD Resource Book on TRIPS provides that: 
Members have considerable leeway in applying those three criteria.57  
Hence, although a member cannot add unique patentability conditions for biotech inventions, 
they are entitled to, for example, construe and apply the requirement of ‘industrial application’ 
in a manner that addresses a specific concern in the field of biotechnology.58 However, requiring 
patents to be available without ‘discrimination’ implies that there is a limit to which this could 
be done, which in turn depends on the meaning attributable to the concept of ‘discrimination’. 
This is the reason why Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss note that the non-
discrimination obligation has the potential to circumscribe this ability of the national courts, 
legislators and administrators to ‘tailor patent protection’ in a manner that reflects the differing 
concerns in different industries.59  
 
In relation to the prohibition of ‘discrimination’ of ‘fields of technology’ with regard to the 
‘enjoyment’ of patent rights, its impact on the ability of the membership to make limited 
exceptions (Article 30) and grant compulsory licences (Article 31) was explicitly 
acknowledged by the Panel in Canada- Pharmaceuticals.60 In this dispute that is more fully 
discussed in the next Chapter, the European Community alleged that Canada’s regulatory 
review and stockpiling exceptions violated the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 
27.1 as they only applied to pharmaceutical products.61 In its defence Canada argued, inter alia, 
that the non-discrimination obligation did not apply to limited exceptions as the latter is 
regulated by a separate provision (Article 30) that makes no reference to this obligation.62 The 
Panel noted in its Report that there was nothing in Article 27.1 to show that the non-
discrimination obligation was subject to either Article 30 or Article 31. As limited exceptions 
                                               
56 C. Correa, ‘Patent Rights’, in C. Correa and A. Yusuf (eds.), Intellectual Property and International Trade: The 
TRIPs Agreement, Third edition, Kluwer Law International BV, 2016, p. 263 at p. 281. Emphasis added. 
57 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development and UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development (eds.), Resource Book on 
TRIPS and Development, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 348. Emphasis added. 
58 See, for e.g. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on The Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, Article 5(3).  
59 G. Dinwoodie and R. Dreyfuss, ‘Diversifying without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandate of the TRIPS 
Agreement’, Mich. Telecomm. & Tech L. Rev., vol. 13, no. 2, 2007, p. 445 at p. 447. 
60 Panel Report, Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R. 
61 Ibid., para. 4.3-4.5. 
62 Ibid., para. 4.16. 
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and compulsory licences affect the enjoyment of patent rights as much as any other measure, 
the Panel noted that such measures should also comply with the non-discrimination obligation.63  
 
This scope of the non-discrimination obligation has been heavily criticized. It has been 
contended that adhering to the non-discrimination obligation prevents an exception from being 
‘limited’ under of Article 30. Therefore, that it intrudes the ability of the WTO Members to 
make limited exceptions. As Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss state: 
requiring exemptions to be available for all forms of technology as a matter of 
international law could distort domestic law by inducing national legislators to 
adopt exemptions that are broader than necessary. This outcome would also 
conflict with the basic thrust of Article 30, which expressly requires any given 
exemption to be "limited."… 
…In the end then, for these and a series of other reasons that we have written 
about at length, we think the Panel was wrong to subject exemptions to the 
technological neutrality condition.64  
Even in respect of compulsory licences, Correa argues that subjecting Article 31 to the non-
discrimination obligation is incorrect as it is only logical to limit certain modalities of 
compulsory licences to particular fields of technology.65 These criticisms concerning the scope 
of the non-discrimination norm have even resulted in the Court of Justice of the European Union 
to doubt the Panel’s opinion,66 all of which demonstrate the potential of this particular facet of 
the non-discrimination obligation to affect the ability of the WTO Members to grant limited 
exceptions and compulsory licences. 
 
In a similar vein, the non-discrimination obligation vis-à-vis the ‘place production’ has caused 
much debate as to whether the ability of the Members to grant compulsory licences for the lack 
of or insufficient ‘local manufacture’ of inventions has still been preserved under the TRIPS 
Agreement. Correa states that: 
The interpretation of this part of the provision is perhaps the most 
controversial. Although this proposition has been understood as prohibiting 
                                               
63 Ibid., para. 7.88-7.93. 
64 Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, n. 59, p. 449. 
65 Correa, n. 9, p. 283 
66 See for example, Monsanto Technology LLC v. Cefetra BV (2010), Case C-428/08, 2010 E.C.R 7, in which the 
European Court of Justice effectively held that 'limited exceptions' to patent rights are not subject to the non-
discrimination rule in TRIPS Article 27.1. 
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any obligation to locally work a patented invention and the possibility of 
granting compulsory licences due to lack or insufficient working, this 
interpretation is not based on a literal reading of the text.67 
In a rather unique reading of this part of the rule, Correa suggests that ‘products’ in this part of 
Article 27.1 only a refers to ‘infringing products’ rather than the patentee’s own products. 
Therefore, that the grant of a compulsory licence due to the patentee’s failure to work an 
invention within a given jurisdiction does not fall within the scope of this ground of 
‘discrimination’. Correa states that in any event, TRIPS Article 7 that identifies the objective 
of promoting technology transfer foresees the grant of compulsory licences for non-working.68 
Similarly, Justin Malbon, Charles Lawson and Mark Davison state that the broad wording of 
the TRIPS provision on compulsory licences (Article 31) is a recognition of the broad discretion 
that members have to grant compulsory licences and that this was confirmed by the Doha 
Declaration that recognizes the freedom on part of the WTO Members to determine the grounds 
upon which compulsory licences could be issued.69  
 
On the contrary, Gervais relies on TRIPS Article 28 that gives a patentee the exclusive right to 
prevent third parties from ‘importing’ the patented product or products obtained by a patented 
process, and states that TRIPS indicates that importation must be accepted among the 
membership as a ‘legally effective working’ of a patent under national law.70 The most extreme 
opinion in this regard is that of Carvalho who disagrees with Correa’s interpretation of this 
norm and Bodenhausen’s explanation that ‘working’ in the context of the Paris Convention was 
the local manufacture of an invention. He states that the non-discrimination rule plainly 
prohibits the grant of compulsory licences based on local working, and that in any event, 
importation should be sufficient to prevent the grant of such licences. In his words: 
What Article 27.1 does is to prohibit WTO Members to oblige patentees to 
work patents (in the sense of manufacturing the claimed products and/or using 
the claimed process) within their territories. In a nutshell, Article 27.1 says 
that, where patent owners are obliged to work their patents, they may provide 
evidence of compliance with such an obligation through the importation of the 
                                               
67 Correa, n. 9, p. 284. Emphasis added. 
68 Ibid., pp. 285-286. 
69 Malbon et al., n. 16, p. 497. 
70 Gervais, n. 9, p. 433. 
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patented articles or the importation of products manufactured directly with the 
patented processes.71  
There are several other academics who take middle ground between these two extreme 
perspectives, a notable one of which is that of Thomas Cottier, Shahiza Lalani and 
Michelangelo Temmerman. They argue that there is no ‘discrimination’ within the meaning of 
Article 27.1 if a measure addresses an abusive failure on the part of a patentee to work an 
invention, which should be determined in the light of the economic factors pertaining to a given 
Member.72 The examination of all the other academic commentaries dealing with this issue is 
beyond the purposes of this section, which was only intended to highlight the potential that 
TRIPS’s non-discrimination norm has to impede the ability of the Members to grant 
compulsory licences due to non-working which was beyond any agreement during the 
negotiations.  
 
This concerning potential of the non-discrimination obligation to inhibit these ‘flexibilities’ in 
TRIPS potentially prevents the WTO Members from striving to achieve the requisite balance 
necessitated by the Objectives and Principles of the Agreement. This is the balance that Antony 
Taubman rightly notes, between the protection intellectual property rights and the ability of the 
membership to pursue other vital public policies.73 The following section examines how these 
potential intrusions could specifically impact public health and technology transfer, which are 
two policies that have been explicitly mentioned in the Objectives and Principles highlighting 
the significance of their protection and promotion for the balance that the Agreement seeks to 
achieve. 
 
• PUBLIC HEALTH AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
In the preceding discussion of the negotiations that crafted the patent section of TRIPS it was 
highlighted that the Group 14 developing countries presented a proposal to the TRIPS 
Negotiation Group in May 1990.74 Part II of this document dealt with substantive norms relating 
to the protection of intellectual property. Article 2 of this Part entitled ‘Principles’ contained 
four sub-articles, which according to Santos Tarragô, highlighted the deep concerns of the 
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73 Taubman, n. 10, p. 17. 
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developing countries and formed the genesis of the current Articles 7 (Objectives) and 8 
(Principles) of the Agreement.75 Of the numerous objectives mentioned in Article 7 one that was 
repeatedly highlighted by the developing countries during the negotiations was technology 
transfer. As the developed countries who demanded high standards of intellectual property 
protection did not have such standards during the periods in which they achieved economic 
prosperity, the developing countries contended that they would be agreeable to the high 
standards of protection only if they could be assured of economic and technological 
development in this process. In the context of patent law, the mechanism that the developing 
countries repeatedly cited as being vital for such purposes was the local working of patented 
inventions, the  lack of which was considered to be an ‘abuse’ of the patent system.76 This was 
a mechanism that at least they believed to be still legitimate under the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
While there is some uncertainty as to whether compulsory licences can be issued under TRIPS 
for a patentee’s ‘mere’ failure to work an invention, there is considerable agreement that the 
abusive failure to do so should entitle a member to grant such a licence.77 As Cottier and others 
have pointed out, whether a patentee abuses his right in this context is necessarily dependent 
on the economic factors of a country that would serve to justify the need for local manufacture 
to meet the objectives of technology transfer in TRIPS Article 7.78 In fact, the jurisprudence in 
India relating to its compulsory licensing scheme shows that patentees could satisfy the local 
working requirement by importation, provided they could adduce sufficient evidence to show 
why the invention could not be locally manufactured.79 With the significance that developing 
country Members continue to give compulsory licences to address the lack of local working of 
patented inventions with the intention of attaining the objectives of TRIPS, the non-
discrimination rule that prohibits ‘discrimination’ based on the ‘place of production’ tends to 
cause discomfort. By preventing ‘discrimination’, together with the right of importation in 
Article 28, it has been argued that importation must be sufficient to satisfy any local working 
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requirements. If such were the case, it effectively undermines the objective of ensuring 
technology transfer by proscribing a mechanism which the developing countries were insistent 
in utilizing for this purpose. As highlighted in Part B, the developing countries were clearly not 
agreeable to any limitations on their ability to grant compulsory licences during the TRIPS 
negotiations which in fact led to the creation of this ‘non-discrimination’ obligation.  
 
Public health is another vital public policy that is explicitly mentioned in the TRIPS Agreement. 
Article 8.1 entitled ‘Principles’ explicitly recognizes the ability of the Members to adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health, provided such measures are consistent with the 
Agreement. The fact that such a provision proposed by the developing countries survived the 
entire TRIPS negotiations demonstrates that the negotiators foresaw that overzealous 
intellectual property protection could impede other equally or even more significant public 
policies such as public health. Hence, the presence of such provisions in TRIPS support 
Taubman’s vision that TRIPS was not a consequence of trade trumping over human rights, 
environment or other vital interests, but a specie of an intricate balance between such 
competing interests. Given that the ability of the WTO Members to address vital policies like 
public health are found in a seperate provision of the Agreement, and therefore, likely to be 
overlooked in the interpretation of the other provisions of TRIPS, the Ministerial Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health confirmed their interpretational significance for all 
the provisions by stating that each provision of TRIPS must be interpreted in the light of the 
Agreement’s Objectives (Article 7) and Principles (Article 8).80 Particularly in relation to public 
health, the Ministers also declared that the Agreement ‘does not and should not’ prevent WTO 
Members from taking measures to protect public health.81 
 
In one of his first works dealing with the TRIPS Agreement and public health, Carlos Correa 
explained why developing countries should pay greater attention to public health in the process 
of complying with the minimum standards of the TRIPS Agreement.82 In a manner that is still 
relevant today, Correa stated that a large part of the world’s population does not have access to 
essential medicines, that they are poor, cannot afford medication, which altogether result in 
them having shorter life expectancies and high rates of mortality. Therefore, he identified that 
the answer lies in well calibrated national health, pharmaceutical and patent policies.83 Before 
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he proceeded to explain some general approaches that these countries could use to devise more 
health-sensitive patent systems, he identified the non-discrimination rule in Article 27.1 as 
being an obstacle. In his words: 
Article 27.1 of the TRIPs Agreement bans any discrimination, in either the 
recognition or exercise of patent rights, based on the field of technology. This 
means that both negative discrimination (e.g., reducing the rights available to 
pharmaceutical patent holders) and positive discrimination (broadening such 
rights) may be deemed TRIPs-inconsistent.84  
On a rather simple premise that differentiation does not constitute ‘discrimination’ under this 
provision,85 Correa went on to suggest some pragmatic instruments that members may adopt. 
The next Chapter of this thesis explains the reasons why Correa’s premise that differentiation 
is not ‘discrimination’ does not draw a complete picture of the non-discrimination obligation. 
Therefore, this distinction does not necessarily render the measures suggested by him to be 
consistent with the non-discrimination obligation. Nonetheless, this section discusses some of 
the most significant proposals that Correa made to demonstrate that WTO Members have in 
fact adopted national measures that could be traced to his suggestions and that their consistency 
with the non-discrimination obligation fundamentally rests on what constitutes ‘discrimination’ 
in the context of this obligation relating to fields of technology.  
 
In the context of patent eligibility, Correa states that WTO Members are not obliged to 
recognize first and second medical use patents.86 In fact, India is one such Member that does not 
recognize patents for medical indications. Section 3(d) of its Patent Act, inter alia, provides 
that a ‘new use of known substance’ is not an invention. Correa also suggests that countries are 
entitled to refuse patents that are purely directed at genes, whether isolated or in purified form, 
by relying on the distinction between discoveries and inventions.87 This is currently a point of 
intense debate in the more developed parts of the world where they have made significant 
progress in the field of biotechnology. After several years of the US Patent Office being in the 
practice of granting patents for isolated gene sequences, the US Supreme Court decided in 2013 
that the mere isolation of a gene is not an ‘invention’ as the subject matter of such alleged 
invention is no different to that which exists in nature.88 
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With regard to the ‘inventive step’ requirement, Correa states that countries may use an 
‘obvious to try’ concept in the pharmaceutical and chemical fields, as there is often: 
… a close structural relationship between a compound which is claimed as new 
and inventive, and known compounds, such as salts of acids, bases, isomers, 
and homologues.89  
In fact, the US Courts utilize a concept known as ‘lead compounds’ to ascertain the 
inventiveness of pharmaceutical and chemical inventions in this manner. As Guyan Liang 
highlights, the US Federal Courts use this concept to draw a presumption of obviousness when 
the invention is structurally similar to a lead compound in the prior art and it would have been 
obvious to a skilled artisan to choose that particular lead compound for modification.90 However, 
Liang also states that it is a concept that is applied very cautiously by the Courts and requires a 
high standard of proof to render an invention ‘obvious’. In his words: 
This is a very high standard, which has not been met by any CAFC case 
challenging the validity of a compound claim. Structural similarity alone does 
not suffice, according to the CAFC, because the court assumed that properties 
of chemical compounds are unpredictable and that similar structures do not 
always lead to similar properties.91 
A similar concept is legislatively provided for in the Indian Patent Act, although this is done in 
the context of patentable subject matter. Section 3(d) of the Patent Act provides that the mere 
discovery of a new form of a known substance is not patentable unless there is an ‘enhancement 
of the known efficacy’ of the substance. Thus, derivative pharmaceutical inventions that build 
on compounds belonging to the prior art not patentable without proof of ‘enhanced efficacy’.92 
 
In relation to the concept of ‘industrial application’, Correa states that countries may use it to 
‘avoid the proliferation of patents that may unduly jeopardize innovation and competition in 
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the health sector’.93 He does not explain as to how this could be done, but a practice in Canada 
that was used to ascertain the utility of inventions up until very recently showed the potential 
of this proposal.94 Canada used a concept known as the ‘promise doctrine’ to ascertain the utility 
of an invention that specifies a specific utility or effect.95 The literature and case-law suggest 
that the Canadian Courts were inclined to generate such ‘promises’ particularly in the case of 
pharmaceutical inventions. The construction of a promise heightened the standard of utility that 
must be disclosed in those patent applications as that promise had to be demonstrated or 
‘soundly predicted’ at the time of filing for patent.96 The impact this was having on 
pharmaceutical inventions was such that Norman Siebrasse notes that of all the cases in which 
the ‘promise doctrine’ was a determinative issue since 2005, only two were not 
pharmaceuticals.97  
 
Finally, with respect to compulsory licences, Correa states that WTO Members are entitled to 
grant compulsory licences for ‘essential drugs’ given that the World Health Organization has 
signified their importance to developing countries.98 Although ‘essential drugs’ falls within the 
ambit of pharmaceutical technology, Correa claims that this would not amount to 
‘discrimination’ of a ‘field of technology’ as it would be limited to pharmaceuticals that are of 
utmost importance to public health.99 Although to the author’s knowledge there is no WTO 
Member that has adopted a compulsory licensing scheme that is specifically directed towards 
a list of drugs categorized as being ‘essential’ by the WHO, many Members currently recognize 
certain grounds for the grant compulsory licences that mainly affect pharmaceutical patents. 
For example, the Indian Patent Act provides that a compulsory licence could be issued when 
‘the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price’.100 In a 
much-commended decision, which is also criticized in other parts of the world, the Controller 
of Patents issued a compulsory licence in 2012 to Natco Pharma for Bayer’s Nexavar drug, 
inter alia, on the basis that Bayer’s cancer drug that was being sold at Rs. 280,000 a month was 
‘undoubtedly’ not made available to the public at a ‘reasonably affordable price’.101 The 
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Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) upheld this decision highlighting the importance 
of the right to life and health.102 Similarly, even the French Intellectual Property Law Code 
entitles the Minister of Industrial Property to issue ‘ex officio licences’ in the interest of ‘public 
health demands’ at the request of the Minister of Health. It specifically states that the provision 
only applies to drugs and medical devices.103 
 
As these instruments suggested by Correa are primarily directed towards pharmaceuticals, their 
compatibility with the wide-ranging rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in 
TRIPS Article 27.1 rests on the meaning attributable to the concept of ‘discrimination’ in this 
context. In fact, several national measures that could be traced to Correa’s recommendations 
have been criticized and even challenged by the pharmaceutical industry for violating the non-
discrimination obligation on the basis that they are disadvantageous to the industry. The 
following Chapters will demonstrate that merely relying on differentiation to defend such 
measures is not that simple as originally suggested by Correa as the manner in which this non-
discrimination norm has been worded gives it an extensive scope of application. At the same 
time, however, reason suggests that a downright prohibition of measures aimed towards the 
protection of public health would not only render patent systems of several WTO Members to 
be inconsistent with TRIPS, but more pressingly, it would destroy the intricate balance that has 
been craftily knitted into the TRIPS Agreement between intellectual property protection and 
other public interests. Therefore, identifying the manner in which such measures could comply 




This analysis of the negotiations that led to the final version of the non-discrimination 
obligation in Article 27.1 and the discussion relating to the concerns surrounding this obligation 
show its potential to affect the delicate balance between intellectual property protection and 
other societal interests that TRIPS seeks to achieve. While all the grounds of discrimination 
mentioned in Article 27.1 have the potential to affect this balance, its facet relating to ‘fields of 
technology’ in particular has the potential to impede the ability of the WTO Members to define 
and apply the patentability criteria, craft limited exceptions and even to determine the grounds 
of compulsory licences. This is the ground in which the trade concept of non-discrimination 
affects patent law most deeply and this is why this thesis focuses on the ground of ‘fields of 
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technology’. Uncertainty as to what constitutes ‘discrimination’ in this context affects the 
ability of the Members to comply with TRIPS’s patent law obligations in a manner that best 
fits their domestic circumstances, that could in turn affect the balance that TRIPS mandates 
between intellectual property protection and other important societal interests. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WTO JURISPRUDENCE AND ACADEMIC COMMENTARY 
ON THE NON-DISCRIMINATION OBLIGATION 
 
Since the TRIPS Agreement came into force in 1994, only eleven disputes initiated at the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) relate to the Agreement’s patent law obligations. Of the eleven 
disputes that have been so initiated, only three have generated Panel or Appellate Body Reports. 
Surprisingly, only one of them has ever substantively dealt with the non-discrimination 
obligation in Article 27.1. This isolated Report is that of a WTO Panel in Canada- Protection 
of Pharmaceutical Patents (2000)1 and it entails the only formulation of this obligation at the 
WTO level. This Chapter examines this Panel Report and its formulation of this obligation to 
highlight the gaps in the Report and the academic literature that concerning the Panel’s concept 
of ‘justification’ in relation to the ground of ‘fields of technology’. 
 
Accordingly, Part A discusses the facts in Canada- Pharmaceuticals pertaining to the non-
discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1, the Panel’s formulation of this obligation and 
its application to the facts in the dispute. Part B highlights the significance of the Panel’s 
concept of ‘justification’ and scrutinizes the academic literature that followed the Report to 
highlight that although much has been written about the Panel’s recognition of autonomy on 
the part of the WTO Members to subject fields of technology to differential treatment, the 
literature has not appreciated that the type of autonomy that the Panel sought to have preserved 
fundamentally rests on its concept of ‘justification’. Finally, Part C entails a brief conclusion 
highlighting the need for a more detailed analysis of this concept that is undertaken in the 
following of Chapters of this work. 
 
A. THE WTO PANEL’S FORMULATION OF ‘DISCRIMINATION’ 
 
To bring its patent law into conformity with its international obligations under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the TRIPS Agreement, Canada made several 
amendments to its patent laws in 1992 and 1993. These amendments cumulatively extended the 
term of patent protection for all inventions to twenty years, allowed product patents for 
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pharmaceutical inventions and introduced exceptions to patent rights in lieu of the laxer 
compulsory licensing scheme that had been applied to pharmaceuticals since 1923.2 Two 
exceptions that were so introduced were the regulatory review and stockpiling exceptions 
respectively provided for in Sections 55.2(1) and 55.2(2) of the Canadian Patents Act. The 
regulatory review exception permitted any person to make, use or sell any invention for a 
purpose that is ‘reasonably related to the development and submission of information required 
under the law of Canada, a province or a country other than Canada that regulated the 
manufacture, construction use or sale of any product’. The stockpiling exception went one step 
further and permitted any person to manufacture and store products for which regulatory 
approval had been sought for a period set by regulations for the purpose of selling the products 
immediately after the expiration of the patent. The regulations made by the Minister concerned 
provided for the stockpiling exception to be applicable to pharmaceutical inventions for a period 
of six months immediately preceding the expiration of the patent.  
 
The European Communities (EC) disputed these provisions and requested consultations with 
Canada in 1997 alleging that they were inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Consequently, 
EC requested the DSB to establish a Panel and in its complaint alleged that the stockpiling 
exception was inconsistent with Article 28.1 and Article 33 as it effectively allowed any person 
to work the invention during the last six months of the patent term. It claimed that this was 
contrary to the exclusive rights set-out in Article 28.1 and reduced the duration of 
pharmaceutical patents to nineteen years and six months as opposed to the twenty years required 
for all patents under TRIPS Article 33.3 As the regulations had only provided for the application 
of the stockpiling exception for pharmaceuticals, EC further alleged that it violated the rule 
against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in Article 27.1 because it treated 
pharmaceuticals less favourably than inventions in other fields of technology.4 
 
With reference to the regulatory review exception, EC argued that it was unlimited in duration, 
quantity, extent and only vaguely regulated with reference to the objective of the permitted 
activity. It alleged that this violated Article 28.1 by permitting very significant quantities of the 
patented product to be manufactured, imported and sold without the consent of the patent holder 
during the entire term of the patent.5 It also alleged that although this exception was not 
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explicitly limited to pharmaceutical inventions, the legislative history and practice showed that 
it was meant to, and did in fact, apply only to pharmaceutical inventions, thereby violating the 
non-discrimination obligation in Article 27.1. It noted that this was particularly so as the 
regulatory review exception did not apply to inventions in other fields of technology such as 
agricultural chemical products, foodstuff, aircraft, ships, or motor vehicles that were similarly 
regulated in Canada.6 Although EC made these allegations based on the non-discrimination 
obligation in Article 27.1, it did not propose an interpretation of the obligation either in its 
complaint or subsequent arguments, except for stating on numerous occasions that the measures 
in question were discriminatory because they treated pharmaceutical inventions less 
favourably.  
 
Canada sought to defend these allegations on a number of grounds. Firstly, it argued that its 
exceptions constituted ‘limited exceptions’ in terms of Article 30, and therefore, that the 
limitation of the rights set-out in Article 28.1 were justified.7 Secondly, it argued that its 
exceptions did not violate the non-discrimination obligation for either of two reasons: the non-
discrimination obligation refers to ‘patent rights’ in Article 28 that can be subject to ‘limited 
exceptions’ in Article 30, and therefore, the rule itself is subservient to the ‘limited exceptions’ 
provision,8 or the Canadian exceptions were not discriminatory in any event because they were 
not associated with any particular field of technology.9 With regard to the first of these sub-
arguments, Canada argued that if the non-discrimination rule applies to Article 30 it would 
require ‘across-the-board’ derogations of patent rights that would by itself prevent exceptions 
from being ‘limited’ within the meaning of Article 30.10 Further, that such an ‘absolute’ scope 
of the obligation as proposed by the EC would deprive the WTO Members of the ability to: 
… create appropriate solutions for specific problems on a case-by-case (or 
product group by product group) basis, and instead obliged them to impose 
universally applicable measures which could be entirely inappropriate in most 
contexts.11 
Finally, with regard to the Article 33 allegations, Canada argued that its exceptions did not 
impair the rights of patentees to exploit the patent by themselves for the full term of the patent.12 
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The Panel initiated its analysis by highlighting that EC had the burden of establishing a prima 
facie case that Canada violated any of the TRIPS provisions.13 With a controversial 
interpretation of Article 30 that deals with ‘limited exceptions’ to patent rights, the Panel found 
that EC had established a prima facie case of inconsistency as it had provided sufficient 
evidence to show that the stockpiling exception was not ‘limited’.14 Hence, the Panel did not 
even scrutinize the consistency of the stockpiling exception with the non-discrimination 
obligation as it was inconsistent with the Agreement in any event. However, the Panel found 
that the regulatory review exception complied with Article 30 and constituted a limited 
exception, and therefore, proceeded to scrutinize its consistency with the non-discrimination 
obligation in Article 27.1.15  
 
The Panel stated that the primary purpose of the non-discrimination obligation was to eliminate 
the restrictions placed on the availability of patent rights and the practice of automatic 
compulsory licensing that specifically affected pharmaceuticals and certain other products in 
the pre-TRIPS era.16 It refused to accept Canada’s contention that the non-discrimination 
obligation was subject to Article 30 by stating that the words ‘patent rights’ in Article 27.1 is 
not qualified by any term or provision. Therefore, it explained that: 
A discriminatory exception that takes away enjoyment of a patent right is 
discrimination as much as is discrimination in the basic rights themselves.17  
Nor did the Panel agree with Canada that this would necessitate ‘across-the-board’ exceptions. 
In an interesting explanation of the co-relation between the non-discrimination obligation and 
Article 30, the Panel stated that an exception does not necessarily satisfy the condition of being 
‘limited’ by merely being applicable to one field of technology.18 Thus, potentially 
‘discriminating’ a field of technology with regard to the applicability of an exception does not 
necessarily make it ‘limited’ in terms of Article 30. It also noted that Article 27.1 does not 
always require all exceptions to be applicable to all products. In the words of the Panel: 
… it is not true that Article 27 requires all Article 30 exceptions to be applied 
to all products. Article 27 prohibits only discrimination as to the place of 
invention, the field of technology, and whether products are imported or 
                                               
13 Ibid., para. 7.16. 
14 Ibid., para. 7.24-7.38. 
15 Ibid., para. 7.39-7.84. 
16 Ibid., para. 7.90. 
17 Ibid., para. 7.91. 
18 Ibid., para. 7.92. 
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produced locally. Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with 
problems that may exist only in certain product areas.19  
While the Panel’s perspective of the relationship between the two provisions is complex to 
comprehend, which is perhaps the reason why this opinion has been criticized in the academic 
commentaries as will be demonstrated in the next Part of this Chapter, the above quoted passage 
highlights that there is a distinction between the ‘discrimination’ of a field of technology and 
‘bona fide exceptions that deal with particular problems in certain product areas’. The upshot 
of this, technically at least, is that there could be exceptions directed at only one field of 
technology that would not be considered to be ‘discriminatory’ under Article 27.1. It will be 
demonstrated in the next Part of this Chapter that it is this section of the Report that has been 
repeatedly cited in the literature as acknowledging some form of autonomy on the part of 
Members to subject fields of technology to differential treatment without violating the rule 
against ‘discrimination’. 
 
Finding that even ‘limited exceptions’ should abide by the rule against ‘discrimination’, the 
Panel began its analysis as to whether it had been violated by Canada. It began by noting that 
the concept of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 is broader than the specific types of 
discrimination addressed by the National Treatment (NT) and Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) 
treatment obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.20 This was quite apparent as Article 27.1 
prohibits a broad notion of ‘discrimination’, unlike the NT and MFN obligations in TRIPS that 
do not even use the word ‘discrimination’. Notwithstanding this wide breadth of the concept, 
the Panel stated that ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 refers to: 
… a normative term, pejorative in connotation, referring to results of the 
unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment.21  
Most of the literature dealing with the Panel Report have not recognized that this passage of the 
Panel takes precedence over its statement that the non-discrimination obligation does not 
prohibit ‘bona fide exceptions’. The Panel made the latter statement only in the context of 
identifying the scope of the obligation, whereas the passage quoted above that is referred to as 
the ‘formulation’ of the obligation here onwards, directly concerns the concept of 
‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1. In terms of this formulation, which the Panel appears to have 
suggested as being relevant for all the grounds of discrimination in Article 27.1, conferring 
                                               
19 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
20 Ibid., para. 7.94. 
21 Ibid., Emphasis added. 
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disadvantageous treatment on a field of technology does not necessarily constitute 
‘discrimination’. Such treatment would violate this obligation only if it were ‘unjustified’. 
Clearly, the Panel either introduced a concept of ‘justification’ into this substantive obligation 
or noted that it is inherent in any such non-discrimination obligation within the WTO’s 
multilateral framework. Whatever the Panel meant to do, it demonstrated that there was a 
concept of ‘justification’ that lingered within the notion of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1. The 
significance of this concept will be more fully addressed in the next Part of this Chapter, but it 
suffices to note at this juncture that the Report lacked any explanation as to how such a concept 
found its way into this obligation that facially prohibits any ‘discrimination’ that affects the 
availability or enjoyment of patent rights on the three grounds specified in Article 27.1 or as to 
how such a concept ought to operate at least in the context of ‘fields of technology’. 
 
The Panel also stated that such ‘discrimination’ could be explicit (de jure) and implicit (de 
facto): 
Discrimination may arise from explicitly different treatment, sometimes called 
"de jure discrimination", but it may also arise from ostensibly identical 
treatment which, due to differences in circumstances, produces differentially 
disadvantageous effects, sometimes called "de facto discrimination".22  
In fact, EC alleged that the Canadian regulatory review exception ‘discriminated’ 
pharmaceuticals explicitly and implicitly. The Panel noted that although these features of 
discrimination have been interpreted and applied in various other GATT (General Agreement 
on Tariff and Trade) and WTO provisions, that their interpretation in TRIPS Article 27.1 could 
be more complex. It stated that: 
These rulings have addressed the question whether measures were in conflict 
with various GATT or WTO provisions prohibiting variously defined forms of 
discrimination. As the Appellate Body has repeatedly made clear, each of these 
rulings has necessarily been based on the precise legal text in issue, so that it 
is not possible to treat them as applications of a general concept of 
discrimination. Given the very broad range of issues that might be involved in 
defining the word "discrimination" in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
Panel decided that it would be better to defer attempting to define that term at 
the outset, but instead to determine which issues were raised by the record 
                                               
22 Ibid. 
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before the Panel, and to define the concept of discrimination to the extent 
necessary to resolve those issues.23  
Acknowledging such complexity, the Panel proceeded to examine the de jure and de facto 
allegations of discrimination. With regard to the de jure claim, the Panel found that the 
legislative history relating to the regulatory review exception showed that it was not meant to 
be limited to pharmaceuticals and that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary: 
… the words of the statute compelled the Panel to accept Canada's assurance 
that the exception was legally available to every product that was subject to 
marketing approval requirements.24  
Thus, the Panel found that EC had failed to establish a de jure case of discrimination as it was 
not explicitly applicable only to pharmaceuticals. With regard to the de facto claim, the Panel 
noted that such a measure should either have a discriminatory effect or a discriminatory 
purpose.25 It stated that a measure would have a discriminatory effect if there was ‘some 
practical reason’ as to why it only disadvantaged one field of technology in reality.26 It found 
that EC had not produced any evidence to show that the regulatory review exception only served 
to disadvantage pharmaceutical inventions.27 In relation to discriminatory purpose, the Panel 
noted that there should be some objective indications relating to the measure from which it 
could be ‘inferred’ that the measure had discriminatory objectives.28 Again, it found that EC had 
not produced any such evidence.29 Accordingly, the Panel concluded its scrutiny of Article 27.1 
finding that EC had not established a prima facie case that the Canadian regulatory review 
exception was ‘discriminatory’. 
 
B. THE CONCEPT OF ‘JUSTIFICATION’ AND THE ACADEMIC 
COMMENTARY 
 
The examination of the Panel Report in Canada- Pharmaceuticals shows how little the Panel 
revealed about its concept of ‘justification’. Its significance, however, should not be 
underestimated. The Panel appears to have suggested that differential treatment that is 
                                               
23 Ibid., para. 7.98. Emphasis added. 
24 Ibid., para. 7.99. Emphasis added. 
25 Ibid., para. 7.101. 
26 Ibid., para. 7.102. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., para. 7.101. 
29 Ibid., para. 7.104. 
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disadvantageous constitutes ‘discrimination’ under Article 27.1 unless it is ‘justified’. Hence, 
any autonomy that the Panel sought to have preserved in its formulation, if not wholly, 
fundamentally rests on its concept of ‘justification’. By introducing such a concept into its 
formulation, it appears to have sensed that this obligation had to be balanced against some form 
of autonomy on the part of the membership. In other words, that the rule against 
‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 is not absolute. As the facts of the dispute did not permit the 
Panel to expand on this concept, the Report left much uncertainty as to the type of autonomy 
that it is meant to preserve or as to how it ought to operate in the context of the ground of ‘fields 
of technology’. 
 
The academic commentary concerning the rule against ‘discrimination’ of ‘fields of 
technology’ that followed the Panel Report rightly identified that the Panel sought to 
acknowledge some autonomy on the part Members to pursue important policy objectives in the 
context of this obligation. However, the literature has not appreciated the significance of the 
Panel’s concept of ‘justification’ in this process. Consequently, the uncertainties that the Panel 
left in its Report relating to this concept have escaped adequate scrutiny even in the academic 
literature, leaving a fundamental gap in the understanding of the rule against the 
‘discrimination’ of fields of technology relating to how it must be balanced against such 
autonomy of the Members. 
 
In his seminal commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, Carlos Correa has criticized the Panel’s 
opinion that Article 30 (limited exceptions) and Article 31(compulsory licenses) should comply 
with the non-discrimination obligation. He states that it only seems ‘logical’ to limit certain 
exceptions or modalities of compulsory licenses to certain fields of technology, which would 
be prevented by such a scope of this obligation.30 He also refers to an ‘interesting statement’ of 
the Panel in which it apparently made a distinction between ‘discrimination’ and 
‘differentiation’.31 The passage of the Report that he cites for this proposition is not that which 
relates to the Panel’s formulation of ‘discrimination’ (that it is the unjustified imposition of 
differentially disadvantageous treatment), but to the part in which the Panel stated that 
‘discrimination’ does not prohibit ‘bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may exist 
only in certain product areas’.32 Observably, the Panel did not make a distinction between 
                                               
30 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 283. 
31 Ibid., p. 282. 
32 This was the distinction the Panel made after holding that TRIPS Article 30 is subject to the non-discrimination 
rule in Article 27.1. See Panel Report, Canada- Pharmaceuticals, n. 1, para. 7.92. 
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‘discrimination’ and ‘differential treatment’ in this part of its Report as it only noted that 
‘discrimination’ does not prohibit ‘bona fide exceptions’.  
 
Be that as it may, Correa gives significance to the distinction between the two concepts of 
‘discrimination’ and ‘differentiation’ to support his argument that exceptions to patent rights 
and compulsory licences should never be subject to the rule against ‘discrimination’. Relying 
on this distinction, he states that: 
… differential treatment (including compulsory licences) could be established, 
for instance, to address public health problems, involving products originating 
from different technological fields, such as equipment, software, diagnostic 
kits, medicines, and a large variety of other products required for public health 
purposes.33 
He opines that even if limitations and exceptions to patent rights are subject to this obligation, 
the differential treatment of a field of technology (in the context of exceptions and compulsory 
licences) to address public health concerns does not constitute ‘discrimination’. Nevertheless, 
Correa does not explain why addressing public health concerns takes such limitations and 
exceptions away from the realm of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1. 
Similarly, again relying on this distinction between ‘discrimination’ and differential treatment, 
Correa has stated elsewhere that the non-discrimination obligation does not: 
…prevent a WTO member to differentiate the treatment of inventions in 
various technical fields, for instance by adopting specific regulations or 
guidelines for the examination and grant of pharmaceutical or 
biotechnological products.34  
Thus, he specifically notes that WTO Members may subject inventions in the fields of 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology to differential treatment when examining their patentability 
without violating the non-discrimination obligation. As before, however, Correa does not 
explain why this must be the case in the context of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. A closer 
inspection of the Panel Report and Correa’s interpretation shows that the reasons for the 
measures suggested by him to be consistent with the non-discrimination obligation are traceable 
to the Panel’s concept of ‘justification’ that has not been analyzed by him. Had Correa dealt 
                                               
33 Correa, n. 30, p. 284. Emphasis added. 
34 C. Correa, ‘Patent Rights’, in C. Correa and A. Yusuf (eds.), Intellectual Property and International Trade: The 
TRIPs Agreement, Third edition, Kluwer Law International BV, 2016, p. 263 at p. 285. Emphasis added. Here too, 
Correa quotes the same passage from the Panel report in para. 7.92. 
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with the Panel’s formulation of the concept of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1, he would have 
appreciated that the mere distinction between ‘discrimination’ and ‘differentiation’ does not by 
itself explain the consistency of the types of differential treatment suggested by him. This is 
because differential treatment that is disadvantageous constitutes ‘discrimination’ unless it 
satisfies the Panel’s concept of ‘justification’. Consequently, even though Correa was correct 
to have opined that the Panel recognized the ability of the membership to subject certain fields 
of technology to differential treatment without violating the non-discrimination obligation, the 
contours of such an ability is fundamentally dependent on the concept of ‘justification’ that has 
not been scrutinized by him. 
 
Consequent to the Panel Report in Canada- Pharmaceuticals, Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle 
Dreyfuss co-authored an article entitled ‘Diversifying without Discriminating’ that specifically 
deals with the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1.35 Speaking in the context of 
US patent law, but clearly relevant to the patent systems of any other country, they state that 
traditional patent law has expanded to cover new fields of technology and that it is unrealistic 
to think that the same law applies to all these technologies in equal form. Therefore, they state 
that: 
…it has become increasingly difficult to believe that a one-size-fits-all 
approach to patent law can survive.36  
They note that patent law is capable of organically expanding in this manner given its inherent 
capability to respond to various demands of different technological communities.37 Citing the 
works of Dan Burk and Mark Lemley,38 they argue that US courts interpret patent norms to suit 
the idiosyncratic features of different technologies, but that the ability of the courts, legislature 
and administrators to ‘tailor’ patent protection in this manner is potentially circumscribed by 
the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1.39 Accordingly, they deal with the Panel 
Report in Canada- Pharmaceuticals and state that the Panel erred in its finding that TRIPS 
                                               
35 G. Dinwoodie and R. Dreyfuss, ‘Diversifying without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandate of the TRIPS 
Agreement’, Mich. Telecomm. & Tech L. Rev., vol. 13, no. 2, p. 445. 
36 Ibid., p. 446. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Dan Burk and Mark Lemely have written extensively to highlight the US Courts’ diverse application of the patent 
law norms such as the person ordinarily skilled in the art and disclosure. In essence, they argue that the concept of 
the person ordinarily skilled in the art is applied more leniently for biotechnological inventions than for computer 
software, while the disclosure requirement is applied more leniently for computer software than for 
biotechnological inventions. See D. Burk and M. Lemley, ‘Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?’, Berkeley Tech. 
L. J., vol. 14, no. 4, 2002, p. 1155; D. Burk and M. Lemley, ‘Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle’, Case W. 
Res. L. Rev., vol. 54, 2004, p. 691; D. Burk and M. Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’, Virginia Law Review, 
vol. 89, 2003, p. 1575.  
39 Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, n. 35, pp. 447-8. 
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Article 30 is subject to the ‘technological neutrality condition’ in Article 27.1.40 Nevertheless, 
they note that there is still considerable room for tailoring given the Panel’s opinion that 
‘discrimination’ is not the same as differential treatment.41 They too rely on the Panel’s 
statement that ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 does not prohibit ‘bona fide exceptions’. They 
further argue that members must be able to defend an allegation of de facto discrimination under 
Article 27.1 by demonstrating a legitimate purpose, as this is consistent with TRIPS Article 1.1 
that gives countries ‘deference’ as to the means by which they implement the general purposes 
of the Agreement.42 Concludingly, they state that WTO Members still have a great degree of 
discretion to tailor technology specific patent laws and that:  
… Lemley and Burk's legally neutral rules, applied through adjudication, 
certainly appear to survive challenge. Legislatively constructed industry-
specific rules could also be sustained if they were framed in a similarly neutral 
manner.43  
Their interpretation of the Panel Report is given near biblical significance by developing 
country Members and policy advisory bodies to show that the non-discrimination obligation 
has preserved a significant level of autonomy on the part of the WTO Members to enable them 
to calibrate their patent systems to best suit their domestic contexts. It is this philosophy that is 
reflected even in the commentary on TRIPS by UNCTAD-ICTSD, which provides that WTO 
Members are entitled to adopt different rules for different product areas provided such rules are 
adopted for bona fide reasons.44  
 
While it is correct to recognize that the Panel in Canada- Pharmaceuticals sought to preserve 
some form of autonomy on the part of the membership, the reasons cited by Dinwoodie and 
Dreyfuss do not draw a complete picture of the Panel Report for the following reasons. Firstly, 
as mentioned in relation to Correa’s opinion on this matter, the significance they attach to the 
distinction between ‘discrimination’ and ‘differentiation’ by relying on the Panel’s statement 
on ‘bona fide exceptions’ over-looks the potential of the concept of ‘differentiation’ to 
constitute ‘discrimination’ under Article 27.1. Although they argue that technology specific 
bona fide exceptions are a matter of ‘differentiation’ as opposed to ‘discrimination’, not 
                                               
40 Ibid., p. 449. 
41 Ibid., p. 450. 
42 Ibid., p. 452. 
43 Ibid., p. 453. 
44 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development and UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development (eds.), Resource Book on 
TRIPS and Development, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 341. 
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scrutinizing the Panel’s formulation prevented them from appreciating that ‘bona fide 
exceptions’ is a potential example of a ‘justified’ differentially disadvantageous treatment that 
does not constitute ‘discrimination’. Consequently, they deal with a potential justification 
without addressing the broader concept of ‘justification’ that the Panel highlighted, which 
would have identified the traits that a technology specific exception should entail to constitute 
a bona fide exception.  
 
The lack of acknowledgement of this relationship between the Panel’s concept of ‘justification’ 
and bona fide exceptions causes them run into further problem in their reasoning. They argue 
that there should be some form of ‘justification’ (not limited to cases of bona fide exceptions) 
that applies to cases de facto discrimination by relying on TRIPS Article 1.1. TRIPS Article 1.1 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
…Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing 
the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.  
This too is problematic for the following reasons. Firstly, a close reading of the Panel Report 
shows that it is not only de facto allegations but that even de jure allegations of discrimination 
are capable of being ‘justified’. Secondly, TRIPS Article 1.1 only gives deference to a WTO 
Member with regard to the ‘method of implementing’ its TRIPS obligations and not with regard 
to the substantive obligations themselves.45 Hence, TRIPS Article 1.1 does not permit the 
introduction of a concept of ‘justification’ even in the limited cases of de facto allegations. 
These issues could have been avoided if Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss had dealt with the more 
relevant part of the Panel Report that entailed its formulation of ‘discrimination’, which would 
have permitted them to acknowledge that their proposition that there is still significant space to 
tailor patent protection would have been much stronger if they had scrutinized the Panel’s 
concept of ‘justification’. 
 
Daniel Gervais also briefly deals with the non-discrimination obligation in Article 27.1 in his 
commentary on the TRIPS Agreement. He states that it requires patents to be available in all 
fields of technology according to the three usual criteria of novelty, inventive step and industrial 
applicability.46 However, citing the works of Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, Gervais notes that: 
                                               
45 See Correa, n. 30, pp. 22-30. Also see Appellate Body Report, India- Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 59. 
46 D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, Fourth edition, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson 
Reuters, 2012, p. 430. 
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… the differential treatment of inventions according to the field of activity may 
be desirable, if not inevitable.47  
While the differential treatment of a field of technology might be inevitable, Gervais does not 
examine how this would be compatible with the rule against ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 as 
he does not deal with the Panel Report in Canada- Pharmaceuticals, leaving its concept of 
‘justification’ unexamined. 
 
In his commentary on TRIPS’s patent regime, Nuno Pires de Carvalho notes that the main 
purpose of the Agreement was to address the non-availability of patents in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sectors and that this was specifically addressed by the non-discrimination 
obligation in Article 27.1.48 Unlike the other commentaries,  Carvalho cites the most relevant 
passage of the Panel Report that formulated ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 as the ‘unjustified 
imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment’. He states that: 
The Panel noted that discrimination goes beyond the concept of differential 
treatment. In other words, in the Panel’s view, discriminatory treatment is 
always differential. But there may be differential treatment that is not 
discriminatory.49  
Hence, the distinction that Carvalho identifies between ‘discrimination’ and ‘differential 
treatment’ based on the Panel’s formulation of ‘discrimination’ makes better sense than 
deriving such a distinction from the Panel’s statement that ‘discrimination’ does not prohibit 
bona fide exceptions. It will be recalled that Carlos Correa and even Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss 
have argued that ‘differential treatment’ does not constitute ‘discrimination’ on the basis of the 
Panel’s statement on bona fide exceptions. This allowed Carvalho to appreciate that bona fide 
exceptions are just one form of differential treatment that is potentially compatible with the 
non-discrimination obligation. Carvalho also states that the Panel erred in its finding that 
‘discrimination’ within the whole of TRIPS Article 27.1 is the disadvantageous differential 
treatment as this means that there could never be discrimination that is not disadvantageous.50 
He argues that such an interpretation affects the obligation not to ‘discriminate’ on the basis of 
the ‘place of production’, possibly because the mere differentiation based on the place of 
production of an invention will not be a sufficient disadvantage to violate this provision.  
                                               
47 Ibid. 
48 N. P. de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patents and Test Data, Fourth edition, Kluwer Law International, 2014, 
pp. 245-6. 
49 Ibid., p. 250. Footnote omitted. 
50 Ibid. 
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In relation to the ground of ‘field of technology’, Carvalho states that ‘differentiation’, as 
opposed to ‘discrimination’, acknowledges the existence of differences between fields of 
technology.51 He notes that: 
… a measure that acknowledges that a given situation is different and aims at 
eliminating such a difference, for the purposes of applying TRIPS standards in 
an equal manner, is TRIPS consistent. That measure is differential, but not 
discriminatory.52 
He perceives differentiation as being necessary to ensure the equality between different fields 
of technology. However, he immediately qualifies this statement by noting that such 
‘differentiation’ should not be used as a pretext to curtail the availability or enjoyment of patent 
rights. In his words: 
Differentiation, on the other hand, shall not be a pretext or an excuse for 
curtailing or expanding availability of patents and/or enjoyment of rights, as 
compared to other fields of technology.53  
He states that such curtailments or expansions of the availability or enjoyment of patent rights 
constitute ‘discrimination’ under Article 27.1 that cannot be justified by a WTO Member:  
… a WTO member may not defend a provision of national law containing 
discrimination against the availability or the enjoyment of patent rights, 
regardless of any motivation that Member may have taken into account for 
adopting that provision.54 
Carvalho’s reading of the Panel Report is in a sense more persuasive than the other 
commentaries dealing with the non-discrimination obligation as he identifies the most relevant 
passage of the Report that dealt with the concept of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1. However, 
his reading that any curtailment or expansion of patent rights necessarily constitutes 
‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 is problematic as this over-looks the Panel’s concept of 
‘justification’. It will be recalled that the Panel formulated ‘discrimination’ as the ‘unjustified 
imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment’. While Carvalho is technically correct 
to have identified that ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 could never be justified, he has not 
recognized that the treatment accorded by a measure can be justified that would in turn prevent 
                                               
51 Ibid., p. 251. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
54 Ibid., p. 252. Emphasis added. 
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the type of ‘discrimination’ proscribed by this obligation. Hence, this gap in his reading results 
from not adequately appreciating the significance of the Panel’s concept of ‘justification’. 
 
Justin Malbon, Charles Lawson and Mark Davison also discuss the Panel’s formulation of 
‘discrimination’ to a limited extent in their commentary on the TRIPS Agreement. They state 
that how ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 would be understood in the future depends on how the 
Panel’s concept of ‘differently disadvantageous treatment’ is interpreted.55 They note that this 
is because the Panel appeared to be reluctant to import interpretations prevalent under the 
National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment obligations in GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade) and the other covered agreements. They also state that there is 
room for further elaboration of ‘discrimination’ dependent on which ground of discrimination 
is in issue.56 It is certainly true that much depends on what is meant by the concept of ‘differently 
disadvantageous treatment’ as this is what potentially triggers a violation of this obligation, but 
they do not discuss the Panel’s concept of ‘justification’ or its significance to preserving any 




The examination of the academic literature dealing with this non-discrimination obligation 
shows that they give great weight to the distinction that the Panel appeared to have made 
between ‘discrimination’ and ‘differentiation’. Thereby, they argue that the Panel sought to 
preserve some form of autonomy on the part of the WTO Members to subject fields of 
technology to differential treatment without violating this obligation. However, the passage of 
the Panel Report that most of the literature cite for this purpose relates to the Panel’s statement 
on ‘bona fide’ exceptions and not its formulation of ‘discrimination’ as the ‘unjustified 
imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment’. This has resulted in the commentaries 
over-looking the Panel’s concept of ‘justification’. Even the commentaries that have cited the 
Panel’s formulation have not been able to acknowledge the significance of this concept. 
Consequently, there are some significant loopholes in the current comprehension of the Panel 
Report and the rule against ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1. 
 
                                               
55 J. Malbon, C. Lawson and M. Davison, The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights: A Commentary, Edward Elgar, 2014, p. 426. 
56 Ibid., p. 427. 
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The preoccupation with the distinction between ‘discrimination’ and ‘differential treatment’ 
that is prevalent in the current literature might have been understandable if the Panel itself had 
made a clear distinction between ‘differential treatment’ and disadvantageous treatment in the 
context of the rule relating to fields of technology. This is because differential treatment of a 
field of technology that is disadvantageous is capable of constituting ‘discrimination’.  
Consequently, clear boundaries between differentiation and disadvantageous treatment would 
have shown the circumstances in which a member could defend an allegation of 
‘discrimination’ without having to rely on a concept of ‘justification’. In the absence of clear 
boundaries that even the academic commentaries have not been able to decipher between 
‘differentiation’ and disadvantageous treatment in the context of a non-discrimination rule 
relating to fields of technology, it is submitted that any autonomy that the Panel is claimed to 
have preserved rests on its concept of ‘justification’, which has hitherto been left unexamined. 
Therefore, a greater understanding of the Panel’s concept of ‘justification’ is necessary to 
appreciate the type and extent of the autonomy that it is claimed to have preserved, which is the 
gap in the understanding of the non-discrimination obligation that thesis seeks to address from 
the perspective of the ground of ‘fields of technology’.
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERPRETING ‘DISCRIMINATION’ OF FIELDS OF 
TECHNOLOGY  
 
This Chapter adopts an interpretational approach to resolve the ambiguities surrounding the 
Panel’s concept of ‘justification’ and how it ought to operate in the context of the rule against 
‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in Article 27.1. This is meant to reveal the reasons that 
appear to have influenced the Panel to recognize the applicability of such a concept in the 
context of this obligation, which provides firm ground to scrutinize how it could operate and 
thereby provide a more concrete and developed interpretation of the rule against the 
‘discrimination’ of fields of technology that builds on the Panel’s formulation of 
‘discrimination’ in Canada- Pharmaceuticals. 
 
An interpretation of ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology must be guided by Article 31(1) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) which provides as follows: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose. 
Although the Panel did not refer to the dictionary meaning of ‘discrimination’ in its Report, it 
is useful to begin by noting that the Oxford Dictionary provides that ‘discriminate’ means 
making an unjust or prejudicial distinction.1 In the context of ‘fields of technology’, the ordinary 
meaning of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 is the unjust or prejudicial treatment of fields of 
technology with regard to the availability and enjoyment of patent rights. Consequently, some 
form of ‘justification’ is somewhat inherent even in the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘discrimination’. However, this Chapter argues that the need for such a concept of ‘justification’ 
in a non-discrimination obligation within the WTO’s multilateral framework is commanded by 
a more fundamental feature prevalent in the WTO’s substantive non-discrimination obligations 
under its covered agreements that constitutes the most relevant ‘context’ within the meaning of 
VCLT. 
 
                                               
1 See Oxford Dictionaries Online, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/discriminate, (accessed 10 
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Accordingly, Part A of this Chapter demonstrates that it is a fundamental trait of the substantive 
non-discrimination obligations under the WTO’s covered agreements, which are the trade 
sibling of the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1, that they are not absolute or 
inflexible so as to disregard the autonomy of the WTO Members to pursue important policy 
objectives and to ignore their diverse levels of economic development. Part B argues that the 
‘object and purpose’ of TRIPS that have been specified in its Objectives and Principles require 
Article 27.1 to be interpreted in a manner that acknowledges a similar form of autonomy that 
has been preserved under the TRIPS Agreement. Part C argues that the broad scope of this 
obligation is such that it is to acknowledge this autonomy that the Panel recognized its concept 
of ‘justification’ and proceeds to identify its constitutive elements to provide a more 
comprehensive interpretation of the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology that 
gives a deeper understanding of the Panel’s formulation of ‘discrimination’. 
 
A. TRADE SIBLINGS: THE NATIONAL TREATMENT AND MOST 
FAVOURED NATION TREATMENT OBLIGATIONS 
 
It will be recalled that the non-discrimination obligation in Article 27.1 was a novel creation by 
the TRIPS Agreement as there was no similar rule in any other multilateral treaty dealing with 
international patent law at the time TRIPS was being negotiated. It will also be recalled that 
this ‘trade concept’ was utilized as a compromise solution when the TRIPS negotiators could 
not agree on certain provisions concerning compulsory licences of patented inventions. The 
interpretation of the concept of ‘discrimination’ in TRIPS Article 27.1 should reflect this 
negotiation context that could be done only by acknowledging the trade origins of this unique 
obligation. These trade origins could be acknowledged only with a proper understanding of the 
operation of the National Treatment (NT) and Most-Favoured Nation treatment (MFN) 
obligations in the WTO. 
 
The NT and MFN obligations that originally formed the basic principles of the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 1947 were given the task combatting discrimination in 
international trade under the WTO’s multilateral system. Distinctly, they were not only meant 
to apply to trade in goods, but also to services, intellectual property, investments, sanitary 
measures and even technical regulations that were the subject matter of the covered agreements. 
These non-discrimination norms formed the principal mechanism by which the WTO sought to 
prevent discrimination in international trade and promote equality. As Thomas Cottier and Lena 
Schneller highlight, these non-discrimination obligations are not ends by themselves, but only 
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a means by which the WTO seeks to enhance global welfare, full employment and sustainable 
development in line with the Preamble of the WTO Agreement.2 Given this broader objective 
of these norms, the following sections of this Part that scrutinize the NT and MFN obligations 
in GATT, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Agreements on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
demonstrate that a fundamental feature in these norms is that they are meant to be balanced 
against the autonomy of the WTO Members to pursue important policy objectives. This is 
achieved in two ways: firstly, they require the demonstration of certain specific standards of 
comparison between the subject matter before they come into operation; secondly, they 
recognize the applicability of certain justificatory concepts that enable WTO Members to 
defend an allegation of inconsistency by demonstrating the legitimate exercise of their 
autonomy. This constitutes the most vital ‘context’ within the meaning of VCLT Article 31(1) 
in the interpretation of ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in TRIPS Article 27.1 as it 
informs an interpreter that a non-discrimination obligation that has trade origins can almost 
never be an absolute obligation. Subsequent Parts of this Chapter argue this what the Panel in 
Canada- Pharmaceuticals acknowledged by identifying a notion of ‘justification’ within the 
concept of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1.  
 
•  THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFF AND TRADE 1994 
 
GATT 1994 that succeeded its 1947 predecessor is the most significant of the thirteen goods-
related multilateral agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement. Its Preamble states that its aim 
is to ‘raise the standards of living, ensure full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand’ by reducing tariff barriers and eliminating 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce. The Most-Favoured Nation Treatment 
(MFN) and the National Treatment (NT) obligations are the fundamental instruments utilized 
to eliminate such discrimination, and therefore, are known as the substantive non-
discrimination norms in the WTO. The general objective of these non-discrimination norms 
was succinctly described by the Appellate Body in EC- Bananas III as ensuring the ‘equal 
treatment of products, irrespective of their origin’.3  
 
                                               
2 T. Cottier and L. Schneller, ‘The Philosophy of Non-Discrimination in International Trade Regulation’ in A. 
Sanders (ed.), The Principle of National Treatment in International Economic Law: Trade, Investment and 
Intellectual Property, Edward Elgar, 2014, p. 3 at p. 3. 
3 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 190. 
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Preserving such equality in the treatment of products is so significant to an international trading 
system dealing with goods that the Appellate Body reiterated in US- Section 211 Appropriations 
Act that these norms have long been the ‘cornerstones’ of the world trading system and that 
they are ‘central and essential’ to assuring the success of a global rules-based system for trade 
in goods.4 These obligations that were initially developed in the context of goods were 
introduced into the new covered agreements that were negotiated under the Punta Del Este 
Ministerial Mandate. Hence, the Preambles to TRIPS, TBT, SPS and GATS state that the 
members recognize the need for new rules to apply the basic principles of GATT that include 
the non-discrimination norms. To ensure harmonious interpretation of these substantive non-
discrimination obligations within the WTO, the WTO tribunals take into consideration the 
manner in which these norms are interpreted and applied under GATT 1994 when interpreting 
and applying these norms under the other covered agreements. Thus, the non-discrimination 
obligations in GATT deserve separate discussion in this Part. 
 
The MFN obligation is considered to have been first used in the international context in the 
eleventh century in a Charter by the Holy Roman Emperor.5 It essentially prohibits 
discrimination between trading partners. The MFN obligation in GATT is principally set-out in 
Article I:1. It requires border or internal measures of a Member that confer ‘any advantage’ on 
products from or destined to a Member to be ‘immediately and unconditionally’ accorded to 
‘like products’ from or destined to other WTO Members.6 Consequently, any advantage given 
to products originating from a Member or being exported to a Member should be given to ‘like 
products’ originating from, or being exported to, any other WTO Member. Bossche and Zdouc 
state that by ensuring that WTO Members have the equality of opportunity7 to import from, and 
export to, other members of the WTO, the MFN obligation prevents favouritism between WTO 
Members.8  
 
                                               
4 Appellate Body Report, United States- Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, para. 
297. 
5 See W. Davey and J. Pauwelyn, ‘MFN Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in View of its 
Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with Particular Reference to the Issue of "Like Product"’, in T. 
Cottier, P. Mavroidis and P. Blatter (eds.), Regulatory Barriers and The Principle of Non-Discrimination in Worlds 
Trade Law, University of Michigan Press, 2000, p. 13.  
6 See P. Bossche and W. Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 
Third edition, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 317-330; M. Matsushita, P. Mavroidis and T. Schoenbaum, 
The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy, Third edition, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 156-
177. 
7 Bossche and Zdouc, n. 6, p. 318. Also see Panel Report, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Ecuador), WT/DS27/R/ECU, para. 7.239; Appellate Body Report, Canada- 
Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, para. 84. 
8 Bossche and Zdouc, n. 6, p. 316. 
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The National Treatment (NT) obligation addresses a different form of discrimination. It 
prohibits the favouring of nationals at the expense of foreigners. The key NT provisions in 
GATT are specified in Article III entitled ‘National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation’.9 The broad and fundamental purpose of GATT Article III is set-out in Article III:1, 
which, as the Appellate Body has noted, informs the interpretation of the specific NT 
obligations found in Article III:2 and Article III:4.10 GATT Article III:1 provides as follows: 
The Members recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and 
laws, regulations … should not be applied to imported or domestic products so 
as to afford protection to domestic production.11 
Hence, the objective of the NT obligations is to avoid protectionism. The Appellate Body 
reiterated in Japan- Alcoholic Beverages II that the NT obligations avoid protectionism by 
ensuring ‘the equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation to domestic 
products’.12 Article III:2 deals with internal fiscal measures, whereas Article III:4 concerns 
internal regulatory measures. Article III:2 subdivides into two provisions that contain two 
distinct NT obligations. Its first sentence specifies that internal taxes should not be applied to 
imported products ‘in excess of’ that which is applied to ‘like’ domestic products. Its second 
sentence, read together with its Ad note, requires internal taxes not be applied to imported 
products that are in a ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ relationship with domestic products 
so as to ‘afford protection to domestic production’. Hence, the applicable sentence of GATT 
Article III:2 in any given case depends on the degree of the competitive relationship that exists 
between the imported product and the privileged domestic product. GATT Article III:4, on the 
other hand, specifies the NT obligation in relation to non-fiscal regulatory measures. It requires 
that internal laws and regulations of a member that affect the internal trade of goods should not 
subject imported goods to ‘less favourable treatment’ than that accorded to ‘like’ domestic 
goods. Unlike in Article III.2, there is no concept of ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ 
products in Article III:4. 
 
Detailed examinations of the substantive scope and application of these obligations have been 
admirably done by many academics and practitioners, and therefore, such a discussion is not 
required here. However, the objective of the following sub-sections is to highlight the 
                                               
9 See generally Bossche and Zdouc, n. 6, pp. 349-402; Matsushita et al., n. 6, pp. 179-210. 
10 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 93. 
11 Emphasis added. 
12 Appellate Body Report, Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, p. 16. 
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significance of two important mechanisms prevalent in GATT’s NT and MFN obligations that 
serve to acknowledge the autonomy on the part of the WTO Members to pursue vital national 
interests even in the context of these obligations. 
 
v The Standards of Comparison Between the Subject Matter 
 
The substantive non-discrimination obligations of GATT only come into play when a specific 
standard of comparison has been established between the subject matter. For example, to the 
exception of the NT obligation in the second sentence of Article III:2, GATT’s NT/MFN 
obligations prevent the proscribed types of discrimination only between ‘like products’. 
Therefore, ‘likeness’ between the disadvantaged and privileged product is a vital prerequisite 
that must be established by a complainant when demonstrating a violation of these obligations. 
The Appellate Body has held in the context of the first sentence of Article III:2 that: 
… there are two questions which need to be answered to determine whether 
there is a violation of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994: (a) whether the imported 
and domestic products are like products; and (b) whether the imported 
products are taxed in excess of the domestic products. If the answers to both 
questions are affirmative, there is a violation of Article III:2, first sentence.13 
Similarly, the Appellate Body has held in the context of Article III:4 that: 
There are three elements that must be demonstrated to establish that a measure 
is inconsistent with Article III:4: (i) that the imported and domestic products 
are "like products"; (ii) that the measure at issue is a "law, regulation, or 
requirement affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution, or use" of the products at issue; and (iii) that the 
treatment accorded to imported products is "less favourable" than that 
accorded to like domestic products.14 
Consequently, Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas Schoenbaum, Petros Mavroidis and Michael Hahn 
note that products that are ‘unlike’ can be lawfully treated differently even if such treatment 
falls below the requisite standards mandated by the NT/MFN obligations.15 Julia Qin opines that 
                                               
13 Appellate Body Report, Canada- Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, p. 468. Emphasis 
added. 
14 Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, WT/DS400/AB/R, para. 5.99. 
15 See Matsushita et al, n. 6, p. 163. Emphasis added. 
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this is because the general notion of non-discrimination is founded upon the concept of equality 
and the standard of comparison meant to be used to determine the existence or non-existence 
of such equality in the GATT’s substantive non-discrimination obligations is the ‘likeness’ of 
the products.16 Hence, the autonomy of the Members to regulate products that do not fall within 
this ‘likeness’ criteria is unhindered by the GATT’s MFN/NT obligations. In a similar vein, the 
NT obligation in the second sentence of GATT Article III:2 only comes into play when the 
products in question are ‘directly competitive or substitutable’. While this concept is different 
to that of ‘likeness’, it is still a prerequisite that a complainant needs satisfy when demonstrating 
a violation of this obligation.  
 
Further, even the ‘like product’ analysis under GATT’s NT/MFN obligations is capable of 
acknowledging certain regulatory concerns of a member to render a product to be ‘unlike’ and 
prevent the application of these obligations. The Appellate Body has noted that the ‘likeness’ 
of products depends on the nature and extent of the ‘competitive relationship’ between the 
products.17 In making this determination, WTO tribunals often resort to four criteria traceable to 
the Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments (1970) and previous GATT practice: (a) 
the end uses of the products; (b) consumer tastes and habits; (c) product properties, nature and 
quality; and (d) the tariff classification. However, these criteria have been held only to provide 
the framework for such an analysis that should be performed on a case-by-case basis.18 They 
only constitute guidelines and are in no way exhaustive of the elements that could be taken into 
consideration when determining ‘likeness’.19 This is facilitated by another feature in the 
‘likeness’ analysis. The Appellate Body has noted that the degree of the ‘competitive 
relationship’ that is necessary to render products to be ‘alike’ varies depending on the context 
in which the concept is used. It explained in Japan- Alcoholic Beverages II: 
The concept of ‘likeness’ is a relative one that evokes the image of an 
accordion. The accordion of ‘likeness’ stretches and squeezes in different 
places as different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width 
of the accordion in any one of those places must be determined by the 
particular provision in which the term ‘like’ is encountered as well as by the 
                                               
16 J. Qin, ‘Defining Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization’, Boston University 
International Law Journal, vol. 23, no. 2, 2005, p. 221. 
17 Appellate Body Report, Philippines- Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS403/AB/R, para. 170.  
18 Appellate Body Report, EC- Asbestos, n. 10, para. 102. 
19 Matsushita et al., n. 6, p. 198. 
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context and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that 
provision may apply.20 
The Appellate Body explained that this ‘accordion’ shrinks in the first sentence of Article III:2 
because there is a concept of ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ in its second 
sentence that accommodates a broader competitive relationship between products.21 Hence, a 
broad interpretation of ‘likeness’ in the first sentence of Article III:2 would render its second 
sentence to be redundant. On the other hand, it explained in EC- Asbestos that the ‘accordion’ 
stretches in Article III:4 as it does not contain the duality found in Article III:2. In its words: 
… the "general principle" articulated in Article III:1 is expressed in Article 
III:4, not through two distinct obligations, as in the two sentences in Article 
III:2, but instead through a single obligation that applies solely to "like 
products". Therefore, the harmony that we have attributed to the two sentences 
of Article III:2 need not and, indeed, cannot be replicated in interpreting 
Article III:4. Thus, we conclude that, given the textual difference between 
Articles III:2 and III:4, the "accordion" of "likeness" stretches in a different 
way in Article III:4.22 
‘Stretching’ the accordion, however, does not mean that more products are likely to be found 
‘alike’, but that the analysis is meant to be broader. Therefore, broader considerations could 
influence the ‘likeness’ or ‘unlikeness’ of the products. This is apparent in the Appellate Body’s 
findings in EC- Asbestos itself. Consequent to explaining that the criteria commonly used to 
examine ‘likeness’ is not exhaustive and that the considerations in Article III:4 are broader than 
in Article III:2, it held that asbestos fibre related products were not ‘like’ other fibre related 
products due to the health risks associated with asbestos fibres. These risks were relevant under 
the criteria of ‘consumer tastes and habits’ that served to distinguish asbestos fibres from the 
other fibre related products, although there were several similarities between them.23  
 
As Matsushita and others state, this practice relating to the interpretation of ‘like products’ gives 
the WTO tribunals a significant degree of interpretative power to determine the scope of 
GATT’s NT/MFN obligations.24 Preserving such an interpretative power is perhaps necessary 
in a multilateral system that seeks to eliminate discrimination in goods that take various shapes 
                                               
20 Appellate Body Report, Japan- Alcoholic Beverages II, n. 12, p. 114. Emphasis added. 
21 Ibid., pp. 112-113. 
22 Appellate Body Report, EC- Asbestos, n. 10, para. 96. 
23 Ibid., para. 121-147. 
24 Matsushita et al., n. 6, p. 196. 
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and forms. It enables the tribunals and the membership to determine the precise circumstances 
in which the substantive non-discrimination obligations come into operation. Consequently, 
relevant for the purposes of this Chapter is to observe that such interpretative power that is 
preserved within these specific standards of comparison mandated by GATT’s NT/MFN 
obligations set important limitations, or are at least capable of imposing limitations, on the 
scope of GATT’s substantive non-discrimination norms that preserve the autonomy of the 
WTO Members to regulate products that are ‘unlike’, the determination of which is also capable 
of taking into account the regulatory concerns of the products in question. 
 
v The General Exceptions 
 
An even greater balance between GATT’s non-discrimination obligations and the autonomy of 
the WTO Members is struck by the General Exceptions that have been set-out in GATT Article 
XX. A Member is entitled to defend a measure that is found to be inconsistent with GATT’s 
substantive non-discrimination obligations, or any other GATT obligation for that matter, by 
relying on these General Exceptions. Bossche and Zdouc state that the promotion of public 
health, consumer safety, environment, employment, economic development and national 
security are the ‘core’ tasks of local governments. Hence, Members may be politically and/or 
economically compelled to adopt measures that are inconsistent with the WTO’s rules on 
market access and non-discrimination.25 They state that it is this that is acknowledged in GATT 
Article XX, which according to Bossche and Zdouc provide: 
… a set of rules to reconcile trade liberalization, market access and non-
discrimination rules with the need to protect and promote other societal values 
and interests.26 
Accordingly, they refer to Article XX as a ‘balancing provision’27 that seeks to strike an 
appropriate balance between GATT obligations and the ability of the WTO Members to pursue 
such vital policy interests. Peter Stoll and Lutz Strack highlight that the need for such a balance 
is fundamental given that the ability to pursue such vital interests is a matter of national 
sovereignty.28 As Article XX is a lengthy provision, only its parts that are most significant for 
the purposes of this Chapter are quoted below: 
                                               
25 Bossche and Zdouc, n. 6, pp. 534-544. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 547. 
28 P. Stoll and L. Strack, ‘GATT Article XX. Lit. B.’, in R. Wolfrum, P. Stoll and H. Hestermeyer (eds.), WTO-
Trade in Goods, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p. 497 at p. 499. 
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Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  
(a)  necessary to protect public morals;  
(b)  necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
(…) 
(d)  necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those… 
(…) 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources … 
…  
It sets out an exhaustive list of policy objectives that a WTO Member may pursue to justify a 
GATT inconsistent measure. It is broad in the sense that Members are entitled to pursue those 
objectives in whichever manner they desire, but it is also limited because the policies that could 
be pursued have been specified exhaustively. The WTO jurisprudence demonstrates that the 
availability of an exception under GATT Article XX is dependent on a two-stage analysis: (a) 
a Member must provisionally justify its measure under one of the sub-paragraphs of Article 
XX, and (b) satisfy the requirements of the introductory paragraph known as the ‘chapeau’.29 
The sub-paragraphs of Article XX do not only identify the policy objectives that are to be 
considered legitimate in the context of this provision, but also specify the degree of connection 
that must exist between a national measure and the stated policy objective. The parts of Article 
XX quoted above demonstrate that measures directed for the protection of public morals, 
human, animal, plant life or health and the compliance with domestic laws and regulations must 
meet a standard of ‘necessity’. 
 
                                               
29 See for example Appellate Body Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 22; Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 159. 
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‘Necessity’ in this context is considered to be the highest form of nexus that is mandated by 
Article XX and is distinguished from concepts such as ‘relating to’ found in certain other sub-
paragraphs of Article XX. The Appellate Body has held, however, that it does not mean 
indispensability and that it should be determined by examining an array of factors and 
circumstances pertaining to a given measure.30 The Appellate Body explained in Korea- Beef 
that it always involves: 
… a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently 
include the contribution… the importance of the common interest or values… 
and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.31 
In an article that examines the evolution of the test of ‘necessity’ in WTO law, Ming Du has 
identified that the importance of the non-trade value, the degree of contribution by a measure, 
its trade restrictiveness and the availability of reasonable alternatives are meant to be ‘weighed 
and balanced’ to ascertain the ‘necessity’ of a measure.32 The ‘availability of alternatives’ 
requires a tribunal to consider if the Member in question had a GATT consistent measure or a 
less-inconsistent measure that it could have ‘reasonably’ adopted instead of its own measure.33 
The use of the term ‘reasonable’ alternatives has been understood to mean that even a less-
inconsistent measure that is identified by a complainant may not be truly an available alternative 
as it might be unrealistic in the light of the respondent Member’s level of economic, social and 
technological standards. In the context of the General Exceptions in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), the Appellate Body seminally noted in US- Gambling that: 
An alternative measure may be found not to be "reasonably available", 
however, where it is merely theoretical in nature, for instance, where the 
responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the measure imposes 
an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive costs or substantial 
technical difficulties.34 
In EC- Asbestos, Appellate Body highlighted the importance of scrutinizing a range of factors 
in determining the presence of an available alternative under GATT Article XX. While it noted 
                                               
30 Appellate Body Report, Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, para. 161- 163. Emphasis added. 
31 Ibid., para. 164. 
32 M. Du, ‘The Necessity Test in World Trade Law: What Now?’, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 15, 
no. 4, 2016, p. 817 at pp. 826-834. 
33 Appellate Body Report, Korea- Beef, n. 30, para. 166. 
34 Appellate Body Report, United States- Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Gaming and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/AB/R, para. 308; Also see Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Retreaded Tyres, n. 29, para. 156 
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that mere administrative difficulties would not by themselves suffice to show that an alternative 
is not reasonably available, it explained that: 
… in determining whether a suggested alternative measure is "reasonably 
available", several factors must be taken into account, besides the difficulty of 
implementation.35  
Consequently, a range of factors between impossibility and mere administrative difficulties 
related to the developmental and economic standards of a Member are relevant in determining 
if an alternative is ‘reasonably available’. Stoll and Strack state that even problems relating to 
the implementation of a suggested alternative are relevant in this determination.36 Hence, an 
alternative that is potentially reasonably available to a developed country Member may not be 
necessarily so to a developing or least developed country Member. This demonstrates that the 
General Exceptions in GATT do not only provide the WTO Members with the ability to justify 
measures inconsistent with their non-discrimination obligations, but that they are also capable 
of acknowledging the diverse levels of development among them. Thereby, Article XX 
recognizes the fundamental principle in the WTO Agreement’s Preamble that requires WTO 
obligations to be balanced against the domestic interests of WTO Members by, inter alia, taking 
into account their ‘different levels of economic development’.37 
Related to the assessment of available alternatives is the significance that the WTO tribunals 
attach to the level of protection of a policy objective that a member has sought to achieve. The 
Appellate Body stated in EC-Asbestos in unambiguous terms that a WTO member has the right 
to determine the level of protection of the policy objectives mentioned in Article XX. In its 
words: 
… we note that it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine 
the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given 
situation. 38 
The Appellate Body reiterated this in Brazil- Retreaded Tyres: 
… the fundamental principle is the right that WTO Members have to determine 
the level of protection that they consider appropriate in a given context.39  
                                               
35 Appellate Body Report, EC- Asbestos, n. 10, para. 170. 
36 Stoll and Strack, n. 28, p. 512. 
37 See the first sentence of the Preamble to the WTO Agreement. 
38 Appellate Body Report, EC- Asbestos, n. 10, para. 168. Emphasis added. 
39 Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Retreaded Tyres, n. 29, para. 210. Emphasis in original. 
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As such, a suggested alternative that does not achieve the same level of protection desired by a 
respondent Member does not constitute an alternative that is available, as it would violate the 
right of the WTO Members to determine the importance of a policy and its desired level 
protection within its jurisdiction. Thus, as Bossche and Zdouc state: 
Other Members cannot challenge the level of protection chosen; they can only 
argue that the measure at issue is not ‘necessary’ to achieve that level of 
protection.40 
For this reason, the Appellate Body held in EC- Asbestos that the ‘controlled use’ of asbestos 
was not a reasonable option for France as it did not meet the same level of protection of human 
life and health as much as a total ‘prohibition’ of asbestos. Speaking of how these trends relating 
to the test of necessity have worked to preserve the autonomy on the part of the WTO Members, 
Ming Du states: 
… the weighing and balancing test, after the AB's constant refinement, tends 
to give more respect to WTO Members' domestic regulatory autonomy than 
the GATT/WTO panels did in the earlier years. To begin with, in interpreting 
"necessary", the AB does not simply endorse an alternative measure with less 
trade restrictive effects and then impose it on the responding Member. Instead, 
the AB has repeatedly stressed that a reasonably available alternative must be 
able to fulfil the responding Member's appropriate level of protection as well 
as being truly feasible in view of the Member's particular political, cultural and 
economic situations.41  
This discussion of GATT’s substantive non-discrimination obligations, the most notable trade 
siblings of the non-discrimination norm in TRIPS Article 27.1, demonstrates that they only 
come into operation in the presence of certain defined standards of comparison between the 
subject matter. They do not only prevent the operation of these obligations in the absence of 
those specific standards of comparison, but the scrutiny of those standards has even served to 
acknowledge certain regulatory concerns relating to certain products that prevent the operation 
of these obligations. Further, even when they do come into operation, members have the 
opportunity to justify an inconsistency by resorting to the General Exceptions. The General 
Exceptions have also been interpreted in a manner that acknowledges the diverse standards of 
development among the WTO Members and their right to determine the level of protection that 
                                               
40 Bossche and Zdouc, n. 6, p. 558. Footnote omitted. Emphasis added. 
41 Du, n. 32, p. 836. Footnote omitted.  
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they desire to achieve. These mechanisms that serve to balance these non-discrimination norms 
against the autonomy of the Members are so vital in the context of the WTO’s multilateral 
system that the next section demonstrates that similar mechanisms are prevalent in the 
substantive non-discrimination obligations under the other covered agreements of the WTO 
concerning goods and services. 
 
• THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES, THE AGREEMENT ON 
THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES AND THE 
AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
 
The extension of the NT/MFN obligations to international trade in services under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was a maiden accomplishment by the GATT/WTO 
trade negotiations that concluded in 1994. As Nicolas Diebold notes, the adoption of these 
obligations to intangible subject matter like services required certain adjustments to be made to 
the MFN/NT obligations.42 Particularly, their intangible nature made it difficult to have a clear 
distinction between border and internal measures. Therefore, the MFN and NT obligations in 
GATS have been given a broad scope by being applicable to any measure that affects trade in 
services. This has been interpreted by the Appellate Body in EC- Bananas III to mean any 
measure that has an ‘effect’ on the trade in services.43 The most fundamental MFN obligation in 
relation to services is contained in GATS Article II:1. It provides that ‘any measure affecting 
trade in services’ of a WTO Member should accord ‘immediately and unconditionally’ 
treatment that is ‘no less favourable’ to ‘like services and service suppliers’ of other WTO 
Members than it accords to ‘like services and service suppliers’ of ‘any other country’. Like the 
MFN obligation in GATT, Bossche and Zdouc note that its main purpose is to ensure that WTO 
Members have the equality of opportunities in the supply of services.44   
 
The NT obligation of GATS is set-out in Article XVII:1 and provides as follows: 
In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply 
                                               
42 See N. Diebold, Non- Discrimination in International Trade in Services: ‘Likeness’ in WTO/GATS, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, Ch. 1; Also see G. Muller, ‘National Treatment and the GATS: Lessons from 
Jurisprudence’, Journal of World Trade, vol. 50, no. 5, 2016, p. 819. 
43 Appellate Body Report, EC- Bananas III, n. 4, p. 220. 
44 Bossche and Zdouc, n. 6, p. 335. 
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of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like 
services and service suppliers.  
Accordingly, it requires that ‘a measure that affects the supply of services’ should accord 
‘treatment no less favourable’ to services or service suppliers of other members than it accords 
to ‘like domestic services or service suppliers’. As in GATT, it too strives to preserve the 
equality of competitive conditions between domestic and foreign services and service suppliers. 
However, evident in the first words of GATS Article XVII:1 is a vital distinction between its 
MFN and NT obligations that is not present in GATT. While GATS’s MFN obligation is a 
general obligation that applies to all members, its NT obligation is a ‘specific commitment’ that 
is applicable and in fact applies only to the extent that a given member has explicitly committed 
itself to grant such treatment in respect of a specific service sector.45 As GATS Article XVII:3 
explicitly recognizes the de facto application of this NT obligation to any national measure 
affecting trade in services, Gilles Muller and several other writers have argued that GATS’s 
NT obligation has the potential to intrude the national regulatory autonomy more than the 
parties had intended.46 Nonetheless, Muller rightly notes that these concerns only materialize if 
a WTO Member has actually undertaken a specific NT commitment.47 While this is a pragmatic 
limitation on GATS’s NT obligation, it is also apparent that even when there is such a specific 
commitment by a Member, the obligation only comes into play when the privileged domestic 
services/service suppliers are ‘like’ one of those mentioned in the Member’s Schedule. 
Similarly, even the general MFN obligation in GATS Article II:1 only applies between ‘like’ 
services/service suppliers. Consequently, the applicability of both these obligations rest on the 
concept of ‘likeness’, which Matsushita and others state, depends on the existence of a 
competitive relationship between the services/service suppliers in question.48 Although GATS’s 
concept of ‘likeness’ has not yet been examined by the Appellate Body, a WTO Panel has 
acknowledged its similarities with GATT’s concept of ‘like products’ in China- Electronic 
Payment Services. It stated that: 
                                               
45 Ibid., p. 403. Also see Matsushita et al., n. 6, p. 557. 
46 G. Muller, ‘De Facto Discrimination Under GATS National Treatment: Has the Genie of Trade Liberalization 
Been Let Out of the Bottle?’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, vol. 44, no. 2, 2017, p. 151. Also see M. 
Crossy, ‘Some Thoughts on the Concept of ‘Likeness’ in the GATS’ and J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Unbearable Lightness 
of Likeness in GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services’, in M. Panizzon, N. Pohl and P. Sauvé 
(eds.), GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 327 and 
p. 358 respectively; M. Krajewski and M. Engelke, ‘Article XVII GATS’, in R. Wolfrum, P. Stoll and C. Feinäugle 
(eds.), WTO-Trade in Services, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, p. 396; G. Muller, ‘National Treatment and the 
GATS’, n. 44. 
47 Muller, ‘De Facto Discrimination’, n. 46, p. 166. 
48 Matsushita et al., n. 6, p. 568 
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As in goods cases where a panel assesses whether a particular product is a ‘like 
product’, the determination must be made on the basis of evidence as a whole. 
If it is determined that the services in question in a particular case are 
essentially or generally the same in competitive terms, those services would, 
in our view, be ‘like’.49 
Accordingly, the Border Tax Adjustment criteria that include end uses, consumer tastes and 
habits, product properties, together with their tariff classification constitute vital indicators of 
‘likeness’ even in the context of GATS.50 Therefore, as in GATT, the autonomy of the Members 
to regulate services/service suppliers that are not ‘like’ is not hindered by the NT/MFN 
obligations. Moreover, broader regulatory concerns relating to a particular service/service 
supplier should also be capable of rendering them to be ‘unlike’ and prevent the application of 
these norms as the Appellate Body has highlighted in the context of GATT. This autonomy is 
even greater in relation to GATS’s NT obligation as even the determination of ‘likeness’ comes 
into play only when there is a specific NT commitment by a WTO Member. 
 
Furthermore, GATS also contains a list of General Exceptions in Article XIV that permit the 
WTO Members to defend a national measure that has been found to be inconsistent with its 
NT/MFN obligations. It follows the identical model of GATT Article XX, which Cottier, 
Delimatsis and Diebold identify as the ‘cornerstone’ of the multilateral trading system that 
allows Members to pursue legitimate non-economic policy objectives.51 Explaining the purpose 
of GATS Article XIV, they state: 
… the protection of interests such as public health, public order, safety, public 
morals, environment etc. requires the adoption of trade restrictive measures, 
technically resulting in a direct conflict with GATS obligations. WTO law 
seeks to establish a proper balance between different policy goals. Such 
balance is sought and achieved in part by principles of progressive 
liberalization and inherent limitations. In part it is sought by allowing for 
general exceptions applicable to all the provisions and existing commitments 
under an agreement.52 
                                               
49 Panel Report, China- Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R, para. 7.701-7.702. 
50 Matsushita et al, n. 6, pp. 568-9. 
51 T. Cottier, P. Delimatis and N. Diebold, ‘Article XIV GATS’, in Wolfrum et al. (eds.), n. 46, p. 290. 
52 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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In order to achieve such a balance, GATS Article XIV recognizes certain policies that a WTO 
Member may legitimately pursue to justify a measure that is inconsistent with its MFN/NT 
obligations. Its sub-paragraphs recognize the legitimacy of measures, inter alia, ‘necessary’ to 
protect public morals, public order, human, animal, plant life and health and the compliance of 
domestic laws and regulations. To date, however, the Appellate Body has substantively dealt 
with GATS’s General Exceptions only in US- Gambling in which it confirmed the relevance of 
the two-stage analysis found in GATT Article XX.53 The Appellate Body also imported the 
‘weighing and balancing’ test to determine the ‘necessity’ of measures that seek to protect 
public morals and public order under GATS Article XIV’s sub-paragraph (a). It is in this 
context that the Appellate Body noted that mere theoretical or costly alternatives are not 
available alternatives when determining ‘necessity’, which as highlighted before, now informs 
the test of ‘necessity’ in GATT Article XX. Consequently, although there is a lack of 
jurisprudence dealing with GATS’ General Exceptions, it is clear that all the considerations 
discussed in relation to the test of ‘necessity’ in GATT Article XX are equally relevant here. 
Therefore, the General Exceptions of GATS not only provide the membership with the 
opportunity to justify a measure that is inconsistent with GATS’s NT/MFN obligation, but they 
are also capable of acknowledging the varying developmental standards and the right of the 
Members to determine the requisite level of protection of a non-economic policy objective. 
Consequently, the manner in which GATS strives to achieve a balance between its substantive 
non-discrimination obligations and the autonomy of Members is near identical to that found in 
GATT. 
 
The mechanisms prevalent in the Agreements on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) that seek to achieve a balance between 
their NT/MFN obligations and the autonomy of the Members are somewhat different to those 
found in GATT/GATS given that TBT and SPS specifically deal with certain types of non-tariff 
barriers to trade. These two agreements are a result of a compromise reached by the Members 
to strike a balance between their right to regulate certain aspects of trade against their desire to 
avoid unnecessary trade obstacles in this process. Thus, Matsushita and others point out that 
SPS and TBT are a result of an intricate balance that has similar traits to that sought by the 
General Exceptions of GATT,54 and even GATS for that matter. This is apparent from the 
Preamble to SPS which provides that it is meant to ‘elaborate on the application of GATT 
Article XX(b)’ that concerns measures for the protection of human, animal, plant life or health. 
                                               
53 Appellate Body Report, US- Gambling, n. 34, para. 292. 
54 Matsushita et al., n. 6, p. 434. 
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The following sections demonstrate that this inherent balancing nature of the SPS and TBT 
Agreements has resulted in their NT/MFN obligations to be interpreted and applied in a manner 
that acknowledges the regulatory autonomy of the Members in order to achieve the type of 
balance that is sought under the NT/MFN obligations in GATT/GATS.  
 
The first recital of the Preamble to the SPS Agreement states as follows: 
… no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the 
requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
Members where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.55 
This sums up the objective of the SPS Agreement: to balance the right of the Members to adopt 
SPS measures against the total disregard of the objectives of the WTO. SPS Article 1.1 provides 
that the Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures that affect international 
trade, which has been further defined in its Annexure to include all measures applied to protect 
human, animal or plant health from food-borne risks, risks from pests and diseases of plants or 
animals. Therefore, as Dukgeun Ahn rightly notes, the applicability of the SPS Agreement is 
solely dependent on the objectives of a national measure in issue.56 This gives the Agreement 
broad scope of application. 
 
SPS Article 2.1 recognizes the basic right of each Member to adopt SPS measures. The 
Appellate Body has held that this is a recognition of the prerogative right of all Members.57 
However, as highlighted in its Preamble, this prerogative right should be exercised responsibly. 
One of the most significant of those responsibilities have been set-out in Article 2.3 that entail 
the general NT/MFN obligation of the SPS Agreement. It provides as follows: 
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or 
similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of 
                                               
55 Emphasis added. 
56 D. Ahn, ‘Comparative Analysis of the SPS and the TBT Agreements’, International Law and Regulation, vol. 8, 
no. 3, 2002, p. 85. 
57 See Appellate Body Report, Australia- Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 199. 
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other Members. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a 
manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. 
Accordingly, SPS measures should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
members (MFN) or between domestic and foreign territories (NT) with identical or similar SPS 
conditions. The specifics of the application of this general rule have been elaborated in the 
jurisprudence concerning SPS Article 5.5 that specifically relates to distinctions made with 
regard to levels of SPS protection. In relevant part, Article 5.5 provides that: 
… each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels 
it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result 
in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. 
Thus, it prohibits arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of SPS protection in 
‘different situations’ that lead to discrimination or restrictions to international trade. 
Notwithstanding the apparent broad notion of ‘different situations’ in this provision, the 
Appellate Body noted in Australia- Salmon that differences in SPS treatment become 
comparable under the notion of ‘different situations’ only when the products pose common SPS 
risks.58 This determination involves the scrutiny of whether the products in question have a 
common risk of entry, establishment and spread of a particular disease.59 Hence, in Australia- 
Salmon where certain Australian measures that specifically applied to imported salmon were 
alleged to violate SPS Article 5.5, the Appellate Body found that the risks associated with the 
importation of certain types of salmon were similar to the risks associated with the importation 
of any other fish. Therefore, such distinctions with regard to the levels of SPS protection were 
comparable under Article 5.5.60 Stoll and Strack have clarified that SPS Article 5.5 applies to 
products that pose common SPS risks in this manner because regulating risks posed by one 
group of products to the exclusions of others that pose similar risks is a sign of protectionism.61 
Consequently, this prohibited form of protectionism does not come into operation when a 
member’s SPS measures differentiate between groups of products that pose different SPS risks.  
 
This jurisprudence now come to influence the scope of SPS’s general non-discrimination 
obligation in Article 2.3. A WTO Panel held in the subsequent compliance dispute in Australia- 
Salmon (Article 21.5- Canada) that even Article 2.3 applies only when the products in question 
                                               
58 Ibid., para. 152. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., para. 147. 
61 P. Stoll and L. Strack, ‘Article 5 SPS’, in R. Wolfrum, P. Stoll and A. Seibert-Fohr (eds.), WTO: Technical 
Barriers and SPS Measures, Martinus Nijhoff Publsihers, 2007, p. 435 at p. 452. 
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could be associated with similar SPS risks.62 It follows, therefore, that a complainant has the 
vital burden of demonstrating that the products in question in any given case pose similar SPS 
risks as it is this that triggers the non-discrimination obligations in SPS Article 2.3 and Article 
5.5. While this is distinguishable from the market competition-oriented standards of 
comparison between products/services that trigger similar obligations in GATT/GATS, the 
objective of preserving ‘equality’ remains the same. The equality sought to be achieved by the 
non-discrimination obligations in SPS is the equal treatment of products that pose similar SPS 
risks. As with products/services that are ‘unlike’ in the case of GATT/GATS, the flip-side of 
this coin is that these SPS obligations do not obstruct the ability of the WTO Members to 
regulate SPS risks that do not fall within the ambit of these provisions. 
 
Furthermore, as Article 5.5 only prohibits arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions, a WTO Panel 
has also noted that different levels of risks that are associated with two groups of products that 
pose similar risks could nonetheless render such risks to be dissimilar and cause such treatment 
to be incomparable under this provision.63 Thus, a higher risk in one group of products compared 
to another group of products with a similar yet less severe risk may not amount to an ‘arbitrary 
or unjustifiable’ distinction under this provision. Denise Prévost notes that in addition to such 
levels of risk, other difficulties associated with controlling such risks and the degree of 
government intervention necessary to achieve the desired level of protection are relevant in this 
determination of whether a distinction in the context of Article 5.5 is ‘arbitrary or unjustified’.64 
Similarly, Joanne Scott notes that while ‘higher risks’ justify the adoption of higher levels of 
protection, this determination should involve the scrutiny of the likelihood of a disease being 
introduced to and being spread in a particular WTO Member, the availability of alternatives 
and the scale of intervention required for that particular WTO Member.65 Consequently, a SPS 
risk posed by one group of products that might not be too severe to a developed country Member 
might be a high risk for a developing or least developed country Member who does not have 
the infrastructure to regulate such risks in those products. These factors that are meant to be 
relevant in the determination of whether Article 5.5 is applicable resemble those relevant under 
the test of ‘necessity’ under the General Exceptions of GATT/GATS. Unlike in GATT/GATS, 
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however, these factors serve to ensure that the very applicability of SPS’s non-discrimination 
obligations acknowledge the autonomy of the membership to determine the appropriate levels 
of SPS protection, the vitality of a given SPS risk and the developmental dissimilarities among 
the WTO Members. 
 
Even when the non-discrimination obligations in SPS Articles 2.3 and 5.5 are triggered in this 
manner, a measure would be inconsistent only if it results in arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination as set-out in Article 2.3. Although Article 5.5 only refers to ‘discrimination’ 
without referring to the concept of ‘arbitrary or unjustified’, the Appellate Body noted in EC- 
Hormones that as Article 5.5 is a specific manifestation of the general rule in Article 2.3, the 
latter constitutes important context to interpret the notion of ‘discrimination’ in Article 5.5.66 
Therefore, the Appellate Body noted that ‘discrimination’ in Article 5.5 refers to ‘arbitrary or 
unjustified’ discrimination. Examining the negotiation history relating to the non-
discrimination obligations in SPS, Denise Prévost states that there was broad consensus among 
the more developed countries to include a non-discrimination norm that prevented such 
measures from constituting illegitimate barriers to trade.67 However, the negotiators foresaw that 
a strict non-discrimination obligation would not be acceptable given that SPS conditions varied 
vastly from country to country and the WTO Members should be entitled to adopt SPS measures 
acknowledging such differences. Hence, the negotiators deemed the concept of ‘arbitrary or 
unjustified discrimination between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail’ to 
be more appropriate in the context of this Agreement.68 
 
She states that this concept of ‘arbitrary or unjustified discrimination’ was meant to strike an 
intricate balance between the domestic regulatory autonomy of the Members to adopt SPS 
measures and their obligation not to create illegitimate barriers. While this balance is very 
similar to that sought by the General Exceptions of GATT/GATS, Prévost identifies a 
difference between the GATT/GATS and the non-discrimination norms in SPS in the following 
manner: 
… a crucial difference exists between … the SPS Agreement and the relevant 
GATT provisions. A rule-exception relationship exists between Article I and 
III:4 of the GATT, on the one hand, and Article XX of the GATT on the other. 
                                               
66 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 212. 
67 Prévost, n. 64, pp. 125-131. 
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In this GATT framework, discriminatory measures are prohibited in principle 
by Articles I and III:4, but may be justified under an Article XX exception… 
By contrast, the prohibition of… the SPS Agreement itself incorporates 
flexibility for legitimate SPS measures by expressly limiting the content of its 
prohibition to cases of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.69 
Hence, although there is no rule-exception structure in the SPS Agreement, its non-
discriminations obligations inherently only prohibit arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between members where identical or similar conditions prevail. The assessment of whether 
there is such ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ is broader than the assessment of the 
presence of ‘similar SPS risks’ that Prévost argues that differences in the disease status between 
the territories, the dissimilar climatic conditions and geographical conditions that affect the 
incidence of pests and diseases, variations in the regulatory controls to minimise such risks and 
divergent dietary habits are just a few of the multitude of factors that are relevant in this 
determination.70 
 
As Prévost states, this gives the non-discrimination obligations in SPS a sui generis character. 
They have adapted to the exigencies of SPS regulation while bearing vital resemblances to the 
common balancing concepts found in the non-discrimination norms in GATT/GATS. They are 
not triggered automatically between products, but only when they pose similar SPS risks. 
Potentially ‘similar risks’ could also be shown to be ‘dissimilar’ by demonstrating heightened 
risks in a given product area in the light of how a WTO Member perceives such risks and its 
ability to regulate such risks. Moreover, Article 2.3 expressly recognizes the existence of 
differences in the SPS conditions among the WTO Members that could justify SPS measures 
that are detrimental to foreign products generally or of a particular Member. Therefore, inherent 
in the language of the non-discrimination obligations in SPS is the recognition of the sovereign 
right of the WTO Members to protect their citizens and territories against SPS risks in a manner 
that is appropriate to their domestic circumstances. This is the reason, Prévost notes, that 
although SPS’s NT/MFN obligations have a broad scope of application, their substantive 
content is limited compared to similar obligations in GATT/GATS.71 
 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) is another vital agreement concluded in 
1994 that seeks to strike an important balance between the autonomy of the WTO Members to 
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regulate products to protect certain public policy objectives and the need to ensure that such an 
autonomy is not abused to the detriment of international trade. As Bossche and Zdouc highlight, 
the objectives of such regulatory requirements are often the protection of life, health, 
environment, consumers, the prevention of deceptive practices and the promotion of other 
legitimate societal values.72 They play an important role in fulfilling multiple societal needs.73 
However, the fifth recital of the Preamble to TBT provides that such regulatory requirements 
should not create ‘unnecessary obstacles to international trade’. One of the fundamental ways 
in which TBT seeks to achieve this balance is by adopting the GATT’s substantive non-
discrimination obligations. The sixth recital of its Preamble states as follows: 
… no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure 
the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers 
appropriate… 
It then immediately goes on to provide that this right should not be exercised in a manner that: 
… would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction 
on international trade…  
Building on this objective, TBT Article 2.1 specifies the substantive non-discrimination 
obligation in relation to technical regulations that encompasses both, the NT and MFN 
obligations in the following manner: 
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products 
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like 
products originating in any other country. 
Consequently, a member’s technical regulations should accord ‘no less favourable treatment’ 
to products originating from a WTO Member than it accords to its own ‘like’ domestic products 
(NT) or to ‘like’ products originating from any other country (MFN). Resembling the non-
discrimination obligations of GATT/GATS, TBT Article 2.1 applies to ‘like products’.74 The 
Appellate Body held in US- Clove Cigarettes that the ‘like product’ analysis is identical to that 
of GATT and involves a determination as to the nature and extent of the ‘competitive 
                                               
72 Bossche and Zdouc, n. 6, p. 851. 
73 Ibid., p. 852. 
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relationship’ between the products in question.75 Hence, the four common criteria that include 
the product characteristics, consumer tastes and habits, end-uses and their tariff classification 
are similarly relevant here.76 As these criteria still remain only as ‘helpful tools’ in the 
assessment of ‘likeness’, the Appellate Body has reiterated that this does not preclude the 
regulatory concerns underlying a technical regulation from being relevant in the ‘likeness’ 
determination provided it has a bearing on the competitive relationship between the products.77 
Consequently, although this is not a licence to adopt an ‘aims and effect’ test, it keeps TBT’s 
‘likeness’ analysis sufficiently flexible so as to accommodate situations similar to that of EC- 
Asbestos where regulatory concerns relating to a group of products might be so severe that they 
could render them to be ‘unlike’ another group of similar products .  
 
Even when the products in question are ‘like’ and the non-discrimination obligations in TBT 
Article 2.1 are triggered, WTO tribunals have sought to achieve an even further balance 
between these obligations and the autonomy of the WTO Members in the interpretation of the 
concept of ‘treatment no less favourable’ under this provision. To begin with, the TBT 
Agreement does not contain any General Exceptions or specific exceptions that apply to its 
non-discrimination obligations in Article 2.1. Therefore, the demonstration of the products in 
question being ‘alike’ and the modification of the conditions of competition to the detriment of 
a group of products would have sufficed to establish an inconsistency. As Matsushita and others 
have noted, this would have led to a much stricter regime of non-discrimination than established 
in GATT.78 However, in US- Clove Cigarettes, which was the first case in which the Appellate 
Body dealt with this provision of TBT, it compensated this omission by what Matsushita and 
others claim to be a ‘dogmatically tenable contextual and teleological interpretation’.79 Dealing 
with the concept of ‘treatment no less favourable’, the Appellate explained that it covers both, 
de jure and de facto, forms of discrimination.80 However, it held that when an allegation is based 
on de facto discrimination, meaning an origin neutral measure in this context, a tribunal must 
not only examine if there has been a detrimental modification of the conditions competition, 
but also examine if it was caused by a legitimate regulatory distinction. The Appellate Body 
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noted that if the answer is affirmative, there would not be ‘treatment no less favourable’ within 
the meaning of Article 2.1. In the words of the Appellate Body: 
… where the technical regulation at issue does not de jure discriminate against 
imports, the existence of a detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for 
the group of imported vis-à-vis the group of domestic like products is not 
dispositive of less favourable treatment under Article 2.1. Instead, a panel must 
further analyze whether the detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively 
from a legitimate regulatory distinction rather than reflecting discrimination 
against the group of imported products. In making this determination, a panel 
must carefully scrutinize the particular circumstances of the case, that is, the 
design, architecture, revealing structure, operation, and application of the 
technical regulation at issue, and, in particular, whether that technical 
regulation is even-handed, in order to determine whether it discriminates 
against the group of imported products.81  
However, this concept of a legitimate regulatory distinction is apparently only applicable where 
the allegation is of de facto discrimination.82 As the Appellate Body appears to suggest, this is 
because an allegation of de jure discrimination is explicitly based on an origin specific national 
measure that is ‘dispositive’ of the prohibited type of discrimination. On the other hand, an 
allegation of de facto discrimination requires an additional inquiry as TBT was meant to strike 
a balance between regulatory autonomy and trade liberalization. Thus, it highlighted that the 
absence of a recognition of the members’ ability to make legitimate regulatory distinctions in 
the context of de facto allegations of discrimination would impede this balance.83  
 
Bossche and Zdouc state that the Appellate Body came to this understanding of the meaning of 
‘no less favourable treatment’ in Article 2.1 on the basis of the context of this provision and 
object and purpose of the TBT Agreement.84 This is apparent in the reasoning adopted by the 
Appellate Body. It noted that the objective of avoiding unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade is qualified by the sixth recital of the Preamble to TBT that recognizes the WTO Members’ 
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right to regulate products to pursue certain legitimate policies.85 It highlighted that this recital 
counterbalances the desire not to create unnecessary obstacles. In the absence of exceptions to 
the non-discrimination obligation that give effect to this balance, the Appellate Body concluded 
that: 
… Article 2.1 should not be interpreted as prohibiting any detrimental impact 
on competitive opportunities for imports in cases where such detrimental 
impact on imports stems exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinctions.86 
As Matsushita and others point out, the Appellate Body referred to TBT Article 2.2 to support 
its introduction of the concept of legitimate regulatory distinctions.87 TBT Article 2.2 requires 
members to ensure that their technical regulations do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade by providing that they ‘shall not be more trade restrictive than necessary to 
fulfill a legitimate objective’. The Appellate Body reasoned that as Article 2.2 foresees that 
trade restrictive obstacles might be necessary to achieve legitimate objectives, it would be made 
redundant if Article 2.1 prohibited all obstacles to international trade.88 Reason suggests that the 
same argument could be made even in relation to de jure allegations of discrimination under 
TBT Article 2.1. 
  
Consequently, the concept of a legitimate regulatory distinction is meant to acknowledge a vital 
form of regulatory autonomy that is similar to that sought by the General Exceptions of 
GATT/GATS. Although the purpose of its creation was more or less clear, its substantive 
content has not yet been fully revealed in the WTO jurisprudence. The Appellate Body noted 
in US- Clove Cigarettes that when assessing if the detrimental treatment is caused by such a 
legitimate regulatory distinction, a tribunal must examine the design, structure, architecture, 
revealing structure and the operation of a measure and in particular, whether it has been applied 
in an even-handed manner.89 However, it did not clearly address as for what end this should be 
done or as to what is even meant by a ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’. 
 
Jason Houston-Mcmillan examines this creation of the Appellate Body and states that subject 
to certain conditions such as even-handedness, it effectively recognizes an open list of 
legitimate policies that a WTO Member may pursue to justify the disadvantageous treatment of 
                                               
85 Appellate Body Report, US- Clove Cigarettes, n. 75, para. 94. 
86 Ibid., para. 174. Emphasis added. 
87 Matsushita et al., n. 6, p. 449. 
88 Appellate Body Report, US- Clove Cigarettes, n. 75, para. 171. 
89 Ibid., para. 182. 
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foreign products.90 He states that the policies mentioned in TBT Article 2.2 including the 
protection of human, animal, plant life or health are instructive as to what may constitute a 
‘legitimate’ policy objective in this context.91 Consequent to examining the meanings that the 
subsequent tribunals have attributed to the words ‘legitimate’, ‘regulatory’, ‘distinctions’ and 
‘even-handedness’, Houston-Mcmillan concludes that the concept of regulatory distinctions 
within the TBT Agreement effectively entitles a Member to differentiate products in the 
pursuance of a reasonable and justifiable objective in a fair and justifiable manner.92 Although 
there is still an appreciable level of uncertainty as to the specifics of this concept and how it 
must be established before a tribunal, the reason identified by the Appellate Body for its 
creation is palpably traceable to the balance that the substantive non-discrimination obligations 
are meant to achieve within the WTO’s system.  
 
The foregoing analysis of the substantive non-discrimination obligations in some of the most 
significant covered agreements of the WTO dealing with goods and services demonstrate a 
recurring theme that is inherent in the trade concept of non-discrimination. This is the 
significance of balancing these obligations with the autonomy on the part of the WTO Members 
to pursue legitimate public policy objectives. Even though the manner in which this balance is 
sought is not identical under each of the covered agreements that have been discussed in this 
Part of the Chapter, the need for such a balance is abundantly clear upon the scrutiny of the 
scope and application of these obligations. This common thread that runs across the substantive 
non-discrimination norms constitutes important ‘context’ in the interpretation of the concept of 
‘discrimination’ in TRIPS Article 27.1 and highlights the need to balance this obligation against 
some form autonomy on the part of the WTO Members. The next Part of this Chapter 
demonstrates that the need for a similar balance to acknowledge the autonomy on the part of 
the Members in the context of the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology is 




                                               
90 J. Houston-Mcmillan, ‘The Legitimate Regulatory Distinction Test: Incomplete and Inadequate for the Particular 
Purposes of the TBT Agreement’, World Trade Review, vol. 15, no. 4, 2016, p. 543. 
91 Ibid., p. 554. 
92 Ibid.; For a critic of the concept of even-handedness see A. Appleton, ‘National Treatment Under the TBT 
Agreement’, in Sanders (ed.), n. 2, p. 92. 
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• THE NATIONAL TREATMENT AND MOST-FAVOURED NATION TREATMENT 
OBLIGATIONS IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
 
Before proceeding to analyse the ‘object and purpose’ of the TRIPS Agreement in the next Part 
of this Chapter, there are some important points to be made in relation to TRIPS’s own National 
Treatment (NT) and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN) obligations in order to 
understand why the common thread that is apparent in the interpretation and application of the 
NT/MFN obligations under the other covered agreements has not manifested in TRIPS. TRIPS 
Article 3 that specifies its NT obligation requires Members to accord ‘treatment no less 
favourable’ to ‘nationals of other Members’ than it accords to its own nationals with regard to 
the ‘protection of intellectual property’. TRIPS Article 4 that contains its MFN obligation states 
that ‘any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity’ given by a Member to the national of any 
other country with regard to the ‘protection of intellectual property’ shall be accorded 
‘immediately and unconditionally’ to the nationals of other WTO Members.93 The concept of 
‘protection of intellectual property’ is defined very broadly in the footnotes to include matters 
affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance, enforcement and use of intellectual 
property rights that have been specifically addressed in the Agreement.  
 
Although these obligations contain the concept of ‘less favourable treatment’ found in the non-
discrimination obligations in the other covered agreements, their scope is very different under 
the TRIPS Agreement. They apply to ‘nationals’ as opposed to goods or services. Thus, for 
example, there is no need to establish the ‘likeness’ of the products that contain the intellectual 
property. This is because the Preamble to TRIPS recognizes that intellectual property rights are 
private rights that are owned by private individuals.94 These obligations also encompass a broad 
range of measures provided they affect the types of intellectual property rights addressed in 
TRIPS. Further and even more fundamentally, TRIPS does not contain any exceptions to these 
obligations except for the minor exception relating to judicial and administrative processes in 
Article 3.2 and few other exclusions set out in Article 4. Thus, on their face, its NT and MFN 
obligations appear to have a greater force than in any of the other covered agreements.  
 
                                               
93 For commentaries on these provisions see, N. de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patents and Test Data, Fourth 
edition, Kluwer Law International, 2014, pp. 109-135; C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 51-72; J. Malbon, C. Lawson 
and M. Davison, The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Edward Elgar, 
2014, pp. 117-163. 
94 See generally A. Sanders, ‘National Treatment under the TRIPS Agreement’, in Sanders (ed.), n. 2, p. 286. 
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Nonetheless, the nature of TRIPS is such that this scope does not so readily intrude upon the 
sort of autonomy that the non-discrimination norms under the other covered agreements have 
sought to balance. While GATT, GATS, TBT and SPS are trade liberalizing agreements, as 
Susy Frankel rightly notes, TRIPS directly concerns trade barriers given that the protection of 
intellectual property rights by itself increases barriers to trade.95 The first recital of its Preamble 
acknowledges this by stating that TRIPS is meant to strike a balance between the lack of 
protection and over protection of intellectual property rights. Frankel further points out, 
however, that WTO Members have agreed that the minimum standards enshrined in TRIPS 
constitute acceptable barriers in this context.96 In these circumstances, it is those minimum 
standards and the higher standards that a WTO Member may voluntarily and consistently adopt 
that are subject to TRIPS’s NT and MFN obligations.97 Hence, as Correa notes, TRIPS’s non-
discrimination obligations do not otherwise by themselves commit WTO Members to provide 
certain levels of protection.98 It is only the level of protection that a WTO Member applies 
consistently with the minimum standards in TRIPS that fall within the scope of its NT/MFN 
obligations.  
 
These minimum standards in TRIPS by themselves recognize certain exclusions and exceptions 
to the various forms of intellectual property rights that acknowledge the ability on the part of 
the Members to pursue important policy objectives to a certain extent in those contexts. For 
example, Article 13 permits limitations and exceptions to copyrights, Article 17 provides for 
exceptions to the rights conferred by a trade mark and Article 30 allows for exceptions to rights 
conferred by patents. Such provisions recognize a level of autonomy on the part of the Members 
to make exclusions and exceptions and do not trigger the substantive non-discrimination norms 
in Article 3 and Article 4 provided they do not explicitly or implicitly apply only to ‘nationals’ 
of other Members. While this is perhaps the reason why the Panel on EC- Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications99 did not signify the need to adopt any concept to balance TRIPS’s 
NT obligation with the autonomy of the Members, it is submitted that this is not a satisfactory 
reason to rule out such a need.  
 
                                               
95 S. Frankel, ‘The Applicability of GATT Jurisprudence to the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement’, in C. 
Correa (ed.), Research Handbook on the Interpretation and Enforcement of Intellectual Property under WTO 
Rules, Edwar Elgar, 2010, p. 3. 
96 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
97 Ibid., p. 10. Also see Carvalho, n. 93, p. 110. 
98 Correa., n. 93, p. 52. 
99 Panel Report, European Communities- Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuff (US), WT/DS174/R. 
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There could be instances when a WTO Member may seek to adopt a measure that renders it 
more difficult for nationals of another Member to protect their intellectual property rights in 
order to pursue an important policy objective. For example, as in EC- Geographical 
Indications, a Member may condition the protection of intellectual property rights of nationals 
of another Member by requiring that Member to adopt a specific system for the protection of 
such rights. Similarly, a Member may adopt an exception to patent rights that in practice serve 
to disadvantage nationals of a particular Member. In such instances the autonomy recognized 
by TRIPS’s exceptions and exclusions will not be sufficient to prevent a violation of the 
NT/MFN obligations. While the WTO tribunals have not yet recognized the applicability of 
any exceptions or concepts that could balance TRIPS’s NT/MFN obligations with the autonomy 
of the membership to pursue vital policies, the final Chapter of this thesis will revisit this issue 
to highlight the significance of a more concrete balance in the light of TRIPS’s Objectives and 
Principles because the same ‘context’ that highlights the need for a balance in the interpretation 
of the concept ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in TRIPS Article 27.1 highlights the 
need for a similar balance in the interpretation and application of TRIPS’s NT/MFN 
obligations. 
 
B. AUTONOMY UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: THE PREAMBLE, 
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 
 
In addition to setting out wide ranging minimum standards relating to the protection of 
intellectual property rights, TRIPS achieved something that had never been done before by a 
multilateral treaty dealing with intellectual property. In a complex manner, the significance of 
which was either unforeseen or very tactical, it highlighted the importance of balancing 
intellectual property law obligations against the WTO Members’ need to achieve economic, 
technological and developmental objectives. Hence, Robert Howse notes that the basic purpose 
of the TRIPS Agreement is: 
… not protection and enforcement of these private rights as such, but rather in 
a manner so as to achieve the mutual advantage of both producers and users 
and a balance of obligations and rights and to contribute to social and economic 
welfare.100 
                                               
100 R. Howse, ‘The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times’, J. World 
Intel. Prop., vol. 3, no. 4, 2000, p. 493 at p. 497. 
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In a similar vein, Abdulqawi Yusuf states that in addition to recognizing the need for 
substantive intellectual property standards to reduce ‘distortions and impediments’ to 
international trade, the Preamble to TRIPS acknowledges the significance of underlying public 
policy objectives in the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and 
technological objectives. He states that this is an ‘explicit’ acknowledgement of the role of 
public policy objectives in the design of national intellectual property systems.101  
 
This acknowledgement in the Preamble102 is manifested in two provisions found in the body of 
the Agreement entitled Objectives (Article 7) and Principles (Article 8) that were the creations 
of the ‘Group of 14’ developing nations. As Peter Yu states, they demonstrate the compromise 
that was struck between the developed and less-developed countries during the negotiations.103 
It was arguably the best achievement by the developing countries in the negotiations, the 
benefits of which have not yet been realized to the fullest. This Part argues that the 
interpretational significance that is meant to be given to TRIPS’s Objectives and Principles 
buttress the ‘context’ highlighted in Part A by demonstrating the need to acknowledge the 
autonomy on the part of the WTO Members within the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields 
of technology in Article 27.1.104 
 
The Objectives and Principles are respectively set-out in Articles 7 and 8 in Part I of the 
Agreement that is entitled ‘General Provisions and Basic Principles’. Given the title of this part 
of the Agreement and their positioning within the substantive parts of the Agreement, Correa 
states that an interpreter cannot disregard this choice made by the negotiators and must give 
them a heightened legal status in the implementation and interpretation of the Agreement.105 One 
can comprehend the accuracy of this reasoning by appreciating the important sentiments 
expressed in these provisions. The Objectives (Article 7) provide as follows: 
                                               
101 A. Yusuf, ‘TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions’, in C. Correa and A. Yusuf (eds.), 
Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPs Agreement, Third edition, Kluwer Law International 
BV, 2016, p. 3. 
102 Also see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development and UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development (eds.), Resource Book on 
TRIPS and Development, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 3 and 11 [hereinafter referred to as ‘UNCTAD 
Resource Book’]; Correa, n. 93, p. 92. 
103 See P. Yu, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement’, Houston Law Review, vol. 46, no. 4, 2009, 
p. 979 at p. 1025. 
104 For detailed commentaries on the Objectives and Principles, also see Correa, n. 93, Ch. 4; S. Frankel, ‘WTO 
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105 Correa, n. 93, p. 93. Also see UNCTAD Resource Book, n. 102, p. 124. 
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The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.  
Article 7 underscores the acknowledgement in TRIPS’s Preamble that intellectual property 
rights are private rights by identifying that the protection of these private rights ‘should’ 
contribute to broader national interests. Suggesting the type of compromise that was reached 
between the negotiators, it acknowledges that the protection of intellectual property is not an 
end by itself, but only a means to an end.106 These ends are those identified in Article 7 and 
include the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and the dissemination of 
technology. Hence, the protection of intellectual property rights should contribute to meeting 
these broader objectives of the Agreement. As Carvalho notes, these ends are to be met with 
three societal considerations in mind: the mutual advantage of producers and users, 
conduciveness to social and economic welfare and a balance of rights and obligations.107 As 
Article 7 uses the term ‘should’, many academics have rightly highlighted that the objectives 
mentioned therein are not achieved automatically by implementing the minimum standards of 
the Agreement, but that they are forward looking and prescribe a sense of responsibility on the 
part of each Member to ensure that the balance between intellectual property rights and the 
other public policy interests would be achieved. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan echoes this 
academic opinion in the following manner: 
…the use of ‘should’ in Article 7 suggests that the desired effects are not 
achieved automatically and do not follow as such from any mode of protecting 
and enforcing IP rights. Neither are these effects necessarily inherent and fully 
realized in all the individual TRIPS provisions. Had this been the case, Article 
7 would be redundant as an operational provision.108  
The UNCTAD Resource Book on TRIPS also notes that: 
The wording of Article 7 suggests that such a protection does not automatically 
lead to the effect described therein. In introducing IPR protection, countries 
should frame the applicable rules so as to promote technological innovation 
                                               
106 Yu, n. 103, p. 1005. 
107 Carvalho, n. 93, p. 166. 
108 Ruse-Khan, n. 104, p. 459. Emphasis in original. Footnotes omitted. 
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and the transfer and dissemination of technology “in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare”.109 
The Panel on Canada- Pharmaceuticals acknowledged this when it stated that the balance 
between intellectual property protection and other societal interests necessitated by Article 7 
has not already taken place in the substantive provisions of TRIPS and that the obligations need 
certain ‘adjustments’ by the WTO Members before being able to do so.110 A WTO Panel 
reiterated similar sentiments in its report in Australia- Plain Packaging by stating that Article 
7:  
… reflects the intention of establishing and maintaining a balance between the 
societal objectives mentioned therein’.111  
This sense of responsibility on the part of the WTO Members that is highlighted by Article 7 
indicates the type of autonomy on the part of the Member States to determine the requisite 
balance between intellectual property rights and other public policy interests that best fits their 
domestic context in the implementation of the TRIPS obligations. The type of autonomy that 
Article 7 preserves could hardly be read in isolation of Article 8. Article 8 entitled ‘Principles’, 
provides as follows:  
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement.  
As the Panel on Australia- Plain Packaging has highlighted, Article 8.1 serves to ensure that 
TRIPS does not prevent WTO Members from taking measures to protect vital societal 
interests.112 It recognizes the ability of the Members to adopt measures ‘necessary’ to protect 
‘public health and nutrition’ and to ‘promote public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development’, provided such measures are consistent 
with the other provisions of TRIPS. Hence, Abdulqawi Yusuf identifies it as the ‘public interest 
principle’ of the Agreement.113 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan even suggests that Article 8.1 deals 
                                               
109 UNCTAD Resource Book, n. 102, p. 126. Emphasis added. 
110 Panel Report, Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, para. 7.25-7.26. 
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with the type of public policy interests that are dealt by the General Exceptions in 
GATT/GATS.114 Carlos Correa, who perhaps gives the widest interpretation to this provision, 
states that Article 8.1 confirms the ‘broad and unfettered’ discretion that members have to 
pursue public policy objectives.115 
 
Both these provisions have been regarded to be significant in the interpretation and application 
of the TRIPS Agreement, which was confirmed by the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration).116 In this Declaration, that Peter Yu states that 
‘strongly reinforced’ the significance of the Objectives and Principles,117 the Members declared 
that: 
 … each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the 
object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its 
objectives and principles.118  
Ruse-Khan notes that this should quash any doubts that anyone continues to have as to the 
effect of the Objectives and Principles of TRIPS.119 Even though the Declaration was subsequent 
to the Panel Report in Canada- Pharmaceuticals and could not have influenced its formulation 
of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1, this Report was the first to have highlighted the significance 
of TRIPS’s Objectives and Principles in the interpretation of the Agreement. The Panel noted 
that ‘the goals and limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind’ in 
the interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement.120 The reason for both these provisions to 
be regarded so significant in the interpretation of the Agreement is because they address two 
important forms of autonomy on the part of the WTO Members.  
 
The Objectives preserve the ability of the Members to determine the requisite balance between 
intellectual property rights and other public policy interests that best fits their domestic context. 
The Principles preserve the ability of the Members to adopt measures to protect public policies 
in order to give effect to that balance. The Objectives and Principles are always read together 
as Article 8 is a specific manifestation of the balance mandated by Article 7. The ability to 
adopt measures to protect vital public policies mentioned in Article 8 is one of the ways in 
                                               
114 Ruse-Khan, n. 104, p. 439. 
115 Correa, n. 93, p. 108. 
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WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, Doha, 2001 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Doha Declaration’].  
117 Yu, n. 103, p. 995. 
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which TRIPS acknowledges the significance of the balance articulated in Article 7. This 
autonomy to determine the proper balance is similar to that found in the jurisprudence relating 
to GATT Article XX, GATS Article XIV, SPS and TBT Agreements. Just as much as WTO 
Members have the right to adopt SPS measures and technical regulations to pursue legitimate 
objectives, they have the autonomy to choose an appropriate balance between intellectual 
property rights and other public interests that they seek to achieve in relation to each form of 
intellectual property rights addressed in TRIPS. It is because this autonomy is manifested in 
Article 8.1 that there is an appreciable level of agreement among the academics that a WTO 
tribunal cannot question a Member’s determination of what constitutes a ‘vital public interest’ 
or the level of protection of such an interest that a Member desires to achieve.121 
 
This autonomy preserved in the Objectives and Principles comes into operation in the 
interpretation and application of different types of ‘constructive ambiguity’ found in the TRIPS 
Agreement. As Ruse-Khan states, Article 7 comes into play when a TRIPS provision uses broad 
and vague legal terminology,122 as is the case with the provisions dealing with exceptions under 
the TRIPS Agreement. Hence, for example, concepts such as ‘limited’, ‘unreasonableness’, 
‘legitimate interests’ and ‘normal exploitation’ found in TRIPS Article 30 should be interpreted 
in a manner that acknowledges the balance that a WTO Member is entitled to determine 
between intellectual property protection and other public policy interests. On the other hand, 
Article 8 comes into play when a positive obligation itself is left ambiguous, which leads to 
uncertainty as to what is expected of a WTO Member. In such instances, those obligations must 
be interpreted in a manner that acknowledges the ability of the WTO Members to pursue vital 
public policy objectives that have been set out in Article 8 subject to its conditions of ‘necessity’ 
and ‘consistency’. Disregarding this ability in the interpretation of an ambiguous TRIPS 
obligation would hinder the autonomy that WTO Members have to determine the requisite 
balance between intellectual property rights and public interests that best fits their domestic 
context. This is the reason why Jayashree Watal states that WTO Members are entitled to use 
the ‘constructive ambiguity’ found in various parts in TRIPS to observe the Objectives and 
Principles of the Agreement.123 Peter Yu further notes: 
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These constructive ambiguities therefore provide less-developed countries 
with a bulwark against the continuous expansion of intellectual property rights. 
If strategically used, they will allow less-developed countries to actively push 
for interpretations that meet their needs, interests, and goals. They will also 
preserve the much-needed policy space that has been appropriately reserved to 
them during the TRIPS negotiations.124  
This varying interpretational significance of the Objectives and Principles has been 
acknowledged in several academic writings. Denis Barbosa and others state that Article 8 
demonstrates a ‘retention of sovereignty’, which together with Article 7, should be given a 
‘vectorial’ reading.125 They appear to suggest that the relevance of the Objectives and Principles 
vary depending on the type of provision at hand. It is submitted that it is dependent on the type 
of autonomy that is in issue, which in turn depends on the type of TRIPS provision that is in 
question. Similarly, Ruse-Khan states that the Objectives and Principles must be adhered to 
when interpreting and implementing specific conditions in TRIPS,126 which he later goes on to 
elaborate that are ambiguous, indefinite and multi-layered.127 
 
In effect, TRIPS preserves a vital yet unique form of autonomy within its Objectives and 
Principles. The manner in which Articles 7 and 8 are meant to operate demonstrate the vital 
policy space that has been preserved in TRIPS, which Peter Yu points out in poetic terms, could 
be a guiding light, a shield for excessive IP demands, a sword to combat overzealous IP 
standards, a bridge to connect to other areas of international law and a seed for future 
development.128 Their interpretational significance demand that even without any reference the 
WTO’s substantive non-discrimination obligations under the other covered agreements 
discussed in Part A of this Chapter, an open-ended concept such as ‘discrimination’ must be 
interpreted in a manner that acknowledges the autonomy on the part of the WTO Members that 
has been preserved in these two provisions of the Agreement. 
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C. REVEALING THE PANEL’S CONCEPT OF ‘JUSTIFICATION’ 
 
The ‘context’ that consists of the substantive non-discrimination obligations in the WTO and 
the ‘object and purpose’ of the TRIPS Agreement highlight the need for a balance between the 
rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology and the autonomy of the WTO 
Members that has been preserved in the Objectives and Principles. This Part shows that the 
nature of the non-discrimination obligation relating to the ground of fields of technology is such 
that this balance could be sought only by creating a concept of ‘justification’, which the Panel 
appears to have done in its formulation of ‘discrimination’ in Canada- Pharmaceuticals. 
Thereafter, this Part proceeds to identify the constitutive elements of this concept and provide 
a more concrete understanding of the Panel’s formulation that is specifically applicable to the 
ground of fields of technology.  
 
• THE BROAD SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATION 
 
The discussion in Part A concerning the NT/MFN obligations in GATT, GATS, SPS and TBT 
showed that they come into operation only in certain defined and comparable circumstances 
that must established between the subject matter. The ‘likeness’ of products/services found in 
GATT/GATS is one such standard. As their NT/MFN obligations seek to preserve the equality 
in the conditions of competition between products/services, such standards of comparison seek 
to determine if the privileged and disadvantaged products/services are in fact in a competitive 
relationship in the first place. Moreover, this determination of ‘likeness’ has the potential to 
acknowledge certain regulatory concerns and prevent these obligations from coming into 
operation when the products in question could be considered to be ‘unlike’. However, such 
standards of comparison are not present in the rule against ‘discrimination’ of fields of 
technology in TRIPS Article 27.1. There is nothing in Article 27.1 that suggests that the rule 
comes into operation only between ‘like’ fields of technology or upon establishing some 
similarity between the fields of technology in question. The Panel on Canada- Pharmaceuticals 
acknowledged this when it noted that the obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1 is broader than 
TRIPS’s own NT/MFN obligations found in Article 3 and Article 4. It stated that: 
The primary TRIPS provisions that deal with discrimination, such as the 
national treatment and most-favoured-nation provisions of Articles 3 and 4, do 
not use the term "discrimination". They speak in more precise terms. The 
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ordinary meaning of the word "discriminate" is potentially broader than these 
more specific definitions. 129 
It is difficult to introduce specific standards of comparison between fields of technology even 
in the interpretation of this obligation for the following reasons. The Appellate Body seminally 
cautioned in India- Patents that no principle of interpretation entitles ‘the imputation into a 
treaty of words that are not there’.130 Although there is a link between the substantive non-
discrimination obligations and the broader obligation in Article 27.1, an interpreter must 
acknowledge the wide scope of the latter that results from the lack of any textual reference to a 
specific standard of comparison that must be established between fields of technology. Hence, 
the rule must be understood as preventing discrimination between all fields of technology, 
irrespective of whether they are similar or not.  
 
Nicolas Diebold has noted in an article that comprehensively examines the concept of non-
discrimination in international economic law that where a non-discrimination rule does not 
specify comparators for its application, it is meant to apply to all the subject matter irrespective 
of any standards of comparison.131 Although Diebold did not specifically identify the non-
discrimination rule in TRIPS Article 27.1 to be an example of this, it is submitted that it is so. 
While NT/MFN obligations are meant to preserve equality in the conditions of competition, the 
rule in TRIPS Article 27.1 does not concern competition at all. It only concerns the availably 
and enjoyment of patent rights for fields of technology. Consequently, the existence of 
competition or of similarities between fields of technology are irrelevant or at most, incidental 
in the context of this TRIPS’s obligation.  
 
Further, there is a pragmatic reason why there could not be a substantive comparison between 
fields of technology in the context of patent law. Unlike products and services, fields of 
technology are more complex. There are often a multitude of factors that could render two fields 
of technology to be different although they may appear to be ‘like’ or similar at first. The costs 
involved in research and development, the likelihood of succeeding in the innovation process, 
market access and consumer demand are just a few factors that vary from technology to 
technology. Given such idiosyncrasies pertaining to each field of technology, it is almost 
impossible to specify the factors that must inform a determination of any specific standard of 
                                               
129 Panel Report, Canada- Pharmaceuticals, n. 110, para. 7.94. 
130 Appellate Body Report, India- Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
WT/DS50/AB/R at para. 45. 
131 See N. Diebold, ‘Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 60, 2011, p. 831. 
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comparison between fields of technology. Thus, the absence of any standard of comparison 
between fields of technology in TRIPS Article 27.1 gives its non-discrimination obligation a 
broad scope of application. It does not have one of the vital safeguards prevalent in the NT/MFN 
obligations under the other covered agreements of the WTO. Thereby, Article 27.1 mandates 
equality between all fields of technology with regard to the availability and enjoyment of patent 
rights. 
 
The broad notion of ‘discrimination’ and the absence of any specific standards of comparison 
between fields of technology makes this obligation to be triggered in a wide array of 
circumstances. As the Panel noted in Canada- Pharmaceuticals in its formulation of 
‘discrimination’, it is triggered when a national measure confers disadvantageous treatment to 
a field of technology in the context of the availability or enjoyment of patent rights. The Panel 
noted that ‘disadvantageous treatment’ is something more than mere differential treatment by 
formulating that ‘discrimination’ in this context is the unjustified imposition of differentially 
disadvantageous treatment. However, the Panel did not explain what constitutes 
disadvantageous treatment in this context.  
 
While it is correct that mere differential should not constitute disadvantageous treatment, it is 
apparent that they are two extremes of the notion of ‘differential treatment’. The notion of mere 
differential treatment acknowledges the very character of patent law in which every invention 
is naturally treated differently. As every invention is different from one another, basic patent 
law concepts need a certain amount of tweaking before being applied to any given invention. 
Thus, concepts such as novelty, inventive step, industrial application and even the scope of a 
patent are dependent on the very specifics of the invention in issue. While those forms of 
differentiation do not trespass the boundaries of disadvantageous treatment, it is also fairly clear 
as to what should constitute the latter. Restricting, or in the words of Carvalho, ‘curtailing’ the 
availability of patents to inventions in a certain field of technology or restricting the scope of 
rights of patents in a particular field of technology should necessarily constitute 
disadvantageous treatment. Such would evidently constitute ‘extra hurdles’.132 In between these 
two extremes of differential treatment, the line demarcating the two concepts fluctuates 
principally in two respects. Firstly, depending on whether the assessment of ‘discrimination’ is 
based on the availability or enjoyment of patent rights. Secondly, and more importantly, 
                                               
132 In EC- Geographical Indications, a WTO Panel noted that there would ‘less favourable treatment’ in the context 
of TRIPS Article 3 if the measure destroyed the effective quality of ‘nationals’ to protect their intellectual property 
rights within the jurisdiction of a given WTO member and that it would be so if the thrust and effect of a measure 
constitutes an ‘extra hurdle’. See Panel Report, EC- Geographical Indications, n. 99, para. 7. 137. 
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depending on the field of technology in issue. Therefore, it is possible that what amounts to a 
mere differential treatment in one field of technology could be disadvantageous to another, and 
vice-versa. Moreover, the broad notion of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 is also such that there 
is no de minimis standard of disadvantageousness that is necessary to trigger a violation of this 
obligation provided it affects the availability or enjoyment of patent rights. 
 
Consequently, whether a field of technology is disadvantaged is dependent on a technology 
specific fact sensitive assessment. Nevertheless, as TRIPS specifies certain minimum standards 
that must be adhered to when granting patents (Article 27.1) and the rights that must be given 
to a patentee (Article 28), it is submitted that there are instances when the disadvantageousness 
of a measure could be presumed. Thus, explicitly imposing additional criteria for the 
patentability of inventions in a particular field of technology and imposing explicit restrictions 
on the patent rights of inventions in a particular field of technology should be so presumptively 
disadvantageous. This is why it is hardly deniable that the practice of automatic compulsory 
licences of patented pharmaceutical and food related inventions, which was prevalent in the 
pre-TRIPS era, was disadvantageous to those fields of technology. However, such a 
presumption should be capable of being rebutted by a respondent by demonstrating that such 
treatment falls within its autonomy to define and apply the patentability criteria (Article 27.1), 
or to grant limited exceptions (Article 30) or compulsory licences (Article 31).  
 
Moreover, a finding of disadvantageous treatment need not be limited to cases where measures 
explicitly confer such treatment. A tribunal should be entitled to find disadvantageous treatment 
even in implicit circumstances. The Appellate Body has highlighted the significance of de facto 
application of WTO’s non-discrimination norms in EC- Bananas III, although this was in the 
context of the National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment obligations. It stated 
that the application of these rules to de facto circumstances serve as an insurance against the 
circumvention of those obligations by preventing discrimination caused by measures that on 
their face appear to be non-discriminatory.133 For the same reason, ensuring the de facto 
application of the rule in TRIPS Article 27.1 is necessary to ensure that WTO Members do not 
implicitly discriminate fields of technology. Such de facto applications of the non-
discrimination norms, however, have not been the simplest to comprehend in WTO 
jurisprudence. Petros Mavroidis notes that although the standard of review is technically the 
same for de jure and de facto allegations, the tribunals have begun to require additional proof 
                                               
133 Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
n. 4, para. 233. 
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in the case of the latter.134 The reason for this is that there is a risk of the WTO rules unjustifiably 
intruding the legitimate regulatory autonomy of its Members if de facto allegations are taken 
too lightly. Hence, a WTO Panel has stated that: 
A complainant, especially in a case of de facto discrimination, cannot simply 
point to the measure at issue and then expect the panel to find a violation where 
the respondent fails to show that the measure at issue never could result in a 
violation of one or more WTO obligations. In cases of de facto discrimination, 
the complainant must provide evidence and argument sufficient to show why 
a measure that appears to be non-discriminatory on its face nevertheless in fact 
provides less favourable treatment to imported products in a way that is 
repugnant to WTO law.135  
Consequently, de facto allegations require a heightened level of proof. This is also perhaps what 
the Panel in Canada- Pharmaceuticals meant when it stated that although the non-
discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1 applies in de facto circumstances, it requires 
proof of a discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory effect.136 An allegation of de facto 
discrimination in the context of Article 27.1 should require the demonstration of the de facto 
disadvantageous treatment of a field of technology with regard to the availability and enjoyment 
of patent rights. This should necessarily be supported with satisfactory evidence in order to 
ensure that it does not unjustly intrude upon the autonomy of the WTO Members preserved 
under the TRIPS Agreement in relation to their patent law obligations. This autonomy is distinct 
from the type of autonomy discussed in relation to TRIPS’s Objectives and Principles. In the 
context of a de facto allegation relating to the availability of patent rights, a tribunal must 
acknowledge the autonomy of the Members to interpret and apply the patentability criteria set 
out in Article 27.1. Similarly, in the context of such allegations relating to the enjoyment of 
patent rights, tribunals must acknowledge the autonomy of the Members to restrict patent rights 
by making limited exceptions (Article 30) and granting compulsory licences (Article 31).  
 
For these reasons, demonstrating disadvantageous treatment in de facto circumstances would 
not be an easy task for a complainant. The difficulty that a complainant would face in such 
circumstances can be observed in the few instances where this non-discrimination obligation in 
TRIPS Article 27.1 has been in issue. For example, in Canada- Pharmaceuticals the Panel was 
                                               
134 P. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade, Vol. 1- GATT, MIT Press, 2016, pp. 361-362. 
135 Panel Report, United States- Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products (Article 21.5 Mexico), WT/DS381/RW, para. 7.65. 
136 See Panel Report, Canada- Pharmaceuticals, n. 110, para. 7.94 and 7.101. 
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reluctant to accept that any disadvantageous treatment caused to pharmaceuticals by the 
Canadian regulatory review exceptions was limited only to pharmaceuticals. It stated that: 
…the critical question was whether there was some practical reason why the 
regulatory review exception would in reality work only to the disadvantage of 
producers of patented pharmaceutical products.137 
Notwithstanding the fact that the regulatory review exception was only being applied to 
pharmaceuticals at that time, the Panel found that there was no de facto discrimination of 
pharmaceuticals. This is also evident in the arbitral award given in the NAFTA dispute initiated 
by Eli Lilly against the government of Canada. Eli Lilly alleged that Canada’s ‘promise 
doctrine’ discriminated pharmaceuticals in violation NAFTA Article 1709(7) which similarly 
prohibits ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in relation to the availability and enjoyment 
of patent rights.138 The Canadian promise doctrine, which has since been ‘over-ruled’ by the 
Canadian Supreme Court139 was used by the Patent Office and the Courts to assess the utility of 
all inventions by examining if an invention is capable of meeting the promise that it makes in 
its patent specification.140 Eli Lilly contended that although the doctrine technically applied to 
all inventions, it was particularly disadvantageous to pharmaceuticals as it had served to 
invalidate more pharmaceutical patents by heightened proof of ‘utility’ that is determined vis-
à-vis the patent specification. Eli Lilly even highlighted that since 2005, more than twenty four 
pharmaceutical patents had been invalidated due to the lack of such heightened utility and that 
the ‘promise doctrine’ had not had any similar impact on other fields of technology.141 
Notwithstanding this, the arbitrators held that Eli Lilly had not sufficiently demonstrated that 
the doctrine worked to disadvantage pharmaceuticals to constitute de facto discrimination.142 
Consequently, while the finding of disadvantageous treatment could be made de jure or de 
facto, an allegation based on the de facto circumstances would necessarily require a significant 
level of proof than an allegation based on the former.  
 
Consequently, the wide notion of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 has the potential to proscribe 
a wide array of patent law measures that disadvantageously affect the availability and/or 
enjoyment of patent rights of a given field of technology. Although de facto allegations would 
                                               
137 Ibid., para. 7.102. Emphasis added. 
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require additional proof to ensure that the obligation acknowledges the autonomy of the 
Members to define the patentability criteria, make limited exceptions and grant compulsory 
licences, this does not limit the scope of the obligation. Even though the Panel in Canada- 
Pharmaceuticals did not acknowledge, the breadth of the notion of ‘discrimination’ in Article 
27.1 is such that it is even triggered by conferring preferential treatment to a field of technology 
with regard to the availability or enjoyment of patent rights. This is because the general 
prohibition of ‘discrimination’ that applies between all fields of technology does not specify 
any particular type or level of treatment that it proscribes. As Catherine Barnard notes, although 
in a different context, all non-discrimination rules are the legal manifestation of the more 
general concept of equality.143 Article 27.1 seeks the highest form of equality by prohibiting a 
broad notion of ‘discrimination’, which prohibits both, disadvantageous and preferential 
treatment. In fact, the WTO is not unaccustomed with how preferential treatment could 
constitute discrimination. For example, the Most-Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN) 
obligations in GATT, GATS, SPS and TBT scrutinize if a preference or advantage given to the 
products/services of one WTO Member are also given to the ‘like’ products/services of other 
WTO Members. For these reasons, several academics have highlighted the applicability of the 
non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1 to cases of preferential treatment. For 
example, Carlos Correa states: 
Whether the discrimination is positive or negative is, in fact, irrelevant in the 
light of Article 27.1. An additional period of patent protection for specific 
categories of products may well be deemed not TRIPS-compliant.144 
Even Carvalho has noted that the expansion of the availability and enjoyment of patent rights 
amounts to discrimination in Article 27.1 as much as their curtailment.145 Similarly, even the 
UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource Book states that ‘discrimination’ in this context means the 
granting of both superior and inferior rights.146 It is submitted that whether a measure confers 
preferential treatment, as in the case of disadvantageous treatment, is dependent on a fact 
sensitive assessment. Nevertheless, such preferential treatment may be presumed where the 
rights conferred on patents of a particular field of technology go beyond those mandated by 
TRIPS’s minimum obligations. An example of this, as Correa points out, is the extension of 
patent terms of pharmaceutical patents.147 
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• THE CONCEPT OF ‘JUSTIFICATION’ WITHIN THE RULE AGAINST 
‘DISCRIMINATION’ OF FIELDS OF TECHNOLOGY  
 
The non-discrimination obligation being applicable to cases of disadvantageous/preferential 
treatment without a requirement of any specific standard of comparison between the fields of 
technology gives it a broad scope of application. To the exclusion of a limited form of autonomy 
that should be acknowledged on the part of the Members to define the patentability criteria, 
make limited exceptions and grant compulsory licences in determining if there is 
disadvantageous/preferential treatment in cases of de facto allegations of ‘discrimination’ under 
this provision, there are no other exceptions to this obligation that entitles a WTO Member to 
pursue vital public policies by subjecting a field of technology to disadvantageous/preferential 
treatment. The consequence of this is that unless a respondent could rebut a presumption that 
an explicitly added criteria or restriction that affects the availability or enjoyment of patent 
rights is disadvantageous or preferential, such a measure would always constitute 
‘discrimination’ without entitling a Member to demonstrate that such treatment was accorded 
to pursue a vital societal interest. 
 
However, the ‘context’ and ‘object and purpose’ under VCLT Article 31(1) highlight the need 
for some mechanism to balance this non-discrimination obligation against the autonomy on the 
part of the WTO Members to protect and pursue fundamental public policy interests. The 
significance of TRIPS’s Objectives and Principles demonstrate the type of autonomy that must 
be acknowledged throughout the TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS Article 8.1 that specifically 
recognizes the ability of the Members to adopt measures for the protection of certain public 
policy objectives must be acknowledged in the interpretation of a TRIPS obligation such as the 
rule against ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 that has been left ambiguous and open-ended. In 
other words, such an obligation should not be interpreted in a manner that impedes the ability 
of the WTO Members to adopt measures to protect important public policies, as this would 
impede the autonomy of the Members to determine the requisite balance between intellectual 
protection and other public policy objectives that has been preserved in TRIPS Article 7. Given 
the nature of the obligation in Article 27.1, this could be done only by recognizing a concept of 
‘justification’ in its interpretation like the Appellate Body has done through the concept of 
‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ in the context of the TBT Agreement. Such is the purpose of 
the Panel’s notion of ‘justification’ that it recognized in its formulation of ‘discrimination’ in 
Article 27.1. In the light of this rationale that now provides a better understanding of the Panel’s 
formulation, the following sections scrutinize the constitutive elements of such a concept. 
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To understand how such a concept ought to operate within the non-discrimination obligation in 
Article 27.1, it is helpful to determine where its burden of proof should lie, which was also an 
examination that was lacking in the Panel Report in Canada- Pharmaceuticals. The Appellate 
Body has observed in US- Wool Shirts and Blouses that the burden of proof generally rests on 
the party who asserts the existence of a particular claim or defence.148 Hence, it is the 
complainant who bears the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie case against a 
respondent. The WTO Panel reiterated in Australia- Plain Packaging that this requires a 
complainant to demonstrate a prima facie case in relation each element of the substantive 
obligation in question.149 Thus, as the Panel on Canada- Pharmaceuticals formulated 
‘discrimination’ as the ‘unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment’, it 
may have suggested that the requirement of ‘unjustified’ falls within the ambit of the 
substantive obligation itself. Therefore, it is the complainant who should initially demonstrate 
that the treatment is ‘unjustified’. This would be consistent with the WTO Panel’s opinion in 
Australia- Plain Packaging in which the Panel noted that the complainant bears the initial 
burden of showing that an encumbrance on the use of a trade mark is unjustified as TRIPS 
Article 20 does not entail a general prohibition of encumbrances.150 
 
However, the allocation of the burden of proof of a concept of ‘justification’ in TRIPS Article 
27.1 might not be so straightforward. In the context of the General Exceptions in GATT/GATS, 
the Appellate Body has explained that once a prima facie case of inconsistency with one of 
their obligations has been established by a complainant, it is the respondent who bears the 
burden of showing that it is entitled to benefit from the General Exceptions.151 This is because 
there is a clear rule-exception structure between the General Exceptions and the substantive 
obligations of GATT/GATS. Even in the absence of a clear rule-exception structure, there have 
been instances when the Appellate Body has adopted a similar allocation of the burden of proof. 
This can be observed in the context of the National Treatment obligation under the TBT 
Agreement. As the Appellate Body noted in US- Clove Cigarettes, there is no violation of TBT 
Article 2.1 if the de facto detrimental impact on imports is caused by a legitimate regulatory 
distinction. Dealing with the burden of proof of this concept in US- Tuna II, the Appellate Body 
reiterated the significance of the basic principle that the party who avers the existence of a 
                                               
148 Appellate Body Report, United States- Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
WT/DS/33/AB/R, p. 335. 
149 See Panel Report, Australia- Plain Packaging, n. 111, para. 7.2164. 
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particular fact bears the burden of proving it.152 It held that after a complainant establishes a 
prima facie case by showing a detrimental impact on imported goods, the burden shifts to the 
respondent to show that such a detriment is caused by a legitimate regulatory distinction. The 
relevant part of its Report stated as follows: 
In the context of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the complainant must 
prove its claim by showing that the treatment accorded to imported products is 
"less favourable" than that accorded to like domestic products or like products 
originating in any other country. If it has succeeded in doing so, for example, 
by adducing evidence and arguments sufficient to show that the measure is not 
even-handed, this would suggest that the measure is inconsistent with Article 
2.1. If, however, the respondent shows that the detrimental impact on imported 
products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction, it follows 
that the challenged measure is not inconsistent with Article 2.1.153  
In the light of these conflicting allocations of the burden of proof of similar justificatory 
concepts, it is not easy to determine where the burden relating to a concept of justification 
should lie in TRIPS Article 27.1. As recognizing a concept of ‘justification’ in the interpretation 
of ‘discrimination’ makes it part of the substantive obligation itself, Australia- Plain Packaging 
suggests that the complainant should at least have the initial burden of demonstrating the 
absence of a justification. However, more in line with the jurisprudence relating to TBT Article 
2.1, the more convincing placement of the burden is on the respondent. This is because the 
concept of ‘justification’ introduced into TRIPS Article 27.1 can be distinguished from 
concepts such as ‘unjustified’ found in TRIPS Article 20 given that TRIPS Article 27.1 entails 
a general prohibition of discrimination between fields of technology. It applies between all 
fields of technology without specifying any level of disadvantageous/preferential treatment that 
violates this obligation. The concept of ‘justification’ is extraneously introduced like the 
‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ concept in TBT to acknowledge a form of autonomy on the 
part of the membership to prevent this obligation being applied in any absolute manner. This 
generality of the obligation shows that there is a greater case for the respondent to establish a 
‘justification’ after a complainant demonstrates a prima facie case of inconsistency. 
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In order to understand how a respondent may demonstrate a legitimate justification in this 
context, it is important to identify the structure that it should entail. Part A of this Chapter 
examined how the substantive non-discrimination obligations under the other covered 
agreements are sought to be balanced against the autonomy of the WTO Members to pursue 
vital policy objectives by recognizing the applicability of certain justificatory concepts. These 
justificatory concepts like the General Exceptions in GATT/GATS and ‘legitimate regulatory 
distinctions’ in TBT permit a Member to defend a violation of the NT/MFN obligations under 
those agreements by demonstrating the legitimate exercise of its regulatory autonomy. It is 
submitted that the structure of those justificatory concepts should inform the substantive content 
of a concept of ‘justification’ in TRIPS Article 27.1. Consequently, three fundamental features 
can be observed in such concepts: 
 
o They require a national measure to pursue a legitimate policy objective. 
o There should be a sufficient connection between the national measure and the stated 
objective. 
o There should be safeguards to ensure that this autonomy is not abused. 
 
As the specific objective of the concept of ‘justification’ is to acknowledge the ability of the 
WTO Members to adopt measures to protect other vital societal interests that have been set out 
in TRIPS Article 8.1 (Principles), it is submitted that Article 8.1 should inform the above-
mentioned features of the concept of ‘justification’ in Article 27.1. The following sub-sections 
examine how they could be adapted to the context of the concept of ‘justification’ in Article 
27.1 and demonstrate the substantive burden on the part of a respondent to defend an allegation 
of ‘discrimination’ under this provision. 
 
v Legitimate Policy Objectives 
 
A prominent feature of the justificatory concepts is that they require the pursuance of a 
legitimate policy objective. The General Exceptions of GATT/GATS exhaustively specify the 
types of policies that are deemed to be legitimate. As highlighted in Part A, they recognize the 
legitimacy of measures that are necessary to protect, inter alia, public morals and human, 
animal plant life or health. Because they are ‘exhaustively’ set out, a Member cannot claim the 
legitimacy of a policy that has not been so identified. However, this need not always be the 
case. When the Appellate Body introduced the concept of ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ to 
TBT Article 2.1, it did not exhaustively specify what policies would be legitimate in that 
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context. It did, however, implicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of the policies set out in TBT 
Article 2.2 that provides in relevant part as follows: 
…such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the 
prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal 
or plant life or health, or the environment. 
However, as Houston-Mcmillan has noted, Members have a broad discretion to pursue a host 
of other policies given that TBT Article 2.2 is not exhaustive as to what may constitute a 
legitimate policy in the context of a ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ under Article 2.1.154 This 
would similarly be the case under the concept of ‘justification’ in TRIPS Article 27.1 as TRIPS 
Article 8.1 does not exhaustively specify the types of policy objectives that a WTO Member 
may legitimately pursue. While it specifically recognizes the ability of the Members to adopt 
measures for the protection of ‘public health and nutrition’, it recognizes a significant level of 
discretion on the part of the Members to pursue other policies in the context of the TRIPS 
Agreement by providing that they have the ability to adopt measures to promote public interest 
in ‘sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development’.  
 
Although TRIPS Article 8.1 appears to be as open-ended as the notion of legitimate regulatory 
distinctions under the TBT Agreement, TRIPS Article 8.1 is more instructive as it recognizes 
the traits of a policy interest that might be legitimate: it should be vital to that Member’s socio-
economic and technological development. Consequently, this is a determination to be made by 
each WTO Member. As Correa has noted: 
Although the adjective ‘vital importance’ would seem to limit the scope of the 
provision to specifically significant sectors, which sector is important or not is 
also subject to determination by the concerned Member in the light of its 
‘socio-economic and technological development’.155 
Many commentators including Correa, Gervais and Malbon have noted that this is a 
determination that cannot be questioned by a WTO tribunal.156 It is the sole right of a Member 
to determine which policy is vital to its socio-economic and technological development and the 
level of protection of such a policy that it desires to achieve. Consequently, much like the 
jurisprudence relating to the General Exceptions in GATT/GATS and ‘legitimate regulatory 
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distinctions’ in TBT, such is a prerogative of a WTO Member. A WTO Panel appeared to 
acknowledge this prerogative right of a WTO Member in Australia- Plain Packaging. In the 
course of explaining that TRIPS Article 8.1 should be instructive when interpreting the term 
‘unjustified’ encumbrances to the use of trade marks under TRIPS Article 20, the Panel noted 
that: 
… the balance intended by the drafters of the TRIPS Agreement between the 
existence of a legitimate interest of trademark owners in using their trademarks 
in the marketplace, and the right of WTO Members to adopt measures for the 
protection of certain societal interests that may adversely affect such use.157  
It deserves to be mentioned that Article 8.1 requires this right on the part of the Members to be 
exercised ‘consistently’ with the other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Nevertheless, this 
right is restricted only to the extent that it has been so limited by the TRIPS obligations. As 
highlighted in Part B, this right cannot be disregarded when a TRIPS obligation itself is 
ambiguous and open-ended as this would disregard the autonomy of the Members that has been 
preserved in TRIPS Article 7 (Objectives). Such ambiguous TRIPS obligations should be 
interpreted in a manner that acknowledges this right of the Members, and therefore, the 
‘consistency’ requirement in Article 8.1 does not constitute an obstacle to the interpretation of 





It is not sufficient for a Member to simply assert that its measure pursues a legitimate policy 
objective. The justificatory concepts also require a requisite level of connection to exist between 
the national measure and the policy objective in question. While a WTO Member may have a 
significant level of discretion to pursue a wide range of policy objectives in this context, 
whether its measure is in fact capable of contributing towards that objective to the extent that 
is required is an entirely different question. The latter is often objectively scrutinized by the 
WTO tribunals.  
 
The General Exceptions of GATT/GATS often contain the requirement of ‘necessity’. The SPS 
and TBT Agreements that build on the General Exceptions of GATT also recognize the 
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prerogative right of the Members to adopt SPS and TBT measures to the extent that they are 
‘necessary’ to achieve vital public policy objectives. As the sixth Recital of the Preamble to 
TBT states: 
… no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure 
the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the 
levels it considers appropriate…158 
Similarly, the first Recital of the Preamble to the SPS Agreement recognizes the right of the 
Members to adopt SPS measures that are ‘necessary’ for the protection of human, animal, plant 
life or health. It was noted that in the context of the General Exceptions in GATT/GATS, the 
‘necessity’ of a measure is scrutinized by weighing and balancing several factors that include 
the importance of the non-trade value, the degree of contribution, its trade restrictiveness and 
the availability of alternatives.  
 
The requisite level of connection between a national measure and a policy objective in the 
context of a ‘justification’ in TRIPS Article 27.1 is once again informed by TRIPS Article 8.1. 
Article 8.1 encompasses a test of ‘necessity’ as it explicitly provides that Members may adopt 
measures ‘necessary to protect public health and nutrition…’. Given that the concept of 
‘justification’ is supposed to preserve the type of autonomy mentioned in Article 8.1, it is 
submitted that this level of connection that it specifies cannot be overlooked. Hence, Daniel 
Gervais states that although a WTO tribunal cannot challenge a Member’s determination of its 
public interest, it is entitled to: 
…consider the adequacy of the measure in terms of the stated objective and its 
compatibility with TRIPS- and perhaps whether there were less inconsistent 
(compliant) measures available to achieve the same objective.159 
He states that this must be examined similar to the way ‘necessity’ is examined under GATT’s 
General Exceptions. Commenting on this ‘necessity’ requirement in Article 8.1, Carlos Correa 
states that the scrutiny should be more flexible than under GATT because it deals with broad 
concepts such as ‘public interest’ and ‘socio-economic and technological development’. He 
states that it would be unreasonable to give a restrictive interpretation to this concept under the 
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TRIPS Agreement as is done under the other covered agreements.160 It is correct that Article 8.1 
uses the broad concepts pointed out by Correa, but in practice a Member is likely to identify a 
specific policy objective. In such circumstances, the use of broad terms such as ‘public interest’ 
in Article 8.1 would not by themselves justify any greater level of flexibility in the assessment 
of ‘necessity’ than that already found in the GATT jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that there are other reasons why ‘necessity’ in TRIPS Article 8.1 should be understood to be a 
more flexible concept than in the context of GATT/GATS, and these reasons are addressed in 
the following paragraphs. 
 
The WTO jurisprudence shows that the following factors should be weighed and balanced in 
determining whether a measure is ‘necessary’: 
 
o The importance of the public interest,   
o The level of contribution towards the said interest, and 
o The availability of compliant or less inconsistent alternatives. 
 
In relation to the first of these factors, the Appellate Body has been noted that the more vital or 
important the policy objective is, the easier it should be to establish that a measure is 
‘necessary’.161 By giving them textual recognition, TRIPS Article 8.1 explicitly acknowledges 
the added significance of protecting of ‘public health and nutrition’. The Panel in Australia- 
Plain Packaging stated that Article 8.1 shows that the protection of public health is 
‘unquestionably’ a vital societal interest.162  
The scrutiny of the level of contribution of a measure must be dependent on the design, 
architecture and application of a measure. It has been noted that it requires a genuine 
relationship of ends and means between the objective and the measure in issue,163  which is to 
be demonstrated with proof of ‘material contribution’ towards the stated policy objective.164 
However, the Appellate Body noted that it may be difficult to demonstrate such material 
contribution where a measure pursues the protection of a policy such as public health, as the 
effects of such measures can only be evaluated with the ‘benefit of time’. Therefore, such 
measures have been regarded to satisfy the requisite level of contribution and show the genuine 
                                               
160 Correa, n. 93, p. 106. 
161 Appellate Body Report, Korea- Beef, n. 30, para. 164. 
162 Panel Report, Australia- Plain Packaging, n. 111, para. 7.2406. 
163 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Retreaded Tyres, n. 29, para. 151. 
164 Ibid. 
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connection that is required provided they are ‘apt’ to make a material contribution towards the 
stated policy objective.165 
 
It is submitted that this is the type of contribution that is required under TRIPS Article 8.1 for 
a reason that is almost unique to the TRIPS Agreement and intellectual property law measures. 
Article 8.1 is a manifestation of the balance mandated by TRIPS Article 7 between the 
protection of intellectual property rights and other vital societal interests. The use of the word 
‘should’ in Article 7 shows that this requisite balance is a forward-looking objective that is not 
necessarily achieved by implementing TRIPS’s minimum standards. This forward-looking 
balance acknowledges that vital societal interests could be affected by the protection of 
intellectual property rights. However, it also acknowledges the opposite: that measures adopted 
in the context of the intellectual property protection can have an impact on those societal 
interests. This potential could be acknowledged in the context of ‘necessity’ in Article 8.1 only 
if a measure’s capability to contribute towards those societal interests to achieve the balance 
mandated by Article 7 could be recognized. This capability should also recognize the fact that 
a measure relating to intellectual property protection may not by itself be sufficient to address 
a particular public interest and may need to form part of a host of national measures. Hence, 
the level of contribution required to demonstrate a measure’s ‘necessity’ in the context of a 
‘justification’ in TRIPS Article 27.1 should consider a wide array of factors pertaining to the 
capability of a measure to protect a legitimate policy objective with the jurisdiction of a given 
member in the light of its design, structure and application. 
 
The final element of this ‘necessity’ analysis should entail the determination of whether there 
are other alternatives to the respondent’s measure. In this context, it involves an examination 
as to whether an alternative measure that is not ‘discriminatory’ or less ‘discriminatory’ is 
available to a respondent. As discussed in relation to the test of ‘necessity’ under the covered 
agreements in Part A of this Chapter, such alternatives should meet the respondent’s desired 
level of protection of the stated policy objective and acknowledge the varying degrees of 
economic, social and technological standards among the membership. In the context of TRIPS 
Article 27.1, this specifically requires the scrutiny of whether there are measures that would 
pursue the same policy objective to the respondent’s desired level of protection without 
conferring any disadvantageous/preferential treatment or conferred 
disadvantageous/preferential treatment to a lesser degree. Fundamentally, and particularly in 
                                               
165 Ibid. 
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the context of patent law, such alternatives should be ‘reasonably’ available to the respondent 
member to achieve the stated policy objective in the light of its technological, social and 
economic standards of development.  
 
With regard to patent law rules, much could be said about the varying legislative, administrative 
and judicial capabilities among the WTO Members to protect other societal interests that are 
potentially affected by patents. There are many Members that are still fighting poverty and have 
not been able to utilize the policy space preserved in the TRIPS Agreement. Carlos Correa has 
written extensively demonstrating how such Members could enact TRIPS consistent measures 
to ensure that patents do not adversely affect access to medicine, which is one of the more 
glaring issues caused by patent systems.166 Several academic articles have been written and 
resource books authored to identify these policy spaces.167 Still, it cannot be conscionably stated 
that these Members are capable of administering patent law in the same way as the developed 
country Members. They lack the expertise necessary in the patent offices, the legislature and 
the judiciary to strike out unwarranted patent applications and monopolies. This does not mean 
that a WTO tribunal pitted to examine the inconsistency of a national measure should always 
examine these factors, but that the scrutiny of alternatives should acknowledge that there can 
be instances when such factors could indicate that certain Members should be given more teeth 
to prevent abuses of the patent system.  
 
For these reasons, the test of ‘necessity’ in TRIPS Article 8.1 and the concept ‘justification’ in 
Article 27.1 is more flexible than in GATT/GATS. The manner in which a measure’s 
contribution towards a policy is meant to be assessed and the determination of the availability 
of alternatives show that it sits in between the GATT/GATS notion of ‘necessity’ and the 
threshold of merely ‘relating to’. This is because a concept of ‘necessity’ in TRIPS that 
concerns broader societal interests that have been addressed in its Objectives and Principles is 
meant to give sufficient regard to the deep and sensitive divergences among the WTO Members. 
                                               
166 See for example C. Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, 
Geneva, South Centre, 2000; C. Correa, ‘Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing 
Countries?’, in K. Maskus and J. Reichman (eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under 
a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 227-256. 
167 S. Sterck, ‘Patents and Access to Drugs in Developing Countries: An Ethical Analysis’, Developing World 
Bioethics, vol. 4, no. 1, 2004, p. 58; E. Oke, ‘Exploring the Flexibilities in TRIPS: Lessons from India’s 
Pharmaceutical Patent Law’, Commonwealth Law Bulletin, vol. 41, no. 1, 2015, p. 82; F. Scherer and J. Watal, 
‘Post-Trips Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Nations’, Journal of International Economic 
Law, vol. 5, no. 4, 2002, p. 913; M. Lamping et al., ‘Declaration on Patent Protection - Regulatory Sovereignty 




In effect, the ‘necessity’ threshold will be satisfied by a respondent if it could show that the 
measure’s design, architecture and application is such that it has the capability to contribute 
towards the stated policy objective within its jurisdiction and the complainant has not been able 




Another vital feature prevalent in the justificatory concepts that recognize the autonomy of the 
Member States in the context of the substantive non-discrimination obligations is the presence 
of safeguards to ensure that Members do not abuse their right. The finest example is the 
‘chapeau’ of the General Exceptions in GATT/GATS. It provides that its exceptions are only 
available if ‘such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade’. Hence, even when the conditions of one of 
the sub-paragraphs of the General Exceptions are met, a respondent needs to demonstrate that 
its measure has not been applied in a manner that constitutes ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ 
discrimination or as a ‘disguised restriction’ on trade. While the precise meaning of these 
‘chapeau’ conditions have attracted much academic debate and still remain somewhat unclear 
in WTO jurisprudence, its purpose has been clearly identified by the Appellate Body in US- 
Shrimp in the following manner: 
Turning then to the chapeau of Article XX, we consider that it embodies the 
recognition on the part of WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of 
rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another 
of the exceptions of Article XX, …and the substantive rights of the other 
Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand. Exercise by one Member 
of its right to invoke an exception, such as Article XX(g), if abused or misused, 
will, to that extent, erode or render naught the substantive treaty rights in, for 
example, Article XI:1, of other Members … The same concept may be 
expressed from a slightly different angle of vision, thus a balance must be 
struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX 
and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other 
Members. To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an 
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exception would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty 
obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other Members.168 
Accordingly, it aims to ensure that a further balance is struck between a WTO Member’s right 
to exercise the type of autotomy recognized under the General Exceptions vis-à-vis the 
obligation not to make the treaty redundant in that process. The concept of ‘even-handedness’ 
prevalent in the jurisprudence relating to the TBT Agreement also has similar objectives. It was 
first coined by the Appellate Body in US- Clove Cigarettes when explaining its ‘legitimate 
regulatory distinction’ exception to TBT Article 2.1. Although subsequent reports tended to 
interpret the concept of ‘even-handedness’ along the lines of the ‘chapeau’ standards of the 
General Exceptions, the more fitting comprehension is that it requires fairness and calibration 
on the part of a national measure. Thus, Houston-Mcmillan states: 
…'what exactly is even-handedness'? Employing the language of the three 
disputes, it can be seen that a valuation of a measure's 'even-handedness' 
involves examining whether the measure is 'fair', 'non-discriminatory', and 
'calibrated' to its purpose.169  
‘Calibration’ in this context means that a Member must have addressed similar concerns in a 
similar manner. Hence, in US – Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body held that reducing the 
smoking of clove cigarettes without regulating menthol cigarettes was not fair as both the types 
of cigarettes were injurious to health. This is also why the Appellate Body held that measures 
aimed at protecting dolphins while fishing for tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) was 
not fair in US- Tuna II because those measures did not consider the risks to dolphins caused by 
fishing practices in other parts of the ocean outside the ETP. Addressing some concerns to the 
exclusion of other similar concerns is considered to be ‘unfair’ as it is an indication of the lack 
of good faith. A similar safeguard is found in Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. The prohibition 
of ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions’ in the levels of protection in SPS Article 5.5 applies 
where the groups of products in question have similar SPS concerns. Therefore, regulating the 
SPS risks in one group of products to the exclusion of another group with similar SPS concerns 
is sign of protectionism that SPS was meant to tackle.    
 
It is submitted that such a concept of ‘even-handedness’ that examines if a Member has 
addressed similar public interests or right-holder oriented concerns in other fields of technology 
                                               
168 Appellate Body Report, United States- Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 156. Emphasis added. 
169 Houston-Mcmillan, n. 90, p. 557. Emphasis added. 
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should serve to ensure that the autonomy that the concept of ‘justification’ seeks to preserve is 
not abused. Hence, the disadvantageous/preferential treatment accorded to a particular field of 
technology to pursue a vital interest traceable to TRIPS Article 8.1 should be accorded to all 
other fields of technology with the same or similar public interest and right-holder related 
concerns. This is the reason that the Panel in Canada- Pharmaceuticals appears to have 
suggested that the non-discrimination obligation in Article 27.1 does not prohibit bona fide 
exceptions directed at only one field of technology.170 It would not be bona fide if there are other 
fields of technology with similar concerns that have not been similarly addressed by a Member. 
Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that although the concerns meant to be addressed in 
one field of technology may be technically prevalent in other fields of technology, the gravity 
of the problem in one field of technology might be so grave that it may justify a Member’s 
preoccupation with that field of technology. This explains why only pharmaceutical patents 
tend to benefit from patent term extension schemes around the world. Many inventions in 
several other fields including automobiles, building systems and telecommunications similarly 
face regulatory delays, but its impact is considered to be incomparable to that faced by the field 
of pharmaceuticals given the nature of the industry. The flipside of this reasoning is that 
particular types of patent abuses in fields like pharmaceuticals could be so detrimental to a 
given Member’s public health that it may justify the adoption of measures that only address 
such abuses in the field of pharmaceuticals. 
 
• AN INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE AGAINST ‘DISCRIMINATION’ OF FIELDS 
OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
The interpretational approach to the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology 
adopted in this Chapter highlights the need for a concept of ‘justification’ in the context of this 
obligation. Consequent to identifying this rationale, this Chapter identified the constitutive 
elements that such a concept should entail in the context of this obligation. In this process, it 
also addressed some fundamental features of this obligation that were not adequately addressed 
by the Panel that demonstrate the wide scope of the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields 
of technology. Consequently, an interpretation of the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields 
of technology that builds on the Panel’s formulation of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1 can be 
presented as follows: 
                                               
170 Panel Report, Canada- Pharmaceuticals, n. 110, para. 7.92. 
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The rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in TRIPS Article 
27.1 prohibits a national measure from according disadvantageous or 
preferential treatment to a field of technology that affects the availability and 
enjoyment of patent rights, unless it is necessary to pursue a legitimate policy 
objective and such treatment is applied in an even-handed manner by 
addressing similar concerns even in other fields of technology. 
This interpretation gives a deeper understanding of the Panel’s formulation of ‘discrimination’ 
in relation to the specific ground of ‘fields of technology’. The precise implications that would 
flow from this interpretation will become evident by testing its operation, which would also 
provide a better comprehension of its elements that have been discussed in this Chapter. As 
such, the subsequent Chapters of this thesis apply this interpretation to examine the potential 
consistency of selected national measures that are currently found in the patent systems of 
certain WTO Members that may trigger a violation of this obligation. 
 
• TECHNOLOGY SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS AND COMPULSORY LICENCES 
 
One of the most criticized aspects of the Panel Report in Canada-Pharmaceuticals was its 
finding that TRIPS Article 30 (limited exceptions) and Article 31 (compulsory licences) are 
subject to the rule against ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1. Academics have opined that this is 
problematic as it prevents the WTO Members from crafting technology specific exceptions and 
compulsory licences that address specific concerns in certain fields of technology which would 
have been possible if not for the non-discrimination obligation. It has been argued that this is 
because Articles 30 and 31 are simply incompatible with the non-discrimination obligation. For 
example, it has been stated that adhering to the non-discrimination obligation in Article 27.1 
prevents an exception from being ‘limited’ in terms Article 30.  
 
However, it is submitted that these fears have been exaggerated. While the Panel held that 
Article 30 and Article 31 should abide by the non-discrimination obligation, it also noted that 
this does not mean that exceptions and compulsory licences should always apply to all the fields 
of technology.171 In the context of limited exceptions, the Panel noted that it does not prevent 
bona fide exceptions that deal with problems in certain product areas.172 The actual issue was 
that the Panel did not identify that such was the realm of its notion of ‘justification’, which was 
                                               
171 See Panel Report, Canada- Pharmaceuticals, n. 110, para. 7.92. 
172 Ibid. 
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not examined its Report. Given that the foregoing Parts of this Chapter substantively identified 
the concept of ‘justification’, the relationship between the non-discrimination obligation and 
technology specific limited exceptions and compulsory licences deserve a fresh clarification. 
 
As explained by the Panel, both Articles 30 and 31 affect the enjoyment of patent rights. 
Therefore, they should adhere to the non-discrimination obligation in Article 27.1. A 
technology specific limited exception or compulsory licence that explicitly applies only to one 
field of technology would trigger a presumption of disadvantageous treatment and a prima facie 
case of inconsistency with this obligation. In the light of the concept of ‘justification’, this does 
not mean that they would always constitute ‘discrimination’. A respondent should be entitled 
to ‘justify’ its preoccupation with one field of technology as the Panel rightly acknowledged in 
its Report. As discussed in the previous Parts, a ‘justification’ in this context would require the 
demonstration of a legitimate policy objective, necessity and even-handedness. Given the type 
of autonomy recognized in Articles 30 and 31, it is submitted that a respondent who could 
demonstrate that its technology specific exception or compulsory licence satisfies the 
conditions of Articles 30 or 31 automatically satisfies the existence of a legitimate policy 
objective and the requirement of ‘necessity’. The only additional condition that a respondent 
would need to establish is that such treatment is applied even-handedly by addressing similar 
concerns in other fields of technology. This is what the Panel appears to have meant when it 
stated that the non-discrimination obligation does not prevent ‘bona fide’ exceptions. Whether 
it is bona fide is scrutinized by the concept of ‘even-handedness’ that has been explained in this 
Chapter. This understanding that flows from a better understanding of the concept of 
‘justification’ gives better sense to the Panel’s perspective of the inter-play between the non-
discrimination obligation and Articles 30 and 31. It is submitted that this reconciliation between 
these two sides of TRIPS’s patent rules meet the requisite balance between the non-
discrimination obligation and the ability of the WTO Members to make to make limited 
exceptions and grant compulsory licences. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY: THREE NATIONAL MEASURES THAT 
POTENTIALLY TRIGGER A VIOLATION OF THE RULE 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 
 
With the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement, subject to certain transitional periods that were 
provided for developing and least-developed country Members, all WTO Members were 
required to bring their patent laws into conformity with its patent law standards. This was a 
major step for those who had not previously provided or only provided limited forms of patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals for reasons of public health and accessibility. As most of these 
transitional periods have now come to an end,1 almost all WTO Members are now required to 
grant process and product patents to all inventions in all fields of technology without any 
‘discrimination’ as to the availability and enjoyment of patent rights.  
 
However, TRIPS did not specify how precisely these minimum standards should be 
implemented in the national systems, except by providing in Article 1.1 that: 
Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing 
the provisions of the Agreement within their own legal system and practice.  
This deference on the part of the Members was clear in the manner in which they changed their 
patent laws to recognize the patentability of pharmaceutical inventions, while simultaneously 
striving to ensure that other vital public policies are not disregarded in this process. As will be 
demonstrated in this Chapter, the manner in which India and Brazil chose to do this provide 
fertile ground to test TRIPS’s rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology and the 
concept of ‘justification’ that has been revealed in the previous Chapter. Moreover, other 
Members like Australia who had recognized the patentability of pharmaceutical inventions 
even at the time TRIPS was being negotiated had begun to provide a form of preferential 
treatment to pharmaceuticals to address the industry’s concerns that the effective life of their 
patents were being impeded by regulatory processes. Such measures that have continued 
beyond the TRIPS Agreement also provide a good opportunity to test the concept of 
‘discrimination’ in TRIPS Article 27.1. 
                                               
1 The TRIPS Council extended the transition period for least-developed countries until 1 July 2021. 
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To enable the subsequent Chapters to apply the more developed understanding of the rule 
against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology and identify the implications that this would 
have on the Members of the WTO, this Chapter examines three selected national measures that 
explicitly subject pharmaceutical inventions to differential treatment. They are dealt in three 
distinct Parts and concern Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act, the Brazilian requirement of 
‘prior consent’ and the Australian scheme of patent term extensions. The aim of each of these 
Parts is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the objectives, nature, scope and 
application of these mechanisms that is necessary to scrutinize their potential consistency with 
the rule against ‘discrimination’ in TRIPS Article 27.1. 
 
A. INDIA’S REQUIREMENT OF EHNANCED EFFICACY  
 
• INDIA’S HISTORY WITH PHARMACEUTICAL INVENTIONS: DENYING PRODUCT 
PATENTS ON CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES AND MEDICINE 
 
India inherited its patent law from the British during the colonial rule by Act No. VI of 1856.2 
Parameswaran Narayanan states that unlike in Great Britain, the concept of patents in India did 
not originate from any royal prerogative but by the statutes of the Indian legislature.3 The 1856 
Act was re-enacted with modifications in 1859, which was succeeded by the Patterns and 
Designs Protection Act of 1872 and the Protection of Inventions Act of 1883. These Acts were 
consolidated by the Inventions and Designs Act of 1888, which was subsequently replaced by 
the Patents and Designs Act of 1911 which was in force till 1970.4 All these statutory 
instruments were based on the British law at the time and recognized the patentability of 
pharmaceuticals, which were overwhelmingly used by British corporations.5 Aradhna Aggarwal 
states that between 1947 and 1957, 99% of the 1704 drug and pharmaceutical patents were held 
by foreign corporations and that they held over 80% of the market-share in India.6 With little or 
no indigenous pharmaceutical industry at that time, Janice Mueller notes that patents seemed 
as mere tools used by British patentees to control the Indian market.7 This had a disastrous 
                                               
2 See P. Narayanan, Narayanan on Patent Law, Eastern Law House, 1975, pp. 1-22. 
3 Ibid., p. 4. 
4 Ibid., p. 5. 
5 W. Bennett, ‘Indian Pharmaceutical Patent Law and the Effect of Novartis Ag v. Union of India’, Wash. U. 
Global. L. Rev., vol. 13, no. 3, 2014, p. 535. 
6 A. Aggarwal, Strategic Approach to Strengthening the International Competitiveness in Knowledge Based 
Industries: The Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other 
Developing Countries, 2004, RIS-DP # 80/2004. 
7 J. Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian 
Pharmaceutical Innovation’, U. Pitt. L. Rev., vol. 68, no. 3, 2007, p. 491 at p. 508. 
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impact on India. By the time it gained its independence in 1947, India was home to one fifth of 
the world’s population, it was the poorest nation, its pharmaceutical industry was dominated by 
multi-national corporations and was one of the countries with the highest prices on drugs.8  
 
Unsurprisingly, immediately upon gaining independence, the Indian legislator gave prime 
importance to making medicine more affordable to its poverty-stricken population. The 
revamping of its patent law began in 1948 with the Government appointing Dr. Bakshi Tek 
Chand, a retired Judge of the High Court of Lahore, to review Indian patent law in order to 
make the system ‘more conducive to national interests’.9 The Chand Committee submitted an 
interim report in August 1949 that suggested the immediate amendment of the 1911 Act to 
counteract the misuse or abuse of patent monopolies.10 These amendments that brought Indian 
law in line with the UK Patents Act of 1949 were aimed at expanding the grounds for 
compulsory licences by the including the non-working of patents and the failure to meet the 
requirements of the public on reasonable terms.11 The Chand Committee submitted its final 
report in April 1950, the recommendations of which resulted in Bill No. 59 of 1953 being 
presented to the Parliament. However, this Bill lapsed before being enacted with the first Lok 
Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament) being dissolved in 1953. 
 
Fresh efforts were made by the Government in 1957 by appointing Shri Justice N. Rajagopala 
Ayyangar to advise on the revision of patent law. The Final Report of this committee was 
submitted in 1959 and formed the catalyst for radical changes in Indian patent law. The 
Ayyangar Report is still biblically cited by the Indian judiciary as it was its recommendations 
that instigated the first indigenous Patents Act (1970) that is currently in force in India. 
Borrowing the same language and findings from the Chand Committee Report, Justice 
Ayyangar noted that ‘the Indian Patent system has failed in its main purpose, namely, to 
stimulate invention among Indians and to encourage the development and exploitation of new 
inventions for industrial purposes in the country so as to secure the benefits thereof to the largest 
section of the public’.12 The Report made certain observations about patent systems generally 
that makes it one of the finest national patent reviews that would be relevant to many countries 
for many years to come. It observed that a patent system should be designed with special 
                                               
8 Ibid. 
9 See Patents Enquiry Committee, Report on the Revision of the Patents Law, 1959, para. 2, [hereinafter referred 
to as ‘Ayyangar Report’]. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See V. Mani, D. Srivasta, M. Chakrapani and J. Erstling, ‘The India Patent System: A Decade in Review’, 
Cybaris, vol. 8, no.1, Article 2, 2017 at p. 4. 
12 Ayyangar Report, n. 9, para. 25. 
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reference to the economic conditions of a country, the state of its scientific and technological 
advancement, its future needs and other relevant factors in order to reduce the abuses to which 
a system of patent monopoly is capable of being put.13 It noted that the failure to suit the patent 
system to such domestic needs could retard the industrial progress of a country.14 
 
Accordingly, the Report suggested several changes to the law, almost all of which were adopted 
by the Patents Act of 1970. The most significant of its recommendations relating to patent 
exclusions had a significant impact on pharmaceutical inventions. The Report called for a clear 
identification of what is patentable and what is not, and in the case of the latter, whether it is 
because it is not an ‘invention’ in the eyes of the law or because it is excluded for competing 
policy reasons such as national economy or national health.15 It recommended severe restrictions 
on the patenting of inventions relating to chemical substances, food and medicine. 
Recommending only process claims for chemical substances, it noted that such a restriction is 
necessary to advance the chemical and pharmaceutical industries in India and to encourage 
research in those fields.16 Similarly, the Report recommended the denial of product claims for 
food and medicine noting that these were articles of daily use, vital for the health of the 
community, and should therefore, be available at reasonable prices and beyond any monopoly.17 
The Indian legislature adopted these recommendations by virtue of Section 5 of the 1970 Act 
that originally provided as follows: 
In the case of inventions- (a) claiming substances intended for use, or capable 
of being used, as food or as medicine or drug, or (b) relating to substances 
prepared or produced by chemical processes (including alloys, optical glass, 
semi-conductors and inter-metallic compounds) no patent shall be granted in 
respect of claims for the substances themselves, but claims for the methods or 
processes of manufacture shall be patentable. 
Even the process patents in these fields were of limited duration. In terms of the then Section 
53 of the 1970 Act, such patents only lasted for five years from the date of sealing or seven 
years from the date of patent, whichever period that was shorter.18 Vitally, such patents were 
                                               
13 Ibid., para. 44. 
14 Ibid., para. 16. 
15 Ibid., para. 46-55. 
16 Ibid., para. 92. 
17 Ibid., para. 101. 
18 See Narayanan, n. 2, p. 179. 
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subject to automatic licences of right that were available from three years after their grant.19 
Thus, Mueller notes that the 1970 Act was the finest example of how domestic patent systems 
were structured to achieve national priorities.20  
 
The economic, social and political impact of Section 5 was enormous. There was a dramatic 
increase in domestic generic manufacture of pharmaceutical products, and hence, a sharp 
decline in the prices of medicine. The reason was because pharmaceuticals patented elsewhere 
could be freely copied in India. Amy Kapczynski points out that the 68% market-share that 
foreign pharmaceutical firms held in India gradually reduced to around 60% by the late 1970s, 
to 55% by 1980, to 40% by 1990 and just over 20% by the early 21st century.21 Sudip Chauduhri 
notes that this market-share that was at around 23% in 2004, reduced to 20% in 2008.22 
Moreover, Chan Park observes that by 1999, 70% of bulk drugs and 80% of formulations in the 
country were supplied by the domestic Industry.23 Consequently, India, along with Japan, 
became the only countries in which the pharmaceutical companies of the US and Europe did 
not dominate.24  
 
These changes did not only reduce the prices of drugs for the Indian populace, they also built a 
thriving generic industry that began to focus on foreign markets. As the Supreme Court of India 
noted in Novartis v. Union of India, India became a net exporter of pharmaceuticals by 1988/89 
and almost 75% of its net exports were pharmaceuticals by the early 21st century, the majority 
of which were bulk drugs.25 The domestic industry became capable of producing bulk drugs 
(also known as Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients) and formulations and saw the formation of 
numerous generic corporations who sought to exploit this patent free environment. Cipla, 
Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy’s, Lupin, Sun Pharmaceuticals, Piramal Healthcare and Cadila Healthcare 
are a few of such generic companies that developed during this time and some of which are still 
found in the list of the 20 largest pharmaceutical companies in India.26  
                                               
19 Competitors were entitled to obtain an automatic licence to practice the patent three years after grant on terms as 
agreed by the parties, or failing such agreement, on terms set by the Patent Controller in terms of Sections 87 and 
88 of the 1970 Act. 
20 Mueller, n. 7, p. 514. 
21 A. Kapczynski, ‘Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s 
Pharmaceutical Sector’, Calif. L. Rev., vol. 97, 2009, p. 1571 at p. 1578. 
22 S. Chaudhuri, ‘The Indian Pharmaceutical Industry After TRIPS’, in S. Chaudhuri, C. Park and K. Gopakumar 
(eds.), Five Years into the Product Patent Regime: India’s Response, United Nations Development Programme, 
2010, p. 19 at p. 21 
23 C. Park, ‘Implementation of India’s Patent Law: A review of patents granted by the Indian Patent Office’, in 
Chaudhuri et al., n. 23, p. 73 at p. 76. 
24 Chaudhuri, n. 22, p. 21. 
25 Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others, 6 SCC 1 (2013), para. 57, [hereinafter referred to as ‘Novartis v. UOI 
(SC)’]. 
26 See Chaudhuri, n. 22, p. 21. 
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• IMPLEMENTING TRIPS STANDARDS 
 
The successes of the Ayyangar recommendations were being threatened by the GATT/WTO 
negotiations which commenced at Punta del Este in 1984, as it clearly signalled the culmination 
of the TRIPS Agreement that was to set-out minimum standards for the protection of 
intellectual property rights. With India being one of the founding members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), it had no other option but to implement TRIPS’s minimum standards 
given the ‘single undertaking’ nature of the WTO and its covered agreements. Nevertheless, as 
India was a developing country which did not grant product patents for pharmaceuticals at the 
time TRIPS came into force, it did not have to comply with TRIPS Article 27 immediately. It 
was entitled to benefit from the ten-year transition period in terms of TRIPS Article 65. Hence, 
TRIPS Article 27 came into full force in India only on 1st January 2005. Up until then, however, 
India made certain amendments to its laws in 1999 and 2002 to comply with other TRIPS 
standards such as the ‘mailbox’ of patent applications, Exclusive Marketing Rights and to 
comply with the mandated twenty-year term of patent protection. 
 
During this transition period the tension between pharmaceutical patents and access to 
affordable medicine came to the international limelight. With certain developed country 
Members of the WTO opposing the grant of compulsory licences by the less developed country 
Members for the manufacture and/or importation of less expensive anti-retroviral medicine for 
the treatment of HIV/AIDS, the ‘access to medicine’ movement was formed. As Swaraj 
Barooah notes, this movement gave birth to a well-coordinated network of scholars, activists 
and community-based organizations who were highly motivated, increasingly sophisticated and 
remarkably aware of how patents affected public health.27 This movement culminated with the 
WTO Ministerial Declaration in 2001 which declared that TRIPS cannot prevent Members 
from taking measures to protect public health and that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted in a manner supportive of the Members’ right to protect public health and promote 
access to medicine for all.28 These developments highlighted the need for the Indian legislators 
to tackle some fundamental issues in the process of recognizing product patents for 
pharmaceuticals, and this served to ensure that the influence of the Ayyangar recommendations 
did not come to an end even with TRIPS. 
 
                                               
27 S. Barooah, ‘India’s Pharmaceutical Innovation Policy: Developing Strategies for Developing Country Needs’, 
Trade L. & Dev., vol. 5, no. 1, 2013, p. 150 at p. 156. Also see Kapczynski, n. 21, p. 1585. 
28 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, Doha, 2001, para. 4. 
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By the end of 2004, India had to decide as to how it was to confer product patents for 
pharmaceuticals, reversing a conscious decision that it had made in 1970. The final round of 
amendments to bring its patent laws into alignment with TRIPS standards initially came by way 
of an Executive Ordinance known as the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance No. 7 of 2004 that 
was promulgated by the President. This Executive Order was subsequently presented as a Bill 
to the Indian Parliament on 18th December 2004. This Bill essentially called for the deletion of 
the original Section 5 of the 1970 Act that denied product patents for chemical and 
pharmaceutical products. It attracted three days of Parliamentary debate in which members of 
the opposition voiced their concerns over public health and access to drugs. The Supreme Court 
aptly described the essence of this debate in Novartis v. Union of India in the following manner: 
To anyone going through the debate on the Bill, Parliament would appear 
keenly alive to national interests, human- rights considerations and the role of 
India as the producer and supplier of drugs to different parts of the world where 
impoverished humanity is critically in need of those drugs at cheap and 
affordable prices. Cutting across party lines, member after member from the 
Opposition benches highlighted the grave risk in creating private monopolies 
in an area like pharmaceuticals, the abuses to which product patents in 
pharmaceutical products were vulnerable, and the ploys used by big 
companies to artificially extend the period of patent to keep competitors out 
and keep the prices of the patented product high.29 
The main focus of the debates concerned the abusive practice of patenting minor modifications 
of already existing substances and its potential to detrimentally affect the public health of its 
citizens. This type of abuse that is commonly referred to as the practice of ‘ever-greening’ was 
explained by the Supreme Court as the ‘ploy used to artificially extend the period of a patent’ 
to keep competitors out and prices high.30 To highlight the gravity of such abuse, several 
members of the legislature specifically referred to Novartis’s patent application concerning 
Glivec, an anti-cancer drug. Shri Suresh Kurup (MP) highlighted that the mere grant of 
exclusive marketing rights for Glivec had by itself resulted in the cost of monthly treatment 
increasing from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 120,000: 
One major area where all of us have raised our criticism was the provision 
which helps the patent holder multinational companies for evergreening of 
                                               
29 Novartis v. UOI (SC), n. 25, para. 79. Emphasis added. 
30 Ibid. 
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patents. Sir, a company which obtains a patent by changing their chemicals, 
before the expiry of the patent, they will again apply for a patent and again get 
a patent. So, in this way, they will continue to get a patent for the same 
medicine. For example, the drug called 'Glevic'', is used for the treatment of 
Leukaemia. It is patented by Novartis. This was originally patented in 1993. 
The cost of the drug for the treatment of this disease comes to about Rs. 
1,20,000 per month in India. At the same time, the generic versions are 
available in the country which cost only Rs. 8000 to Rs. 10,000.31  
The public outcry regarding Novartis’s Glivec drug neatly substantiated these fears against 
‘ever-greening’.32 Hence, the lack of any rules in the Bill that identified which inventions 
genuinely deserved patent protection in the chemical/pharmaceutical sector was considered to 
be a serious issue. For this reason, the Bill was even criticized for bearing a ‘heavy footprint’ 
of multinational pharmaceutical companies who wanted to sell high priced drugs only to India’s 
growing middle-class population.33 Acknowledging these concerns, the Government introduced 
a new Section 3(d) that provided as follows: 
Section 3. What are not inventions- The following are not inventions within 
the meaning of this Act- 
. 
(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere 
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere 
use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process 
results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant. 
Explanation- For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, 
metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, 
combinations and other derivatives of known substance shall be considered to 
be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regard 
to efficacy. 
                                               
31 See Lok Sabha Debates, Fourteenth Session, Vol. VIII, 4th Session, 22 March 2005, pp. 605-607, [hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Lok Sabha Debates’]. 
32 Also see S. Ghoshray, ‘3(d) View of India’s Patent Law: Social Justice Aspiration Meets Property Rights in 
Novartis v. Union of India & Others’, J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L., vol. 13, 2014, p. 719. 
33 Lok Sabha Debates, n. 31, pp. 553-558. 
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This new version of Section 3(d) added a new rule to the previous Section 3(d) by providing 
that the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance shall not be regarded as an 
invention unless there is an enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance. The 
Explanation that accompanied it also set out a list of derivatives that shall be considered to be 
the same as the previous known substance ‘unless they differ significantly in properties with 
regard to efficacy’. The then Minister of Commerce and Industry, Shri Kamal Nath, assured 
that the new Section 3(d) that encompasses this rule would tackle the ever-greening concerns 
raised in Parliament.34 With this assurance and without any discussion about the specifics of the 
new rule that was introduced to Section 3(d), the Amendment Bill was passed in the Lok Sabha 
on the 22nd of March 2005, in the Rajya Sabha (Secondary Chamber) on the very next day and 
received Presidential assent on the 4th of April 2005. Accordingly, the deletion of the then 
Section 5 removed the bar on product patents in the chemical, food and medicine sectors that 
existed since 1970. However, this did not mean that India was going to face the kind of turmoil 
that it faced did during the colonial era because it had utilized a number of flexibilities provided 
for under the TRIPS Agreement to ensure that its patent system accommodates its national 
interests.35 The new rule in Section 3(d) that was introduced by the 2005 amendments was one 
such tool, and its interpretation and application by the Indian Courts and Patent Offices is 
examined below to reveal how it is meant to do so. 
 
• GETTING ACQUAINTED WITH SECTION 3(D): INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION 
 
It should be noted that unless stated otherwise, any reference to ‘Section 3(d)’ here onwards is 
a reference to the rule that was specifically introduced into Section 3(d) by the 2005 
amendments relating to new forms of known substances. Recalling the words used in this part 
of the provision is vital to appreciate the subsequent role played by the judiciary and the Patent 
Offices in revealing the specificities of this rule. It provides that ‘the mere discovery of a new 
form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of 
that substance’ shall not be treated as an invention. It is followed by an Explanation which 
provides that derivatives of a known substance, such as salts, ester and so on, shall be treated 
as the same substance ‘unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy’. 
The upshot of this is that an invention that is a derivative of a known substance would be 
                                               
34 Lok Sabha Debates, n. 31, pp. 639-650.  
35 See V. Unni, ‘Indian Patent Law and TRIPS: Redrawing the Felxibility Framework in the Context of Public 
Policy and Health’, Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L. J., vol. 25, no. 1, 2012, p. 323. 
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patentable only if there is a significant enhancement of the known efficacy. Neither did the 
Amendment Bill of 2004 nor the Act explain what constitutes a ‘known substance’, ‘efficacy’ 
or ‘significant enhancement’ of properties with regard to efficacy. The following sub-sections 
discuss how the Courts and Patent Offices in India have resolved these ambiguities surrounding 
this rule in the light of its intended objective of tackling ‘ever-greening’.  
 
v ‘Enhanced Efficacy’ 
  
As Mueller rightly envisioned back in 2007, the extent to which Section 3(d) could achieve its 
objective is fundamentally dependent on the meaning of ‘efficacy’ and the extent of its 
enhancement that is necessary to render a derivative invention to be patentable.36 These issues 
were addressed by the Supreme Court of India in Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others.37 
This was the first dispute that instigated a steady comprehension of the scope and effect of 
Section 3(d), from the Patent Office up until the apex Supreme Court.38 This section scrutinizes 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term ‘efficacy’ in Section 3(d) with regard to 
pharmaceutical inventions as it is the most authoritative interpretation of this concept that raises 
the brows of the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1.  
 
The scrutiny of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 3(d) would not be complete 
without an adequate understanding of the facts and history concerning the dispute in Novartis. 
Novartis’s patent application for Glivec concerned the beta crystalline form of an active 
ingredient known as imatinib mesylate. In 1993 Novartis had applied for a patent in the US in 
for imatinib in freebase form. At that time, however, India did not recognize product patents 
for pharmaceuticals, and therefore, foreign patent applications that preceded the TRIPS 
Agreement became part of the prior art in India. Novartis filed its Indian patent application 
relating to the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate in 1998 after TRIPS came into force, 
on the basis that it had significant improvements compared to imatinib in freebase form that 
                                               
36 Mueller, n. 7, p. 553 
37 See Novartis v. UOI (SC), n. 25.  
38 In addition to the literature cited above relating to Section 3(d), see S. Thambisetty, ‘Novartis v Union of India 
and the Person Skilled in the Art: A Missed Opportunity’, Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, vol. 4, 
no.1, 2014, p. 79; P. Kinge, ‘The Supreme Court of India on the protection of incremental inventions’, J. Intell. 
Prop. L. & Pract., vol. 8, no. 8, p. 581; S. Barazza, ‘Incremental pharmaceutical innovation in India: The Supreme 
Court’s judgment in the Novartis Gleevec case’, J. Intell. Prop. L. & Pract., vol. 8, no. 10, 2013, p. 776; E. Oke, 
‘Exploring the Flexibilities in TRIPS: Lessons from India’s Pharmaceutical Patent Law’, Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin, vol. 41, no. 1, 2015, p. 82; B. Sampat and T. Amin, ‘How do Public Health Safeguards in Indian Patent 
Law Affect Pharmaceutical Patenting in Practice?’, J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L., vol. 38, no. 4, 2013, p. 735; R. 
Gabble and J. Koehler, ‘To Patent or Not to Patent? The Case of Novartis’s Cancer Drug Glivec in India’, 
Globalization and Health, vol. 10, no. 3, 2014; J. Patel, ‘India’s Crack Down on the Practice of Pharmaceutical 
Evergreening: The 2013 Novartis Decision’, UMKC L. Rev., vol. 85, no. 1, 2016, p. 503. 
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was part of the prior art in India. As the ‘mailbox’ system was in place until the end of 2004, 
Novartis’s patent application for beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate was taken up for 
examination only after the final patent law amendments in 2005 that introduced the new rule to 
Section 3(d). 
 
The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs in Chennai initially denied the patent on the 
basis that Novartis’s application lacked novelty, inventive step and a significant improvement 
of efficacy mandated by Section 3(d). The decision, inter alia, noted that Novartis’s assertions 
relating to the 30% increase in bioavailability of the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate 
compared to imatinib in freebase form and its improved physio-chemical properties were not 
sufficient to demonstrate an enhancement of efficacy as the prior art consisted of imatinib in 
freebase and mesylate forms.39 Hence, the data that Novartis had submitted demonstrating 
enhancements in the beta crystalline form of imatinib compared only to its freebase form were 
insufficient. Citing this deficiency, the Assistant Controller did not think that it was even 
necessary to define the term ‘efficacy’ in Section 3(d). 
 
Aggrieved by the Controller’s decision, Novartis filed two distinct appeals. A substantive 
appeal was made to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), while an appeal 
challenging the constitutionality of Section 3(d) was made to the High Court of Madras. In the 
latter appeal that was decided first, Novartis claimed that the interpretation of ‘efficacy’ results 
in arbitrariness, and thus, violates the Indian Constitution. Disagreeing with Novartis, the High 
Court explained that the term ‘efficacy’ is particularly well known to everyone in the field of 
pharmaceuticals and that the enhancement of such efficacy could in fact be clinically proven in 
the field of pharmacology.40 After examining how the new Section 3(d) was proposed by the 
Government to allay the fears concerning ever-greening, the Court stated that its objective is: 
… to prevent evergreening; to provide easy access to the citizens of this 
country to life saving drugs and to discharge their Constitutional obligation of 
providing good health care to its citizens.41  
                                               
39 Decision of the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs for Patent Application No. 168/MAS/1998 on 
25/01/2006. 
40 Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others, High Court of Judicature of Madras, 2007 (4) MLJ 1153 (W.P. No. 
24759 and 24760 of 2006), para. 4. 
41 Ibid., para. 19. 
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Referring to the Darland’s Medical Dictionary, the High Court was the first judicial tribunal to 
state that ‘efficacy’ in the context of pharmaceutical products means therapeutic efficacy. In its 
words:  
Darland’s Medical Dictionary defines the expression “efficacy” in the field of 
Pharmacology as “the ability of a drug to produce the desired therapeutic 
effect” and “efficacy” is independent of potency of the drug. Dictionary 
meaning of “Therapeutic”, is healing of disease- having a good effect on the 
body”. Going by the meaning for the word “efficacy” and “therapeutic” 
extracted above, that the patent applicant is expected to show is, how effective 
the new discovery made would be in healing a disease/having a good effect on 
the body?42 
Accordingly, stating that the pharmaceutical industry in particular was not entitled to claim that 
the interpretation of ‘efficacy’ could lead to arbitrariness, the High Court dismissed Novartis’s 
appeal.  
 
The substantive appeal was thereafter taken up by the IPAB. In a detailed order, the IPAB 
upheld the Controller’s decision to deny the patent on the basis of Section 3(d), but over-turned 
the Controller’s findings that the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate was neither new 
nor inventive.43 Citing the High Court’s interpretation of ‘efficacy’, the IPAB noted that 
Novartis had failed to show the enhanced efficacy of the beta crystalline form vis-à-vis either 
imatinib in freebase form or mesylate form.44 Stating that whether there is a ‘significant’ 
enhancement of efficacy should be decided on a case-by-case basis,45 it noted that neither did 
the advantageous properties of imatinib in beta crystalline form, nor its increased bioavailability 
enhanced the therapeutic efficacy of imatinib.46 It also stated that Section 3(d) constitutes a 
heightened inventive step requirement for ‘drug and pharmaceutical inventions’, and therefore, 
is a part of the patentability criteria together with novelty and industrial applicability in terms 
of Section 2(1)(j) of the Patents Act.47  
 
                                               
42 Ibid., para. 13. 
43 Novartis AG v. Union of India, Order of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, M.P No.1 to 5/2007 in TA/1 
to 5/2007/PT/CH. 
44 Ibid., pp. 186-190. 
45 Ibid., p. 188. 
46 Ibid., p. 189. 
47 Ibid., p. 190. 
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Dissatisfied with the IPAB Order, Novartis made its final substantive appeal to the Supreme 
Court. Refusing to interfere with the Order, the Court availed itself of the opportunity to revisit 
the issues that were dealt by the High Court and the IPAB and to provide judicial guidance from 
the apex Court in India. It exhaustively examined how the 1993 patent in the US for imatinib 
in freebase form contained the teachings for the making of imatinib in mesylate form.48 The 
Court explained that the substance that is ‘known’ to have the effect of treating a disease should 
be considered as the ‘known substance’ for the purposes of Section 3(d). As imatinib in 
mesylate form, in addition to its freebase form, was known particularly to Novartis to be 
effective in the treatment of cancer, the Court stated that imatinib in mesylate form was the 
correct ‘known’ substance for the purposes of Section 3(d).49 Prior to examining if the beta 
crystalline version of imatinib mesylate had enhanced the efficacy compared its mesylate form, 
the Court delved into the history of Indian patent law. Concurring with the High Court’s 
observations, the Supreme Court stated that Section 3(d)’s legislative purpose is to tackle the 
problem of ever-greening: 
The amended portion of section 3(d) clearly sets up a second tier of qualifying 
standards for chemical substances/pharmaceutical products in order to leave 
the door open for true and genuine inventions but, at the same time, to check 
any attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the patent term on spurious 
grounds.50  
However, the Supreme Court did not think that it had to decide as to where Section 3(d) exactly 
fits in the process of patent scrutiny.51 It was of the opinion that it could either belong to the 
patentability criteria, or be a patent eligibility standard that identifies patentable inventions.52 
The Court stated, however, that the application for the beta crystalline form of imatinib 
mesylate ‘directly runs into’ Section 3(d) of the Act.53 The Court referred to the New Oxford 
Dictionary of English to interpret the term ‘efficacy’. It noted that ‘efficacy’ is the ability to 
produce the desired result that varies depending on the product in question.54 Stating that this 
depends on the ‘function, utility and the purpose of the product under consideration’,55 the Court 
                                               
48 Novartis v. UOI (SC), n. 25, para. 131-157. 
49 Ibid., para. 159-161. 
50 Ibid., para. 103. 
51 See Thambisetty, n. 38. 
52 Novartis v. UOI (SC), n. 25, para. 104. 
53 Ibid., para. 158. 
54 Ibid., para. 180. 
55 Ibid. 
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noted that ‘efficacy’ in the case of medicine could only mean therapeutic efficacy that must be 
judged ‘strictly and narrowly’.56  
 
With these general observations in mind, the Court dealt with the enhancements referred to by 
Novartis. Novartis claimed that the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate had more 
beneficial flow properties, better thermodynamic stability and lower hygroscopicity compared 
to imiatinib in freebase form. It also claimed that the beta crystalline form increased the 
bioavailability of imatinib by 30% which increased the bodily absorption rate of the drug, again 
however, only compared to the freebase form. The Court noted that there were essentially two 
problems with these enhancements. Firstly, the data submitted were only with reference to 
imatinib in freebase form, whereas what was actually needed were enhancements vis-à-vis 
imatinib in mesylate form. Secondly, as efficacy in relation to medicine had to be examined 
strictly and narrowly, the improved physio-chemical properties and the increased 
bioavailability of the beta crystalline form were in any event insufficient. The Court 
categorically stated that beneficial properties relating to a substance cannot be taken into 
account for the purpose of Section 3(d) as they did not relate to the therapeutic effect of a drug.57 
With regard to increased bioavailability, however, the Court was less severe. It opined that 
while bioavailability could enhance the therapeutic efficacy of a drug, it was not so in this case 
as no evidence was produced to show that the increased bioavailability resulted in better a 
therapeutic effect. The Court noted that such an assertion should be ‘specifically claimed and 
established by research data’.58 As such, the Court agreed with the Controller and the IPAB that 
Novartis had failed to establish ‘enhanced efficacy’ of the beta crystalline form of imatinib 
mesylate.  
 
Consequently, Section 3(d) prevented Novartis from patenting its ‘new’ version of imatinib, 
which effectively permitted generic versions of the drug to be sold in the market for lesser 
prices. The following subsections examine how subsequent Patent Office and judicial rulings 
have applied and even developed this interpretation of Section 3(d) in the hope of providing 




                                               
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., para. 187. 
58 Ibid., para. 189. 
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v Applying ‘Therapeutic Efficacy’ 
 
The interpretation of ‘efficacy’ of pharmaceutical substances as ‘therapeutic efficacy’ was a 
bold move by the Indian judiciary as it was this that made Section 3(d) a truly a unique 
mechanism to address the problem of ever-greening. With the endorsement of the Supreme 
Court, this interpretation that ‘efficacy’ with regard to pharmaceuticals is therapeutic efficacy, 
gradually entered the Patent Office manuals and guidelines in India.59 The Courts and Patent 
Offices situated in Mumbai, Chennai, Delhi and Kolkatta have since reiterated the significance 
of ‘therapeutic efficacy’ and have provided greater insights relating to this notion in a series of 
decisions. The most significant of these decisions are discussed in this sub-section to understand 
how Section 3(d) operates in practice to prevent ever-greening. Some of these decisions were 
made after the High Court’s decision in Novartis, but before the Supreme Court decision. This 
difference in timing does not really matter as the High Court’s interpretation of Section 3(d) 
was nearly identical to the subsequent reading by the Supreme Court. 
 
The decision of the Delhi Patent Office relating to Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals’ 
patent application for nevirapine hemihydrate60 was one of the most significant Patent Office 
decisions on Section 3(d) after Novartis. The application concerned a pediatric HIV drug. 
Nevirapine was the active ingredient of the invention and was already known to be effective in 
the treatment of HIV. The Network for People Living with HIV/AIDs and the Positive Women 
Network filed pre-grant oppositions, inter alia, claiming that the hemihydrate form of 
nevirapine did not significantly enhance the therapeutic efficacy of nevirapine. They alleged 
that the only advancement asserted by Boehringer related to improved particle size stability. 
The Controller cited the objective of Section 3(d) as explained by the Madras High Court in 
Novartis (as the Supreme Court had not dealt with the matter by then). After citing the High 
Court’s definition of ‘efficacy’ as ‘therapeutic efficacy’ in relation to pharmaceuticals, the 
Controller stated that: 
… what the patent applicant is expected to show is, how effective the new 
discovery made would be in healing a disease/having a good effect on the 
body.61  
                                               
59 See the Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, Manual of Patent Office Practice and 
Procedure 2011, pp. 84- 85; The Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, Guidelines for 
Examination of Patent Applications in the Field of Pharmaceuticals, 2014, pp. 28-33.  
60 In the Matter of Patent Application No. 2485/DEL/1998. 
61 Ibid., p. 13. Emphasis added.  
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The Controller stated that even though the improved particle size of the hemihydrate form of 
nevirapine could provide better storability of the drug, this did not enhance the therapeutic 
efficacy of nevirapine in healing or curing HIV. Therefore, the Controller denied the patent on 
the basis of Section 3(d). 
 
Another significant pre-Supreme Court (Novartis) Patent Office decision was that of the Delhi 
Patent Office relating to Gilead Science’s much litigated drug, Tenofovir. The application 
concerned particular ester forms (carbamate and carbonate) of a prodrug known as adenine that 
is used in the treatment of HIV/AIDS.62 As the patent was directed to a particular ester form of 
a substance that was already known in the prior art, Section 3(d) required Gilead to prove 
‘enhanced efficacy’. Explaining that ‘efficacy’ according to the High Court in Novartis is 
therapeutic efficacy, the Controller noted that: 
The intention of the legislation encompassed in section 3(d) of the Patent Act 
is very clear, product patents particularly of pharmaceutical products in India 
should be granted with utmost care and should be granted only to very genuine 
cases. Therefore, a clear bar of showing efficacy has been imposed to Patent 
the products particularly the Pharma products.63  
Gilead had submitted data demonstrating the efficacy of its invention, but it had not produced 
data demonstrating the enhancement of efficacy vis-à-vis the prior art that included the base 
prodrug. The Controller stated: 
The Data provided by the applicants is related to the improved properties of 
the compound of the present invention. There is no evidence and data in 
specification to prove the improved clinical efficacy of the claimed 
pharmaceutical substance as compared to its own base drug moiety PMPA.64 
In the absence of such comparative data, the Controller noted that there could not be an 
examination of an ‘enhancement’, which is fatal to the demonstration of ‘enhanced’ efficacy. 
Therefore, the Controller denied the patent, emphasizing the significance of producing 
comparative data to demonstrate the ‘enhancement’ of the clinical efficacy of substances that 
fall within the scope of Section 3(d).  
 
                                               
62 In the Matter of Patent Application No. 2076/DEL/1997. 
63 Ibid., p. 22. 
64 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
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A final Patent Office decision that deserves mentioning is that of the Mumbai Patent Office 
concerning the patent application of the German pharmaceutical firm, Takeda, that claimed an 
isotopically substituted pantoprazole derivative.65 The invention was meant to serve as a proton 
pump inhibitor, effective in the reduction of gastric acid and the treatment of other 
gastrointestinal diseases. This was one of the first Patent Office decisions after the Supreme 
Court judgment in Novartis. The active compound of Takeda’s invention was pantoprazole, 
which was already a known substance. However, the invention related to a deuterated form of 
this compound. Takeda had provided comparative data that compared the clinical data of the 
invention vis-à-vis the prior art substance and claimed that it demonstrated that its deuterated 
form metabolized to a lower extent indicating higher stability and exposure. It asserted that 
these higher exposure levels enhanced the efficacy of the deuterated pantoprazole compared to 
the non-deuterated form.  
 
Takeda had also produced data to show the enhancement of the efficacy of their invention 
compared to a structurally close compound known as omeprazole, which had similar proton 
pump inhibiting capabilities. In the process of dealing with this data, the Controller made an 
important observation with regard to Section 3(d). The Controller noted that the data comparing 
the invention with the omeprazole compound was not relevant as the enhancement of efficacy 
should be vis-à-vis the closest known compound, which in this case was pantoprazole. In the 
words of the Controller: 
The question of Section 3(d), vis-à-vis the significantly improved therapeutic 
efficacy is to be adjudicated against the closest compound known, in this case, 
pantoprazole and not omeprazole. Therefore, the question to be answered is, 
whether the applicant’s counter argument and experimental details meet the 
requirement of significantly improved therapeutic efficacy against 
pantoprazole.66 
This explains why the Courts dealing with the Novartis dispute insisted on the enhancement of 
efficacy of the beta crystalline form of imatinib vis-à-vis its mesylate form rather than its 
freebase form. It was because the mesylate form of imatinib that had been disclosed was the 
‘closest’ to the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate. Dealing with the increased metabolic 
stability and intrinsic clearance values of Takeda’s invention, the Controller held that these 
experimental details only showed how the human body reacted to the drug, whereas what was 
                                               
65 In the Matter of Patent Application No. 293/MUMNP/2008. 
66 Ibid., para. 20. Emphasis in Original. 
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necessary was evidence relating to how the drug worked in the human body.67 As such evidence 
was missing, the Controller denied the patent on the ground of Section 3(d). 
 
These decisions that followed the Novartis dispute clarified some fundamental aspects relating 
to ‘therapeutic efficacy’. A decision of the IPAB demonstrating this developed understanding 
of Section 3(d) is Fresenius Kabi Oncology Ltd. v. Glaxo Group Ltd (No. 1).68 In this case, 
Fresenius had obtained a patent relating to quinazoline ditosylate salt compounds that served 
as protein tyrosine kinase inhibitors (PTK), effective in the treatment of a variety of disorders 
such as psoriasis and cancer that show inappropriate or uncontrolled cell growth. The prior art 
had consisted of a previous patent which was also owned by Fresenius that related to bicyclic 
heteroaromatic compounds of quinazoline that also served as a PTK inhibitor. The disadvantage 
of the prior invention, however, was that it absorbed large amounts of water that affected its 
stability as a medicament. Fresenius’s patent for the ditosylate form of quinazoline alleged that 
it made the quinazoline compound less hygroscopic, more crystalline and more stable. Glaxo 
subsequently challenged this patent, inter alia, on the basis that Fresenius’s patent application 
had not satisfied Section 3(d). The IPAB noted that the alleged enhancements vis-à-vis the prior 
art compounds related to the moisture absorption property and the increase in stability, which 
affected the potency of the drug. Citing the decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court 
in the Novartis dispute, it stated that the improvement of the potency of a drug did not enhance 
its ‘therapeutic efficacy’. It held that: 
The word ‘therapeutic’ is linked with healing of disease which means healing 
that disease. In fact this decision holds that better potency does not mean better 
therapeutic efficacy.69 
Therefore, noting that advantages unrelated to the therapeutic effect of a drug are not relevant 
in the assessment of the ‘enhancement of the known efficacy’, the IPAB revoked Fresenius’s 
patent on the ditosylate form of quinazoline. 
As such, the meaning of therapeutic efficacy is almost well settled. Where the patent 
application relates to a derivative of a substance that is known to have a medicinal effect, the 
patent applicant should establish the enhancement of the therapeutic efficacy of that derivative 
vis-à-vis the closest previous version of that substance. This is to be interpreted narrowly, both 
by the Courts and the Patent Offices, given the legislative intention to prevent ever-greening 
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and the Supreme Court’s guidance that it should be determined ‘strictly and narrowly’. 
Consequently, a patentee should adduce comparative data to establish the enhancement of such 
efficacy against the closest version of that substance in the prior art. Moreover, such data must 
not relate to the pharmacokinetics, but to the pharmacodynamics of the drug that demonstrate 
the healing or curing effect of a drug in the body. 
 
v A Patent Eligibility Standard 
 
An issue that lingered ever since the creation of Section 3(d) was as to where exactly it fits in 
the process of patent scrutiny. It was noted in relation to the IPAB ruling in Novartis, that the 
IPAB was of the opinion that Section 3(d) was a heightened standard of the inventive step 
requirement for pharmaceutical inventions. This was doubted because the Supreme Court 
subsequently held that it could either be a patent eligibility or a patentability standard. This 
uncertainty was finally laid to rest in the latter part of 2015 by the High Court of Delhi in F. 
Hoffmann La Roche Ltd. & Anr. v. Cipla Ltd.70 Roche owned a patent for erlotinib hydrochloride 
in mixed polymorphic forms of A and B. The product that Roche marketed encompassing the 
patented invention was Terceva, but only utilized the B polymorphic form of erlotinib 
hydrochloride as it had a better thermodynamic stability. Consequently, Roche had applied for 
a new patent directed only at the B polymorphic form of erlotinib hydrochloride. This had been 
denied by the Patent Office on the basis of Section 3(d) as the improved thermodynamic 
stability did not increase the therapeutic efficacy of erlotinib. Cipla began marketing an anti-
cancer drug called Erlocip in 2006 that also only used the B polymorphic form of erlotinib 
hydrochloride. Based on its previous patent for the mixed polymorphic forms, Roche sued Cipla 
in 2008 for infringement. The trial judge initially held that Roche had failed to establish 
infringement, and being aggrieved with the said judgment, Roche appealed to the High Court.  
 
One of Cipla’s rather novel defences was that the fact that Roche had applied for a new patent 
for the B polymorphic form and its denial by the Patent Office by itself showed that a product 
based purely on the B polymorphic form was beyond the scope of the original patent owned by 
Roche. The Court stated that Section 3(d) is a patent eligibility standard, because a subject 
matter that does not satisfy this standard does not even require the assessment of novelty, 
inventive step and industrial applicability.71 It further stated that Section 3(d) assumes that 
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structurally similar derivatives are functionally similar, and therefore, unpatentable.72 Where an 
invention is structurally similar to a previous substance, it demands better functionality to be 
patentable by virtue of its requirement of ‘enhanced efficacy’. Nevertheless, the Court 
dismissed Cipla’s unique defence noting that Section 3(d) is not meant to penalize an innovator 
twice.73 In other words, Section 3(d) is not meant to bar the patenting of a new form of an 
existing invention and also prevent such a patentee from enforcing his or her rights under an 
original patent. It stated that Section 3(d) is meant to recognize incremental innovation, but that 
it also acknowledges that: 
 … the incremental steps may sometimes be so little that the product is no 
different from the original.74  
Stating that in ‘no stretch of imagination’ could it be understood as constituting a defence for 
infringement, the Court allowed Roches’s appeal.75 
 
v Triggering Section 3(d) as an Objection and Ground for Invalidity 
 
The preceding discussion concerning Section 3(d) demonstrates that the burden of proving the 
enhancement of the efficacy of a derivative substance is clearly on the patent applicant. The 
Patent Office has the power to deny patents in the absence of such evidence. Chan Park 
observes, however, that the Indian Patent Offices still rarely demand such information on their 
own in the absence of third-party oppositions.76 After reviewing 2060 pharmaceutical product 
patents granted between 2005 and 2008, Park observes that there are still instances when patents 
are granted for polymorphic forms of known substances without any evidence of enhanced 
efficacy.77 While these oversights are attributable to the institutional capabilities of the Patent 
Offices in India, a more pragmatic issue concerned what an objector should establish in order 
to place the burden on the patent applicant to show ‘enhanced efficacy’ before the Patent Office.  
 
This issue received the attention of the IPAB in Fresenius Kabi Oncology Ltd. v. Glaxo Group 
Ltd (No. 2).78 In Fresenius owned a patent in relation to bicyclic heteroaromatic compounds of 
quinazoline that was used in the treatment of cancer. In addition to seeking the revocation of 
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Fresenius’s new patent concerning a derivative of this substance, Glaxo alleged that Fresenius’s 
original patent for bicyclic heteroaromatic compounds of quinazoline should be revoked on the 
basis of Section 3(d). It argued that the bicyclic heteroaromatic compounds of quinazoline were 
also derived from a prior art compound and that Fresenius had not provided any comparative 
data to show any enhancement of efficacy.79 Fresenius, on the other hand, insisted that its 
invention was a new chemical entity and did not attract the higher standards of Section 3(d).The 
IPAB stated in its decision that it is the patentee who must ordinarily demonstrate the enhanced 
efficacy of an invention in terms Section 3(d). However, it noted that in revocation proceedings, 
it is the applicant seeking revocation who must plead and prove that the invention is caught by 
Section 3(d). It stated: 
… in a revocation the applicant must plead and prove that it is hit by S.3(d) 
and that is has the same therapeutic efficacy as the known substance.80 
When an applicant seeking revocation establishes this, the IPAB noted that the patentee has the 
ability to: 
… counter it either by proving that it is not a derivative of a known substance 
or by proving that though it is only a new form of a known substance he has 
shown that it has enhanced therapeutic efficacy.81 
Noting that Glaxo had only provided vague evidence to show that the bicyclic heteroaromatic 
compounds of quinazoline were derivatives of a prior art substance, the IPAB thought it was 
insufficient to trigger Section 3(d) and refused to revoke the patent. These observations made 
by the IPAB have great practical relevance for the triggering of Section 3(d) and although they 
were set-out in the context of a revocation proceeding, it could be, and in fact has been adopted 
even in the context of opposition proceedings. Consequently, a mere allegation that an invention 
is a derivative is insufficient to either deny or revoke a patent on the basis of Section 3(d). The 
opposition must establish a prima facie case that the invention is a derivative of a known 
substance and that their therapeutic effectiveness remains the same. It is only then that the 
burden shifts to the patent applicant or patentee, as the case may be, to either prove that their 
invention is new, or that although it is a derivative, its therapeutic efficacy has been enhanced.  
The significance of this is evident in a decision of the Mumbai Patent Office relating to Eli 
Lilly’s patent application relating to a novel chemical compound.82 The Patent Office examiner 
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had initially raised an objection based on Section 3(d), subsequent to which Eli Lilly had 
adduced evidence to demonstrate that the prior art compound suggested by the examiner was 
structurally different to Eli Lilly’s invention. Noting that these structural differences were so 
significant, the Controller eventually held that Eli Lilly’s invention was a ‘new’ compound and 




The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Section 3(d) evidently adds an extra layer in the 
patent examination of pharmaceutical inventions. It is meant to deal with the issue of ‘ever-
greening’ by scrutinizing the therapeutic efficacy of inventions that concern new forms of 
already known pharmaceutical substances. However, it is also apparent that it is not a complete 
bar on the patentability of such inventions. As highlighted by T.C. James who has examined 
the scope of Section 3(d), nearly 86 patents have been granted for inventions that fell within 
the scope of Section 3(d) between 2005 and 2009.83 He states that this would not have been 
possible if Section 3(d) totally denied patents for incremental pharmaceutical inventions: 
…the fact remains that Section 3(d) had not come in the way of patenting 
incremental inventions which meet the criteria of patentability.84  
Whether the criteria specified by Section 3(d), as interpreted and applied by the Patent Offices 
and the Courts, would potentially constitute ‘discrimination’ of a field of technology under 
TRIPS Article 27.1 will be examined in the next Chapter of this thesis. 
 
B. THE BRAZILIAN REQUIREMENT OF ‘PRIOR CONSENT’  
 
• BRAZIL’S HISTORY WITH PHARMACEUTICAL INVENTIONS 
 
Brazil started granting patent protection in 1809 after it gained independence from Portuguese 
rule. It is considered to be the first Latin American country and the fourth in the world to 
recognize patent monopolies.85 Brazil even granted patents for pharmaceutical inventions until 
1945 when industrial development in the post-World War II period was considered to 
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necessitate the restriction of intellectual property rights in technology-intensive industries.86 
Hence, the then Industrial Property Law was amended to deny patent protection for medicines 
and chemical products in 1945 with the objective of encouraging the national production of 
pharmaceuticals.87 This policy was even reflected in Article 9 ‘C’ of the Industrial Property Law 
No. 5772/1971, which was the immediate predecessor of the current Industrial Property Law 
No. 9.279/1996.88 However, unlike India, the exclusion of pharmaceutical and chemical 
inventions from the patent system did not produce the intended result of creating a developed 
domestic pharmaceutical industry. In fact, Brazil had to import generic antiretroviral medicines 
to tackle the AIDS crisis that it faced in the latter part of the twentieth century.89  
 
Although the domestic pharmaceutical industry did not develop, the right to health achieved 
great prominence in Brazil in the period between 1971 and 1996. The new Brazilian 
Constitution that was introduced in 1988 and is still in force today, recognized the right to health 
as a fundamental right of every Brazilian citizen. Article 196 of the Constitution provides that: 
Health is a right of all and the responsibility of the State, to be guaranteed by 
means of social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and 
other hazards, and all the universal and equal access to actions and services for 
its promotion, protection and recovery.  
As Jae Sundaram opines, the placement of the right to health in the Constitution in this manner 
showed that it was not meant to highlight a State aspiration, but that it should be of instant 
application for the benefit of the Brazilian citizens.90 This constitutional provision soon began 
to play a vital role in enhancing the access to medicines debate, particularly in the context of 
HIV/AIDS given that Brazil was having the highest absolute number of HIV cases in all Latin 
American countries at that time.91 In addition to several programmes initiated by the Brazilian 
Health Ministry to provide non-patented antiretroviral medication, Brazil established its Public 
Healthcare System in 1990 known as Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS). Its objective was to 
deliver universal healthcare to all Brazilian citizens.92 Article 6(I) of Health Act No. 8080/90, 
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which was one of the legislative enactments that created the SUS, converted the constitutional 
provision relating to the right to health into an enforceable constitutional right by providing that 
the SUS ‘must’ be responsible for promoting full medical assistance including pharmaceutical 
assistance. Sundaram explains the distinctiveness of the Brazilian SUS scheme in the following 
manner: 
… the SUS is a publicly funded rights-based universal health system, which 
does not restrict access to medical care and medicines to its citizens, but one 
that empowers them to seek access to health care and medicines.93  
The creation of the SUS transformed the Brazilian health-care system to guarantee the 
constitutionally recognized right to health. Together with the absence of patent protection for 
pharmaceutical inventions, the Brazilian legal environment was considered to be one of the 
most sensitive to public health. However, this environment was not to last long as this was also 
the time when technology-intensive countries who demanded higher standards of patent 
protection began to triumph in the GATT/WTO trade negotiations that culminated with the 
TRIPS Agreement. In fact, Brazil began amending its patent laws several years before TRIPS 
negotiations actually concluded. The current Brazilian Industrial Property Law that 
implemented TRIPS’s standards was tabled to the Brazilian Congress in 1991, whereas TRIPS 
was concluded only in 1994. The similarities between the Brazilian Draft Act presented in 1991 
and the TRIPS Agreement was a clear sign of the forces behind the Brazilian Law. Hence, by 
the time Brazil signed TRIPS in 1994, it had already debated its TRIPS compliant Industrial 
Property Law, and with TRIPS being institutionalized by the legislature in that year, Brazil’s 
new Industrial Property Law No. 9.279/1996 was passed in May 1996 and came into full force 
in May 1997. Consequently, Article 8 of Law No. 9.279/1996 (here onwards referred to as the 
‘Brazilian IP Act’) recognized the patentability of any invention that is novel, inventive and 
capable of industrial application, thereby lifting the bar on pharmaceutical and chemical 
inventions that had existed since 1945. 
 
• THE ‘PRIOR CONSENT’ REQUIREMENT AND ITS OBJECTIVES 
 
In the haste to introduce its new intellectual property legislation and comply with TRIPS 
standards, Brazil oversaw the flexibilities enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement. It did not avail 
itself of any of the transitional arrangements and was prepared to grant patents for 
                                               
93 Sundaram, n. 85, p. 92. 
 135 
pharmaceuticals within a year or two of the conclusion of TRIPS negotiations. Consequently, 
with the new Brazilian IP Act coming into full force in May 1997 that removed the bar on 
pharmaceutical and chemical inventions, the number of patent applications filed in Brazil 
increased from 8,057 in 1996 to 16,235 in 1997, reaching 21,825 in the year 2007.94 75% to 80% 
of these applications were made by foreigners.95 Official data published by the Brazilian Patents 
and Trademark Office (INPI) also show that there were only 200 patent applications relating to 
chemical compounds in 1996, but that this number almost doubled each year after the new 
legislation came into effect, only to the exclusion of 1998.96 These applications were dominated 
by applicants from the developed parts of the world. Maria Oliveira, Gabriela Chavez and Ruth 
Epsztein note that from 1996 to 2002, the domestic pharmaceutical industry was responsible 
for a mere 3.1% of the total chemical based pharmaceutical patent applications in Brazil.97 This 
was similarly the case with patent applications relating to biotechnological inventions.98 
 
A pressing concern after the new Brazilian IP Act was the rise in the prices of medicine that 
placed a significant weight on Brazil’s Public Healthcare System (SUS). This was aggravated 
by the fact that Brazil had decided to examine patent applications that they referred to as ‘pipe-
line’ applications. As opposed to the ‘mail box’ system which countries benefiting from the 
transitional arrangements had to implement, the ‘pipe-line’ system was meant to examine 
applications that were already pending in the patent offices in other countries at the time the 
new Brazilian IP Act came in to effect.99 However, the pipe-line system only applied when the 
product encompassing the invention had not been placed in any market. Additionally, the 
system only applied for one year between May 1996 and May 1997. Notwithstanding these 
restrictions, almost 63% of these ‘pipe-line’ applications related to medicine.100 Inclusive of 
‘pipe-line’ applications, there were an estimated 3000- 4000 medicine related patent 
applications pending before the Brazilian Patents Office by 1999.101 The impact that the patent 
system was already having on the Public Healthcare System (SUS), the further impact that it 
would have if all those pharmaceutical patents were granted and the consequential impact that 
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this would in turn have on the Constitutional right to health of the Brazilian citizens sent chills 
down the spine of the Brazilian Government.  
 
Therefore, Brazil’s National Congress set up a Parliamentary Inquest Committee (CPI) in 1999 
to examine the reasons behind the exorbitant rise in the prices of drugs and as to what measures 
could be taken to prevent any further impact on its Public Healthcare System (SUS).102 The then 
Brazilian Health Minister, José Serra, submitted to Congress at this inquiry that the new patent 
system had contributed to this problem.103 Noting that this had been the impact of having a mere 
twenty patented medicines at that time, José Serra highlighted that more patents will cause even 
more chaos and that therefore, the grant of pharmaceutical patents should be strictly 
scrutinized.104 To address this risk that José Serra had pointed out, the Ministry of Health together 
with the Ministry of External Relations, Industry and Management proposed a mechanism to 
involve Brazil’s national sanitary agency, Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘ANVISA’) in the process of granting patents for pharmaceuticals.  
 
The rationale was that the Brazilian Patents and Trade Mark Office (hereinafter referred to as 
‘INPI’) did not have sufficient technical expertise to examine pharmaceutical patent 
applications as such inventions had been excluded from the patent system since 1945, and that 
this would lead to the grant of undue patents in this field. ANVISA, on the other hand, being 
the drug regulatory authority, was considered to be in a better position to do this or at least to 
assist the INPI in this process, as its expertise in the field of pharmaceuticals would serve to 
ensure the adherence to better technical standards in the patentability assessment of 
pharmaceutical inventions.105 This is evident in the Inter-Ministerial explanatory statement that 
made this recommendation: 
As for … the granting of patents – of both process and product – by the 
Brazilian Patent Office will only be granted with the prior consent of the 
National Sanitary Agency (ANVISA). This joint work by the Brazilian Patent 
Office and ANVISA will ensure better technical standards in the decision 
process for pharmaceutical patents, similar to procedures employed by the 
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most advanced systems of patent control and sanitary surveillance in force in 
more developed countries.106  
Satisfied with this proposal, President Cardoso issued an Executive Decree in 1999 known as 
Provisional Measure No. 2006/1999 introducing the requirement of ‘prior consent’ for 
pharmaceutical inventions. It was formally legislatively introduced into the Brazilian IP Act in 
2001 as Article 229-C by Law No. 10.196/2001. Accordingly, Article 229-C of the Brazilian IP 
Act currently provides as follows: 
The granting of patents for pharmaceutical products and processes shall 
depend on the prior consent of the National Sanitary Agency – ANVISA.  
This mechanism that was introduced by Brazil was hailed by many commentators and human 
rights organizations for defending the constitutional right to health of the Brazilian citizens.107 
Simultaneously, however, it created an opposition which alleged that this mechanism is 
unconstitutional and inconsistent with Brazil’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.108 
 
• ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Article 229-C merely stated that the grant of pharmaceutical patents ‘shall depend’ on the ‘prior 
consent’ of ANVISA. It was completely silent as to what aspects of a patent application 
ANVISA should examine in giving its consent. This became one of the most pressing issues 
relating to this mechanism as Law No. 9782/99 that established the ANVISA identified its 
institutional purpose as to: 
… promote public health protection by carrying out a sanitary control of the 
products submitted for sanitary surveillance’.109  
Hence, it was an agency responsible for sanitary control that was not foreseen to be involved in 
the patent system. Although the Ministries that recommended this ‘prior consent’ mechanism 
suggested that similar measures were used in the developed countries to prevent undue patents 
in the field of pharmaceuticals, none of these countries had used a health regulatory authority 
in this manner. This made Brazil the only country in the world to have allowed a regulatory 
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authority to participate in the patenting process. Without any precedent from any other part of 
the world, even the Brazilian lawmakers did not know if ANVISA should examine the 
patentability criteria or limit itself to examining the public health and safety dimensions of an 
invention or do both. Hence, Maristela Basso has opined that: 
The Brazilian law, due to its laconic wording, let room for unending 
discussions regarding the mechanism’s range of application, its functioning, 
goals and legality…110  
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, ANVISA started examining the patentability criteria of 
applications that were forwarded for its ‘prior consent’. Maurice Cassier notes that ANVISA 
recruited sixteen professionals in 2001 who were chemists, biologists and pharmacists who had 
received IP training and began denying consent when it had determined on its own that a 
pharmaceutical invention had not met the patentability criteria.111 This troubled the INPI as it 
only forwarded applications that it had determined to be patentable. It saw no reason why its 
findings should be doubted by any external authority. Thus, INPI perceived ANVISA’s 
duplicative patentability assessment to be unlawful as it was acting ultra vires its institutional 
purpose of sanitary surveillance. Therefore, when ANVISA denied its consent on the basis of 
its own patentability assessment, the INPI that was ideally required to reject those applications, 
started to ‘shelve’ them without a rejection or approval. Nevertheless, ANVISA continued to 
examine patentability as it was of the opinion that it should protect public health broadly even 
by preventing the grant of unworthy pharmaceutical patents.  
 
ANVISA’s jurisdiction became a serious cause for concern to the pharmaceutical industry who 
publicized its objection through the Brazilian Intellectual Property Association (APBI) in 
September 2001. The APBI resolved that ANVISA’s participation should be limited to 
scrutinizing public health concerns without examining the patentability criteria and that the 
failure to do so would violate the Brazilian Constitution and the TRIPS Agreement.112 To 
aggravate matters further, ANVISA adopted a technical note to deny the grant of ‘prior consent’ 
for pharmaceutical inventions that concerned new therapeutic uses of known substances and 
new polymorphic forms of existing substances. It considered such patents to be harmful to 
public health, to Brazil’s scientific and technological development and hinder access to related 
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drugs.113 This contradicted the INPI’s policy to grant patents for such inventions that meet the 
usual patentability criteria set-out in Article 8 of the Brazilian IP Act. Kenneth Shadlen notes 
that this further agitated the pharmaceutical industry, as although it is considered to be the 
‘bastion’ of innovation, it is heavily dependent on incremental innovation.114 
 
The relationship between the ANVISA and INPI further deteriorated with ANVISA adopting 
an internal Resolution in 2008 known as RDC No. 45/2008 that sought to legitimize its own 
mandate. It set-out ANVISA’s internal ‘work flow’ and Article 4 explicitly provided that it 
would examine the patentability of applications that are forwarded to it by the INPI. With this 
official text clearly showing ANVISA’s unwillingness to stop examining the patentability 
criteria, the number of applications being ‘shelved’ at the INPI gradually increased. This led to 
an administrative proceeding being initiated by the INPI at the Attorney General’s Office. In 
its Opinion in 2009, the Attorney General’s Office noted that ANVISA should scrutinize patent 
applications only in accordance with its institutional purpose of sanitary and public health 
protection and that it is not its responsibility to examine patent criteria.115 As this was a blow to 
ANVISA’s mandate, it filed a request of reconsideration, which resulted in a similar Opinion 
being made in 2010.116 
 
These calls to ensure that ANVISA adhered to its ‘institutional purpose’ in the context of Article 
229-C, however, were counter-productive as there was a problem in applying the ‘institutional 
purpose’ reasoning here. ANVISA’s institutional role was to examine the sanitary requirements 
of products that are about to be placed on the market. In the case of medicine, these products 
often encompassed patented inventions. When these products are submitted to ANVISA, there 
is usually an array of evidence and data suggesting the safety and efficacy of the product. 
Conversely, a patent application precedes an actual pharmaceutical product. A patent 
application does not usually contain sufficient information to demonstrate the safety and 
efficacy of a future product that will encompass the invention. In the context of medicine, there 
would never be clinical trials at the time of applying for a patent. Eventually, requiring 
ANVISA to examine the health and safety of pharmaceutical patent applications resulted in 
many applications being denied consent as they did not contain sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate health and safety of any pharmaceutical product.117 
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 With tensions mounting once again, an Inter-Ministerial Working Group was appointed by the 
Government in 2011 to find a lasting solution. It included the Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, the ANVISA, Attorney General’s Office and the 
INPI. This culminated in the Inter-Ministerial Ordinance No. 1065 of 2012 and a Final Report. 
They resolved that the INPI would forward a patent application to ANVISA after a formal 
‘initial’ patentability assessment and that INPI would conduct a full substantive assessment 
only after it receives ‘prior consent’ from ANVISA. They also agreed that ANVISA would 
examine a patent application only in light of ‘public health’. These decisions were adopted by 
ANVISA by its Resolution RDC 21/2013. This Resolution amended the former RDC 45/2008 
and the new Article 4 explicitly stated that ANVISA shall scrutinize applications ‘in the light 
of public health’. It also stated that a patent application would be considered to be contrary to 
public health where: (a) the pharmaceutical product or process presents a health risk,118 or (b) 
the application concerns a product or process that is of interest to an access to medicines policy 
or to a pharmaceutical care programme under the Public Healthcare System (SUS) and did not 
meet the patentability criteria.119 Article 4(3) stated that a pharmaceutical product or process 
would be of interest to drug policy or pharmaceutical services under the SUS either, when it 
falls within a list resulting from an Ordinance of the Ministry of Health relating to the products 
relevant for the SUS or, relates to a treatment listed in that Ordinance. Consequently, the 
patentability criteria could be examined by ANVISA only when the pharmaceutical product or 
process was of interest to the Public Healthcare System according to the Ordinances maintained 
by the Ministry of Health.  
 
This was an important limitation on the power of ANVISA. Nevertheless, the Ordinances of 
the Ministry of Health referred to in RDC 21/2013 listed a broad range of medications that fell 
within ANVISA’s official power to examine patentability. As Mueller and Costa note, 
Ordinance No. 1248/2010 of the Ministry of Health contained long lists of therapeutic 
categories including antiretroviral medication, medicines for neglected diseases and for several 
other diseases prevalent in Brazil.120 Coupled with the fact that INPI was still bound by 
ANVISA’s ‘prior consent’ relating to these medications, the reforms in 2013 did not change 
the mechanism as much as the pharmaceutical industry had originally desired. The Washington-
based Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhrMA) incessantly 
complained about Brazil’s ‘fourth criterion’ when obtaining patents for pharmaceutical 
                                               
118 Article 4(1)(i), RDC 21/2013. 
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120 L. Mueller and S. Costa, ‘Should ANVISA Be Permitted to Reject Pharmaceutical Patent Applications in 
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inventions.121 They submitted to the US Trade Representative in 2016 that Article 229-C of the 
Brazilian Act has been: 
…interpreted to inappropriately permit the health regulatory agency, the 
Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) to review all patent 
applications for pharmaceuticals products and/or processes, resulting in both: 
i) application of patentability requirements contradictory and/or additive to 
those established by Brazilian Patent Law and adopted by the Brazilian Patent 
Authority (INPI); and ii) duplicative, prolonged patent review processes that 
contribute to the already existing patent backlog that averages more than 10 
years.122  
This summed up the allegations that were being made by the pharmaceutical industry even 
against this streamlined mechanism of Article 229-C, which resulted in Brazil continuing to be 
on the ‘priority watch list’ of United States Trade Representative’s annual Section 301 Reports. 
With the Brazilian pharmaceutical market being forecasted to value USD 19.2 billion by 2021,123 
reducing ANVISA’s power in the patenting process was of utmost importance to the industry. 
This endeavor was complemented by numerous decisions of the Federal Courts of Brazil. When 
ANVISA prolonged their assessment or denied consent based on the patentability assessment, 
patent applicants resorted to filing action in the Federal District Courts to obtain writs of 
mandamus to expedite and/or overturn these decisions. Mueller and Costa note that of a near 
eighteen cases filed against ANVISA, a majority have been decided in favour of the patent 
applicants.124 The reason for this was the Courts’ disapproval of ANVISA duplicating and 
contradicting the patentability assessment conducted by the INPI. For example, in Novartis AG 
v. ANVISA, ANVISA had been delaying its ‘prior consent’ assessment and Novartis filed for a 
writ of mandamus against ANVISA, inter alia, praying for a preliminary injunction compelling 
ANVISA to grant prior approval within a prescribed time-frame.125 The Court granted the 
preliminary injunction compelling ANVISA to complete its analysis within 15 days and held 
that ANVISA should not examine patentability requirements.126 
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With the Federal Courts’ increasing intervention to limit its authority and mounting pressure 
from the developed countries, it became apparent that ANVISA could not continue its 
assessment of the patentability criteria even in respect of inventions that were of interest to 
Brazil’s National Healthcare System. In a significant move aimed at solving this power 
struggle, the ANVISA and INPI signed Inter-Agency Ordinance No. 1/2017 on April 2017. 
Article 5 of this Ordinance curtailed the relevance of ANVISA’s patentability assessment of 
pharmaceutical inventions that are of interest to the Public Healthcare System to the level of 
‘technical opinions’. These technical opinions are to be considered only as third-party 
observations during INPI’s substantive patentability assessments. Article 6 further provides that 
if INPI disagrees with ANVISA’s technical opinion, it should identify technical grounds for 
such disagreement. Hence, INPI is entitled to state technical grounds and continue to grant a 
patent notwithstanding ANVISA’s opinion that might suggest otherwise. This Ordinance was 
recognized by ANVISA by internal rule RDC 168/2017 of August 2017, and it is apparent that 
it has severely curtailed ANVISA’s power under the Article 229-C mechanism that was created 




There has not been any empirical data that has been published or examining the exercise of 
ANVISA’s power under Article 229-C of the Brazilian IP Act, except for a qualitative analysis 
conducted by ANVISA itself in November 2009.127 This Report stated that it had analyzed 1346 
pharmaceutical patent applications between 2001 and October 2009, and that ANVISA had 
denied prior consent for 119 of those applications. 47.9% of those denials were due to the lack 
of novelty, whereas 22.7% were due to the lack of inventive step. Interestingly, none of the 
denials were due to public health/sanitary reasons. While these statistics show that ANVISA 
had applied more stringent patentability criteria, they do not show how Article 229-C operated 
under the work-flows implemented in 2013 and 2017. It will be recalled that ANVISA was only 
entitled to examine the patentability of applications that were of interest to the Public 
Healthcare System since 2013, and the legal effect even of those assessments was limited to 
mere ‘technical opinions’ in 2017. Hence, the practical impact that the ‘prior consent’ 
mechanism currently has on the patenting of pharmaceutical inventions cannot be derived from 
the 2009 data.  
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While these developments have clearly reduced the power of ANVISA in the patent granting 
process, it must be noted that Article 229-C of the Brazilian IP Act has remained unchanged.  
It still merely states that the ‘prior consent’ of ANVISA is necessary for the grant of patents for 
pharmaceutical products and processes. While the scope and application of this mechanism has 
changed over time, there is still an explicit hurdle to obtain patents for pharmaceutical 
inventions. The next Chapter will examine whether Article 229-C triggers a violation of the 
non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1, and if so, whether the recent 
developments relating to its operation could weigh in favour or against Brazil in defending an 
inconsistency with this obligation. 
 
C. THE AUSTRALIAN PATENT TERM EXTENSION SCHEME 
 
• AUSTRALIA’S HISTORY WITH PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS 
 
Patent term extensions have been a part of the Australian patent system for a long period of 
time. Such extensions were first provided by the Patents Act of 1903(Cth). This Act set-out a 
scheme for the extension of the term of a patent that was available to patents in all fields of 
technology. The Act granted an original fourteen-year monopoly and Section 84(1) permitted 
the extension for a further term of seven years, and fourteen years in exceptional cases.128 These 
durations were later modified by the Patents Act of 1921(Cth) that conferred a sixteen-year 
monopoly with extensions for a period of five years, and up to ten years in exceptional cases.129 
However, it was the Courts that had the power to grant extensions under these Acts, which 
made it significantly different to the current system in Australia. Patentees seeking extensions 
had to petition the Court at least six months before their patent lapsed,130 and the Court could 
grant an extension if it was satisfied that the patentee had been ‘inadequately remunerated by 
his patent’131 that had to be determined by taking into account the following factors: 
 … the nature and merits of the invention in relation to the public and to the 
profits made by the patentee as such and to all the circumstances of the case.132  
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As Charles Lawson notes, the basis for extensions under those Acts was the concept of 
‘inadequate remuneration’.133 This was a near identical basis adopted by the British Courts at 
that time to grant patent term extensions before their scheme was withdrawn by the Patents Act 
1977.134 Lawson states that the Australian Courts formulated a guiding principle in determining 
whether there had been such ‘inadequate remuneration’: it was the existence of a 
disproportionate difference between the benefit given to the public and the remuneration that 
the patentee had received.135 However, this determination was always subject to public interest. 
This meant that the Courts often placed restrictions on the enforcement of those ‘extended’ 
patents against public uses and even specified price limits and licensing terms to ensure that the 
public was not unduly burdened by such extensions. After scrutinizing each of the non-
exhaustive elements that the Courts were statutorily required to examine, Lawson notes that the 
Courts began to look at the quality of the inventiveness of the invention, its utility, the profit 
that was made by the patentee and any other circumstances that affected the patentee from 
obtaining the benefit that he deserved.136 
 
The Patents Act of 1921(Cth) was replaced by the Patents Act 1952(Cth) that contained near 
identical provisions on term extensions for patents in all fields of technology.137 As before, the 
Court had the power to grant extensions based on ‘inadequate remuneration’. While there were 
some basic guidelines deducible from the case-law as to how this had to be assessed, a 
developing problem at that time was that the Court process to obtain an extension was time 
consuming, subjective and uncertain. This was aggravated by the fact that parties were entitled 
to oppose extensions, and this resulted in lengthy Court battles.138 Another problem was that the 
concept of ‘inadequate remuneration’ was so broad that it even covered losses suffered during 
times of war. With the scope of the extension scheme being so ambiguous and time consuming, 
the Australian Government commissioned the first whole-scale review of the country’s patent 
system in 1979 that was conducted by the Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC).  
 
The IPAC submitted its Final Report in August 1984.139 It is evident from the Report that the 
pharmaceutical industry had called for the increased availability of extensions citing the 
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marketing delays they faced due to regulatory processes.140 As the existing extension scheme 
was based on the concept of ‘inadequate remuneration’ that often involved lengthy and 
uncertain Court processes, the industry had wanted more certainty in this respect. To its 
surprise, the IPAC recommended that the extension scheme should be abandoned in toto.141 Its 
reasoning was straightforward. There was simply no evidence to show that the extension 
scheme was operating beneficially, either to the patent system or to Australia as a whole. As 
term extensions are only granted at the end of a patent term, it noted that it is hardly conceivable 
that they could influence innovation-oriented investment decisions made at the very beginning 
of the innovation cycle and that it only increases social costs.142 Refusing to accept the industry’s 
call for extensions due to the delays it faced by the regulatory process, the IPAC noted that 
pharmaceuticals were not the only type of inventions that faced marketing delays in this 
manner. It further noted that there were other reasons beyond the control of the Government 
that caused delays in marketing a product.143 Hence, it found that granting extensions purely on 
the basis of regulatory delays was simply illogical. The only logical option in the opinion of the 
IPAC was, therefore, to abandon the extension scheme completely.  
 
IPAC’s recommendation to remove the only scheme that even marginally seemed to 
compensate the pharmaceutical industry for its regulatory delays was disheartening to the 
industry to say the least. Therefore, subsequent to this Report, the pharmaceutical industry 
actively lobbied against the full implementation of its recommendations. The Australian 
Government deliberated on the IPAC report for nearly four years before taking any action. This 
was also the period during which the Government decided to adopt a programme known as the 
‘Pharmaceutical Industry Development Programme’.144 Its aim was to encourage the growth of 
the pharmaceutical industry in Australia at a time when the Australian patent environment was 
considered to be ‘hostile’ to the international pharmaceutical industry.145 Perhaps, the lengthy 
Court-based extension scheme was an example of the ‘inadequate’ protection of pharmaceutical 
investments. The Government feared that pharmaceutical corporations would move away from 
Australia and that this would hamper the country’s economic progress. These fears were not 
wholly unfounded, as corporations like Eli Lilly, Ciba-Geigy and Upjohn ceased the local 
manufacture of their products and Roche even closed its research and development facilities in 
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 146 
Australia in the early 1980’s.146 With the Government policy adopted in 1987 to make Australia 
more attractive to the industry, it was almost clear that it was not going to ignore the industry’s 
calls for a better formulated patent term extension scheme. 
 
It was during such a state of affairs that the Government introduced the Patents Amendment Act 
of 1989(Cth) that amended the Patents Act of 1952(Cth). In line with the IPAC’s 
recommendations, it abolished the extension scheme that had applied to all patents, but 
simultaneously introduced a new and more stream-lined extension scheme that only applied to 
‘pharmaceutical substances for human use’. The Government stated that the objective of this 
new scheme was to: 
… recognize the time necessarily taken to obtain marketing approval for new 
pharmaceuticals, but the present uncertain and costly court actions are replaced 
with more straightforward administrative procedures.147 
The administrative procedure introduced by the 1989 amendment shifted the power of granting 
extensions from the Court to the Patents Commissioner. The Commissioner was entitled to 
grant a one-off four-year extension for claims covering pharmaceutical substances. Patentees 
were required to make an application for such extensions no later than twenty-one months 
before their patents lapsed along with an ‘extension eligibility certificate’ from the health 
authority and indicating the specific claims that had to be extended.148  
 
The 1989 amendments made it clear that the patent extension scheme was an added privilege 
that was only available to the pharmaceutical industry while all other inventions were only 
entitled to the standard term of sixteen years. While the regulatory delays coupled with the 
relatively greater innovation costs in this field were highlighted to be the reason for such a 
preferential treatment, the Government had not given any regard to the IPAC’s observation that 
there were other fields of technology that faced similar obstacles. Be that as it may, this scheme 
made its way in identical form to the current Patents Act 1990(Cth). However, with the 
culmination of TRIPS in 1994, the Australian legislature passed the Patents (World Trade 
Organization Amendments) Act of 1994 to bring its patent law into conformity with TRIPS’s 
minimum standards. One of the most significant changes brought about by the 1994 
amendments was the expansion of the term of all patents from the then prevailing sixteen years 
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to the TRIPS mandated term of twenty years. With the term of all patents being enhanced in 
this manner, the Government thought that there was no immediate need to provide further term 
extensions for pharmaceuticals. Therefore, the 1994 amendments also repealed the extension 
scheme in Patents Act 1990(Cth) that had been applied to pharmaceutical patents since 1989.149  
 
This was not the end of patent term extensions in Australia, as abiding by its policy to attract 
investments from foreign corporations and develop its economy, the Government once again 
expressed its commitment to ensure that pharmaceutical patents receive an effective patent life 
of fifteen years as pharmaceutical inventions still faced significant regulatory delays.150 Hence, 
the Government initiated fresh consultations with interest groups to create a new scheme which 
resulted in the current scheme that now prevails in Australia.  
 
•  THE CURRENT EXTENSIONS SCHEME OF 1998 
 
The Australian Government examined a number of proposals for a new extension scheme 
between 1994 and 1997. Unlike with previous schemes, however, it conducted detailed studies 
as to how the proposed schemes could affect Australia’s healthcare system. It paid particular 
attention to the potential impact on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) that contained 
a list of drugs that were subsidized for the benefit of its citizens. It concluded its consultations 
in 1997 and passed the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act of 1998 that introduced the 
current scheme into the Patents Act of 1990(Cth). The objective of the new scheme is clear in 
the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the Amendment Bill of 1997:151 It states in 
relevant part as follows: 
Extensions of up to five years on the standard 20 year term are available for 
pharmaceutical patents in the United States, the European Union and Japan in 
recognition of the exceptionally long development time and regulatory 
requirements involved in developing and commercialising a new drug. The 
aim is to provide an ‘effective patent life’, or period after marketing approval 
is obtained during which companies are earning a return on their investment, 
more in line with that available to inventions in other fields of technology.152  
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The ‘exceptionally long development time and regulatory requirements’ faced by the 
pharmaceutical industry was perceived as preventing its innovators from benefiting from the 
patent system in a manner that was ‘more in line’ with inventions in other fields of technology. 
Therefore, the extension of their patent terms was meant to ‘level’ the playing field and ensure 
that sufficient incentives are maintained for the technological development in the field of 
pharmaceuticals. The Memorandum also proceeds to state that the effect of granting such term 
extensions would be Australia being more attractive to investments from international 
pharmaceutical corporations that would in turn develop its economy.153 These constitute the 
objectives of the current scheme that is found in Sections 70 to 79 of the Patents Act 1990(Cth). 
 
v The Basic Formula  
 
In terms of Section 70(2), a patent is eligible for extension if it discloses and claims a 
pharmaceutical substance per se, or discloses and claims a pharmaceutical substance that is 
produced by means of recombinant DNA technology. Section 70(3) provides that the goods 
containing or consisting of such a substance should be included in the Australian Register of 
Therapeutic Goods and that the difference between the date of the patent and first regulatory 
approval should be at least five years. In terms of Section 65, the ‘date of the patent’ is ordinarily 
the date on which the patent application is made. An applicant is required to make an application 
for extension to the Commissioner of Patents while the patent is in force, either within six 
months from the date the patent was granted or within six months of the product being included 
in the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods, whichever is later.154 Once the Commissioner 
is satisfied that the substantive requirements of Section 70 and the other procedural 
requirements have been met, the whole patent is eligible to be extended for a period that is 
equivalent to the period between the date of the patent and the date of first regulatory approval, 
reduced by five years.155 Finally, Section 77(2) states that the term of an extension cannot exceed 
five years.  
 
This constitutes the basic formula of the Australian extension scheme. By compensating patents 
that claim pharmaceutical substances in this manner, it seeks to provide a minimum effective 
patent life of fifteen years for such patents. There are certain specificities relating to this 
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structure of the mechanism that relate to its scope of application and they are discussed in the 
following sub-sections.   
 
v The Significance of Claiming New and Inventive Pharmaceutical 
Substance 
 
Section 70(2) of the Act identifies the types of patents that are eligible for extensions in 
Australia: 
(a)  one or more pharmaceutical substances per se must in substance be 
disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance fall 
within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification;  
 (b)  one or more pharmaceutical substances when produced by a process that 
involves the use of recombinant DNA technology, must in substance be 
disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance fall 
within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification. 
In essence, it requires that a patent should either claim a pharmaceutical substance per se 
(Section 70(2)(a)) or a pharmaceutical substance that is produced by means of recombinant 
DNA technology (Section 70(2)(b)). Hence, claiming a ‘pharmaceutical substance’ is vital 
under both the sub-provisions of Section 70(2). A ‘pharmaceutical substance’ is defined in 
Schedule 1 of the Act as a substance that has a therapeutic application: 
"pharmaceutical substance" means a substance (including a mixture or 
compound of substances) for therapeutic use whose application (or one of 
whose applications) involves: (a) a chemical interaction, or physico-chemical 
interaction, with a human physiological system; or (b) action on an infectious 
agent, or on a toxin or other poison, in a human body; but does not include a 
substance that is solely for use in in vitro diagnosis or in vitro testing.156 
Accordingly, it should be a substance that works in a human body or a human physiological 
system. In other words, the substance should be capable of being used in the treatment of 
humans.157 Therefore, Andrew Christie, Saba Elkman and Melanie Howlett note that the type of 
substances that fall within the scope of Australia’s patent term extensions scheme are more 
limited than those covered under concepts such as ‘medicinal product’ under the European 
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Union’s scheme of Supplementary Protection Certificates.158 The limited nature of this scheme 
is further confirmed by the definition given to ‘therapeutic use’. Schedule 1 of the Act provides 
that: 
"therapeutic use " means use for the purpose of: (a) preventing, diagnosing, 
curing or alleviating a disease, ailment, defect or injury in persons; or (b) 
influencing, inhibiting or modifying a physiological process in persons; or 
(c) testing the susceptibility of persons to a disease or ailment.159 
The significance of claiming a ‘pharmaceutical substance’ for a patent to be eligible for an 
extension under the current scheme can be traced to the legislative policy that underpins this 
scheme. The 1997 Explanatory Memorandum states in relevant part: 
The extension of term provisions will be available for patents that include 
claims to pharmaceutical substances per se (provided that the other criteria are 
met). These claims to pharmaceutical substances per se would usually be 
restricted to new and inventive substances. Patents that claim pharmaceutical 
substances when produced by a particular process (product by process claims) 
will not be eligible unless that process involves the use of recombinant DNA 
technology. Claims which limit the use of a known substance to a particular 
environment, for example claims to pharmaceutical substances when used in a 
new and inventive method of treatment, are not considered to be claims to 
pharmaceutical substances per se.160  
It was the legislative policy that a patent must claim a ‘new and inventive substance’ in order 
to be eligible for an extension. Such claims are considered to be necessarily different to claims 
directed at processes or methods of use.161 The Australian Courts have noted that this legislative 
policy must be borne in mind when determining a patent’s eligibility for an extension. 
Interpreting the concept of ‘pharmaceutical substance per se’ in Section 70(2)(a) for the first 
time in Boehringer Ingelheim International v. Commissioner of Patents, Justice Heerey stated 
that: 
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The 1990 Act in its present form manifests a policy which draws a distinction 
between, on the one hand, a pharmaceutical substance that is the subject of 
patent claim and, on the other hand, a pharmaceutical substance that forms part 
of a method or process claim. The specific exception to the latter (an exception 
which proves the rule) is the provision for recombinant DNA technology in s 
70(2)(b).162 
Heerey J indicated that the general legislative policy is to apply the extension scheme to 
‘pharmaceutical substances’ that form the subject matter of a patent claim. Claims directed at 
processes or methods of use in which the pharmaceutical substance is merely a part of do not 
amount to claims directed at ‘a pharmaceutical substance per se’ unless the specific exception 
in Section 70(2)(b) is applicable. Further explaining the requirement of ‘per se’ in Section 
70(2)(a), the Courts have reiterated that it requires a pharmaceutical substance to have a 
significant degree of unity, the operation of which should be devoid of any extraneous factors. 
It was held in The Children’s Medical Center Corporation that the term ‘pharmaceutical 
substance per se’ is intended to mean a pharmaceutical that is presented as a single entity, and 
therefore, claims to kit forms or separate dosage forms did not satisfy this.163 Even the Australian 
Patent Office Manual states that the use of the words ‘per se’ requires the claim to the 
pharmaceutical substance to be unqualified by process, temporal or environment components.164 
 
As Heerey J indicated in Boehringer, Section 70(2)(b) is an exception to the general rule that 
there should be a claim to a ‘pharmaceutical substance per se’. It is an exception to the general 
rule that there should be a claim directed at a ‘new and inventive substance’. Hence, Section 
70(2)(b) was regarded as permitting the extension of patents that claimed processes or products-
by-processes provided there was a use of DNA technology. However, in Commissioner of 
Patents v. AbbVie Biotechnology,165 the Federal Court of Australia reiterated the significance of 
the general legislative policy that there should be a ‘new and inventive substance’ in the 
interpretation and application of both the sub-provisions of Section 70(2).  
 
This case concerned AbbVie’s Swiss type claim relating to a pharmaceutical substance known 
as adalimumab. The claim was specifically for the use of adalimumab for the manufacture of a 
medicament using recombinant DNA technology for the treatment of ulcerative colitis.166 The 
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Court noted that even though Section 70(2)(b) does not contain the terms ‘pharmaceutical 
substance per se’ and is an exception to the general rule that there should be a claim for a ‘new 
and inventive’ pharmaceutical substance, the exception only goes so far as allowing an 
extension when there is in fact a claim for a ‘product’ that is made by using recombinant DNA 
technology. In other words, even Section 70(2)(b) requires a claim to be directed to a product 
and it is not a licence to claim a process or use that cannot be regarded as a ‘new and inventive 
substance’. Therefore, a Swiss type claim that was directed at the manufacture of a medicament 
did not satisfy this requirement in Section 70(2)(b) even though it used recombinant DNA 
technology. In the words of the Court: 
With specific reference to the present case, adalimumab is a pharmaceutical 
substance produced by a process that involves recombinant DNA technology. 
However, the claims in suit are not directed to adalimumab produced by 
recombinant DNA technology. They are directed to different subject matter. 
First, they are directed to a method or process in which adalimumab is used to 
produce a medicament. Secondly, they are directed to a medicament containing 
adalimumab that is to be used for specific therapeutic purposes, being those 
identified at [16] above. These claims do not meet the requirements of s 
70(2)(b).167 
Consequently, the legislative policy that patent term extensions should only be available to 
patents that claim ‘new and inventive’ pharmaceutical substances is fundamental feature of the 




Another feature of the Australian scheme that deserves consideration relates to the scope of 
rights of a patentee during the extended term. A patentee has the exclusive right to ‘exploit’ the 
invention during the original twenty-year term of a patent.168 Schedule 1 of the Act defines 
‘exploitation’ broadly to include making, selling, hiring and the importation of an invention. 
Interestingly, there is no provision in the Australian Act that explains how the scope of 
protection must be determined. In a similar vein, the Act does not explicitly state the rights of 
a patentee during the extended period of a patent. This appears to be a rather odd omission as 
the scheme itself requires the presence of two specific types of ‘claims’ for a patent to be 
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eligible for extension in the first place. The insistence of such prerequisites would not make 
any sense if all the other claims were similarly extended.  
 
However, Section 78 specifies two limitations on the rights of a patentee during the ‘extended’ 
period. Firstly, a person who uses the types of substances mentioned in Section 70(2) for ‘a 
purpose other than therapeutic use’ does not infringe the patent.169 Secondly, an extended patent 
is not infringed by someone who uses ‘any form of the invention’ other than the two types of 
substances referred to in Section 70(2). This is a rather complex way of setting out the rights of 
a patentee during the extended term, but it shows that the rights are limited to the therapeutic 
uses of the pharmaceutical substance that has been claimed in the patent. As the rights of a 
patentee are inseparable from the pharmaceutical substance and therapeutic uses of that 
substances, it shows the reason why Australian Courts insist on there being a ‘new and 
inventive’ pharmaceutical substance. Therefore, Charles Lawson accurately points out that 
although the patent is technically extended as a whole in Australia, the exclusive rights of a 
patentee are limited to the pharmaceutical and therapeutic uses of the pharmaceutical substance 
that has been claimed in the patent.170 This is also reflected in the Patent Examiner’s Manual 
which states as follows: 
Although the term of the patent as a whole is extended, exploitation of any 
form of the invention that is not a pharmaceutical substance and exploitation 
of pharmaceutical substances for non-therapeutic uses do not constitute 
infringement of the patent during the extended term.171 
 
• CALLS FOR REFORM 
 
The current scheme has been subjected to a number of reviews since its inception in 1998. They 
have recommended the reformation and even the total abandonment of the current scheme of 
extensions in the light of its alleged failure to meet the intended objectives of technological and 
economic development. The Government has signified its intention to maintain the current 
scheme without adopting any of these recommendations, but this section examines these 
reviews to get a sense of the criticisms that have been levelled against this scheme. 
 
                                               
169 Patents Act 1990(Cth), Section 78(a). 
170 Lawson, n. 133, p. 383. 
171 Manual of Practice and Procedure, n. 161, on the ‘Overview’ of the Extension of Term of Standard Patents 
Relating to Pharmaceutical Substances at Section 3.12. Emphasis added. 
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It was highlighted that the Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) recommended the 
total abandonment of scheme in 1984 that applied to all patents under the then Patents Act 
1952(Cth). While the IPAC did not conduct a detailed analysis of the scheme’s economic 
impact or its effect in attracting investments, it stated that the extension scheme only increased 
social costs, that there was no empirical evidence to suggest the contrary and that 
pharmaceuticals did not deserve special treatment for its regulatory delays as this issue was not 
unique to the pharmaceutical industry.172 This recommendation was only partially implemented 
by the Government, as although it abolished the previous scheme, it simultaneously introduced 
a new one that applied only to pharmaceuticals in 1988. The IPAC Report is insightful as even 
though it was made in the context of a previous extension regime, the recent reviews of the 
current scheme express similar sentiments. 
 
One of the first reviews of the current scheme was conducted by the Pharmaceutical Patents 
Review (PPR) that was initiated by the then Parliamentary Secretary for Innovation, Hon. Mark 
Dreyfus QC MP in October 2012. It was meant to examine whether the patent system ensured 
the timely access to affordable drugs, supported innovation and had provided employment to 
Australian citizens. An important part of its terms of reference was to evaluate the extension 
scheme that applied to pharmaceuticals. The PPR published its Final Report in May 2013 in 
which it made some interesting observations about the current system.173 It noted that the United 
States-Australia Free Trade Agreement requires Australia to grant extensions for 
pharmaceutical patents beyond the TRIPS mandated twenty-year period.174 However, it stated in 
no ambiguous terms that this scheme established in 1998 that gives preferential treatment to 
pharmaceuticals is inconsistent with the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1.  
In its own words: 
Using the patent scheme to preferentially support one industry is inconsistent 
with the TRIPS rationale that patent schemes be technologically neutral.175  
Notwithstanding such a bold statement, the PPR did not explain how or why the scheme is 
inconsistent with this TRIPS obligation. In fact, the quoted sentence is the only sentence in the 
whole Report that even mentioned the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS. The PPR stated 
                                               
172 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, n. 139, pp. 36-39. 
173 See T. Harris, D. Nicol and N. Gruen, Pharmaceutical Patents Review Report, Canberra, 2013, [hereinafter 
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Trends in Relation to “Evergreening” of Patents’, Melbourne University Law Review, vol. 30, no. 2, 2006, p. 29.  
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that one of the vital objectives of the extensions scheme was to attract investments by the 
pharmaceutical industry but that it had manifestly failed in achieving this objective.176 
Scrutinizing investment data between 1991 and 2011, it noted that there had not been any 
notable increase in investments after the introduction of the current scheme.177 It also noted that 
even with this scheme that had been in operation since 1998, R&D in Australia as at 2013 
represented a mere 0.3% of global pharmaceutical R&D, while countries like US, Japan and 
UK represented 53%, 14% and 8% respectively.178 It stated that this was not surprising as there 
were other factors that influenced investment decisions. It stated: 
We should not be surprised that the outcomes expected by Government have 
not materialised. Pharmaceutical companies endeavouring to maximize 
shareholder benefits could be expected to make decisions about where to locate 
pharmaceutical R&D on the basis of countries’ relative costs (after taxes and 
subsidies) and skills, although other influences, such as the location of 
company headquarters also play an important role in those decisions.179  
The colossal financial impact that the extension scheme was having on Australia’s 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) was another serious concern to the PPR. The extension 
scheme increased the costs of the PBS as it took longer for generic versions to enter the state-
subsidized list of drugs. The Explanatory Memorandum to the 1997 Bill estimated this cost to 
be approximately $6 million in 2001- 02, which was to peak to a maximum of around $160 
million in 2005-06.180 However, the PPR estimated that the cost for 2012-13 alone was a near 
$240 million.181 As there was ‘no evidence or convincing argument’ to demonstrate that the 
scheme was contributing to the development of the Australian industry or to Australian R&D 
in a way that was commensurate with its ‘very substantial costs’, the PPR noted that the scheme 
needed reformation.182   
 
The PPR suggested two alternative reforms: to reduce the maximum term for which a patent 
could be extended or to reduce the effective patent life of pharmaceutical patents. It estimated 
that the mere reduction of the maximum extension period from five to four years would save 
the Government $45 million per annum.183 It also estimated that the mere reduction of the 
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effective life of a pharmaceutical patent from fifteen to fourteen years would save the 
government $46 million per annum.184 The PPR highlighted that such amendments were 
necessary as the only provision that had exercised some form supervision over the extended 
patents had also become ineffective. This provision that the PPR referred to is Section 76A of 
the Patents Act that was also introduced by the 1997 Amendment Bill. By the time this Bill was 
introduced to the legislature, the Government had decided to invest $800 million to assist 
pharmaceutical R&D with the intention that the pharmaceutical firms would retain their 
operations in Australia. As a form of assurance that these objectives will be met by each 
extended patentee, the Senate introduced Section 76A to the Bill to make a patentee of an 
extended patent demonstrate how these objectives were being met.185 This system, however, is 
only a notification system that requires a patentee to disclose details relating to, inter alia, the 
amount of Commonwealth funds used in the research and development of the drug that is the 
subject matter of the application during each financial year. While such notifications hardly 
showed how Australia benefited from each extended patent, the more practical issues related to 
the non-observance of this provision and the lack of access to this information by the public.186 
Consequent to the PPR Report, the Government gradually distanced itself from it by stating 
that it was commissioned by a previous Government and that the views and recommendations 
expressed in the Report did not reflect Government policy.187 
 
The next and most recent call for amendment of the scheme came from the Australian 
Government’s Productivity Commission in its Report titled ‘Intellectual Property 
Arrangements’ in September 2016.188 The Commission did not only examine Australia’s patent 
system, but examined Australia’s intellectual property system as a whole to scrutinize its effect 
on investment, competition, trade, innovation and consumer welfare.189 In this process, it 
dedicated an entire chapter to patents and pharmaceuticals. It noted that the pharmaceutical 
industry was a prominent user of the patent system because of the significant costs involved in 
the development of drugs.190 According to a submission by Medicines Australia that represented 
the research-based medicines industry, the average cost to develop a drug was estimated to be 
                                               
184 Ibid., p. 78. 
185 See Lawson, n. 133, p. 395. 
186 PPR Report, n. 173, pp. 89-92. 
187 See Government Statement on the Pharmaceutical Patent Review Final Report, 
https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/g/files/net856/f/government_statement_on_the_pharmaceutical_patent_revi
ew_final_report.pdf, (accessed 28 January 2018).  
188 See Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, Intellectual Property Arrangements, Canberra,  2016, [hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Productivity Commission’]. 
189 Ibid., Terms of Reference, p. iv. 
190 Ibid., p. 290. 
 157 
around US$2.6 billion.191 The Commission also noted, however, that the vast majority of 
pharmaceutical patent applications filed in Australia were by foreign applicants. It found that 
between 2001 and 2014, only 4.3% of pharmaceutical patent applications were filed by 
Australian residents.192 With these observations, the Commission stated that a patent system 
should not only provide incentives to develop new drugs, but that it should also ensure that 
these drugs are accessible and affordable.193 Tracing the objectives of the current extensions 
scheme, the Commission noted that it is meant to compensate pharmaceutical innovators for 
the heavy burden of expenses and risks incurred by them due to the regulatory review process.194 
However, it saw four glaring problems with such a justification for the current scheme.  
 
Firstly, it was not entirely clear that the standard patent term that had been increased from 
sixteen years to twenty years in 1994 was insufficient. Secondly, ‘parity’ was not a convincing 
rationale. It will be recalled that the Australian Government intended that system would give 
pharmaceuticals an ‘effective patent life’ that was equal to that enjoyed by inventions in other 
fields of technology.195 This justification did not make much sense to the Commission for two 
reasons. Firstly, as the IPAC had noted in 1984, there were other industries that faced similar 
regulatory hurdles. Secondly, and more importantly, it ignored the reality of the significant 
returns that the pharmaceutical industry made in the market given that its product life-cycle was 
not as short as in other fields of technology which reduced the effective patent life of patents of 
those technologies.196 Hence, the pharmaceutical sector could not really be equated with other 
fields of technology as it was in fact benefiting more from the patent system than any other field 
of technology. 
 
The third problem with this compensatory justification was that there was no evidence to show 
that the scheme was attracting more investments from the industry.197 This was similar to the 
opinion of the Pharmaceutical Patents Review (PPR) in 2013. Scrutinizing the information 
submitted to the Health Department by patentees in terms of Section 76A of the Patents Act, 
the Commission found that only 39% of the returns reported any R&D expenditure in Australia 
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and that this has only been declining since 2011.198 Simply put, the Commission could did not 
see any nexus between the extension scheme and pharmaceutical R&D in Australia. 
 
The fourth and final problem was the enormous costs that had to be borne by the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme (PBS). The Commission estimated that the cost to the Australian Government 
was $260 million per annum.199 This estimate was almost similar to the figure that the PPR had 
estimated in 2013. For these reasons the Commission concluded that: 
Overall, the Commission considers that the policy case for Extension of Terms 
was never made and that such provisions impose a net cost on the community.200  
However, the Commission did not suggest the total abandonment of the scheme. It made two 
recommendations to reform the system. Its first recommendation was to amend the manner in 
which ‘regulatory delay’ is calculated. It stated that calculating the length of extension solely 
based on the period that that has elapsed between the date of the patent and the first regulatory 
approval did not necessarily signify any delay on the part of the regulatory body. Hence, it 
recommended that the clock to calculate the term of an extension should start running only after 
a lapse of 255 working days, which is the reasonable time frame that has been allocated for the 
Therapeutic Goods Administration by the Australian legislature.201 It stated that most drugs 
obtain regulatory approval within 255 days and that such a period should not be considered to 
be ‘unreasonable’. The Commission estimated that such a mechanism will save the Government 
$258 million per year.202 The Commission also recommended that the availability of extensions 
be limited to Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs). While such was and still is the case in 
Singapore, it is based on the premise that it is the development of new APIs that is most 
expensive and time consuming. It stated that the original legislative intention was to limit the 
scheme to APIs although subsequent case law broadened the availability of the scheme to all 
types of pharmaceutical inventions.203 
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The Government announced its response to the Commission’s Report in August 2017.204 With 
regard to its recommendations concerning patent term extension scheme, the Government 
indicated in no uncertain terms that it was not willing to alter the current system. It stated that: 
The Government notes this recommendation, however has no plans to proceed 
with this recommendation in the form proposed by the Productivity 
Commission. The Government will discuss ways to improve the patent term 
extension system with the sector.205  
The response also continued to explain the significance of the patent system to the 
pharmaceutical industry. Highlighting that regulatory processes reduce the effective patent life 
of pharmaceutical patents, it stated that the failure to grant patent term extensions as done under 
the current mechanism would erode the incentives to introduce new pharmaceutical products 
to the Australian market.206 It concluded by stating that any consideration of changes to the 
extensions regime must strike a balance ‘between ensuring that new pharmaceutical products 
are developed and that they are safe and effective, but also ensuring that they are accessible and 
affordable’.207 This was perhaps a subtle hint that the Commission’s recommendations were not 
adequately ‘balanced’. 
 
It also deserves to be noted that during the time that lapsed between the Productivity 
Commission’s Report and the Government’s response, many submissions were made to the 
Australian Department of Industry, Innovation and Science. One such submission was by 
Medicines Australia.208 A brief observation of this submission provides some vital context to 
understand the Government’s response to the Report. Unsurprisingly, Medicines Australia 
submitted that patent extensions should not be limited to APIs as such a restriction would affect 
the incentive to engage in research of follow-on inventions relating to existing drugs. It stated 
that: 
Restricting patents to APIs limits the scope and incentive for pharmaceutical 
companies to invest, discover and develop new pharmaceutical substances. As 
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an example, a number of combination products have been developed, which, 
although scientifically not creating a new API, had extensive inventiveness 
that led to improved patient health outcomes. Additionally, the invention of 
new pharmaceutical substances can allow different methods of administration 
that treat completely new indications.209  
It also submitted that patent extensions should not be calculated with reference to regulatory 
delay that only exceeds 255 working days as this ignores the very rationale for patent term 
extensions by discounting the significant time and costs involved in conducting clinical trials 
mandated by the regulatory requirements.210 These submissions that showed the industry’s 
perspective of the Productivity Commission’s recommendations appear to have influenced the 




Patent term extension schemes are prevalent in the patent systems of several WTO Members. 
The examination of the Australian scheme demonstrates the broad objectives that such schemes 
aim to pursue by maintaining adequate incentives for the pharmaceutical industry. It is evident 
that the Australian scheme only applies to patents that claim a ‘pharmaceutical substance’, to 
the exclusion of all the other inventions that similarly face marketing delays due regulatory 
processes. Whether conferring a patent term that goes beyond the TRIPS mandated twenty-year 
term is subject to the rule against ‘discrimination’ in Article 27.1, and if so, the Australian 
scheme’s potential consistency with this obligation will be addressed in the next Chapter. 
                                               




THE CONSISTENCY ANALYSIS 
 
This Chapter examines the potential consistency (or inconsistency) of the national measures 
that have been discussed in the previous Chapter of this thesis with the rule against the 
‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in TRIPS Article 27.1. Its objective is not to make a 
case for or against the consistency of those measures, but more significantly for the purposes 
of this thesis, to understand how the elements of this obligation and the concept of ‘justification’ 
that have been revealed in this thesis would potentially apply in practice.   
 
A. THE INDIAN REQUIREMENT OF ENHANCED EFFICACY 
 
• THE DISADVANTAGEOUS TREATMENT OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
It will be recalled that one of the rules of Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act (1970) requires 
an invention that is a new form of a known substance to demonstrate an enhancement of the 
known efficacy in order to be patentable. As in the previous Chapter, it should be noted that any 
reference to ‘Section 3(d)’ here onwards is a reference to this particular rule of Section 3(d). Its 
legislative history demonstrates that it was meant to apply to chemical based pharmaceutical 
substances and agricultural chemicals with a view to prevent the problem of ‘ever-greening’. 
However, the Supreme of Court noted in Novartis v. Union of India that almost 80% of the 
legislative debates relating to Section 3(d) concerned medicines and drugs, whereas only 20% 
related to agro-chemicals.1 This signified the obvious concerns that the Indian legislature 
specifically had in relation to the practice of ever-greening in the field of pharmaceuticals in 
the light of its potential detrimental impact on public health. The High Court of Madras also 
noted in the same Novartis dispute that these concerns relating to pharmaceuticals were 
confirmed by the fact that the Explanation accompanying Section 3(d) only refers to the field 
of pharmacology.2 Consequently, although Section 3(d) is meant to apply to pharmaceuticals 
and agro-chemicals, the text and legislative intentions indicate that preventing ever-greening of 
pharmaceutical patents was clearly the core objective of this provision. 
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To establish an inconsistency with the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1, a 
complainant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that a field of technology 
is being subjected to disadvantageous/preferential treatment. While this could be both de jure 
and de facto, a presumption to that effect is raised in the case of a de jure allegation when a 
respondent’s measure explicitly imposes additional criteria or restrictions that affect the 
availability and enjoyment of the patent rights of a field of technology. As the text and history 
of Section 3(d) distinctly demonstrates that it is meant to apply to new forms of known 
substances in the field of pharmaceuticals and imposes an additional requirement of 
demonstrating ‘enhanced efficacy’, it is submitted that this explicitly affects the availability of 
patent rights for pharmaceutical inventions. Therefore, its disadvantageous effect on 
pharmaceuticals would be presumed in this context.  
 
This presumption is augmented by the manner in which the Indian judiciary has interpreted the 
elements of Section 3(d). The narrow interpretation of ‘efficacy’ as therapeutic efficacy in the 
context of pharmaceutical inventions and largely disregarding any enhancements of other 
properties relating to a pharmaceutical substance only confirms its disadvantageous impact on 
the patentability of those inventions. These interpretations of the elements in Section 3(d) that 
have now been incorporated into the Patent Office Manuals have been the reason for 
pharmaceutical research-intensive members to have expressed their disapproval of Section 
3(d). For example, in its Special 301 Report of 2017, the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) noted that the US pharmaceutical industry continues to face challenges due to Section 
3(d) and has continued to keep India on its ‘priority watch’ list.3 This is because the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) that represents the research 
based pharmaceutical industry in US have continuously referred to Section 3(d) as an 
‘impermissible hurdle to patentability’ in their Special 301 Submissions to USTR.4 In a similar 
vein, a report published by the European Commission highlights the restrictive patentability 
criteria for pharmaceuticals and chemicals in India which is a clear reference to Section 3(d). It 
similarly places India on a so-called Second Tier priority list.5 
 
                                               
3 Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), 2017 Special 301 Report, p. 42. 
4 See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Special 301 Submission 2017, p. 51 and 
Special 301 Submission 2018, pp. 84-5. 
5 See European Commission, Report on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third 
Countries, February 2018, p. 13. 
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When a WTO Member takes a bold move to impose additional criteria for the patentability of 
inventions in a given field of technology in this manner, the interpretation of the non-
discrimination obligation suggests that it should have had good reasons to do so. With a 
presumption being made that Section 3(d) is disadvantageous to pharmaceuticals, the burden 
shifts to the respondent to demonstrate either that its measure does not disadvantage 
pharmaceuticals and is of ‘mere’ differential treatment or that such treatment could be justified. 
It is submitted that it is unlikely that India would succeed in the first of these counter-arguments 
for the following reason. As highlighted in Chapter 4, the concept of ‘mere’ differential 
treatment broadens when such treatment is accorded in the context of the patentability criteria 
of novelty, inventive step and industrial application. It was argued that this is a consequence of 
the autonomy that that TRIPS has preserved on the part of the membership to interpret and 
apply those criteria. On the other hand, the concept of ‘mere’ differentiation narrows when the 
differential treatment is caused by measures extraneous to the patentability criteria because such 
treatment goes beyond the autonomy preserved in the interpretation and application of those 
criteria.  
 
While there was a period when there was some ambiguity in the Indian jurisprudence as to 
whether Section 3(d) was a patent eligibility or patentability standard, these doubts were cleared 
by the High Court of Delhi which held that it is a patent eligibility standard.6 In other words, it 
is meant to regulate patentable subject matter, which is an assessment that is conducted before 
the patentability criteria come into operation. The consequence of this is that India cannot claim 
that it falls within its autonomy that relates to the patentability criteria, which effectively makes 
it difficult for it to rebut the presumption that Section 3(d) is disadvantageous. While Section 
3(d)’s limitation of patentable subject matter may render India to be in potential violation of 
the first sentence of TRIPS Article 27.1 which specifies that ‘patents shall be available to any 
inventions in all fields of technology’, this issue will not be examined here. 
 
• ANALYSIS OF A JUSTIFICATION 
 
v A Legitimate Policy Objective- Public Health 
 
The previous Chapter discussed India’s dramatic transformation of its patent laws relating to 
pharmaceutical inventions since it gained independence up until it implemented the TRIPS 
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standards in 2005. Its vast population, low-hygiene standards, low levels of income and thriving 
generic drug industry made its lawmakers wary of granting product patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals. Section 3(d) was introduced to alleviate the concerns that product patents in 
the field of pharmaceuticals would lead to ‘ever-greening’ that would in turn affect its public 
health. Although the concept of ‘ever-greening’ was not strictly defined at that time, and is, 
perhaps, beyond any precise definition even today, the Indian legislators considered it to be a 
type of patent abuse that resulted in the grant of a series of patents by making minor additions 
or alterations to existing drugs. By requiring the ‘enhancement’ of the known efficacy before 
granting such patents, the Government reiterated that only deserving inventions would be given 
any patent monopoly, thereby reducing the likelihood of such patent abuse.  
 
In establishing a ‘justification’ in the context TRIPS Article 27.1, the first hurdle that India 
should surmount is demonstrating that Section 3(d) pursues a legitimate policy objective. It was 
noted that TRIPS Article 8.1 is instructive for this purpose and that members have a significant 
level of discretion to pursue a wide spectrum of policy objectives provided they perceive such 
policies to be of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development. As 
the WTO Panel noted in Australia- Plain Packaging, the protection of public health is 
‘unquestionably’ such a legitimate policy as Article 8.1 explicitly refers to the protection of 
public health and nutrition.7 Moreover, WTO jurisprudence also demonstrates that a WTO 
Member has the right to determine the desired level of protection of the policy that it seeks to 
pursue. 
 
Given Section 3(d)’s objective to prevent ‘ever-greening’ and to keep medicines affordable to 
its citizens, India would most certainly claim that its measure seeks to protect public health. Its 
objective of protecting public health was aptly explained by the Indian Supreme Court in the 
Novartis case in the following manner: 
To anyone going through the debate on the Bill, Parliament would appear 
keenly alive to national interests, human- rights considerations and the role of 
India as the producer and supplier of drugs to different parts of the world 
where impoverished humanity is critically in need of those drugs at cheap and 
affordable prices. Cutting across party lines, member after member from the 
Opposition benches highlighted the grave risk in creating private monopolies 
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in an area like pharmaceuticals, the abuses to which product patents in 
pharmaceutical products were vulnerable, and the ploys used by big 
companies to artificially extend the period of patent to keep competitors out 
and keep the prices of the patented product high.8 
Similarly, in a statement that was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court, the High Court 
of Madras identified the legislative policy of Section 3(d) in its judgment in the Novartis dispute 
in the following manner: 
…the object which the Amending Act wanted to achieve namely, to prevent 
ever-greening; to provide easy access to the citizens of this country to life 
saving drugs and to discharge their Constitutional obligation of providing good 
health care to its citizens.9 
To this end, the Supreme Court noted that Section 3(d) sets up a ‘second tier’ of qualifying 
standards for chemical substances/pharmaceutical products and thereby: 
…leave the door open for true and genuine inventions but, at the same time, to 
check any attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the patent term on 
spurious grounds.10 
The significance that must be given to the protection of public health in the context of the patent 
system in India is highlighted by another provision of the Patents Act that concerns compulsory 
licences. This provision, namely Section 83, lays down the general principles that the Controller 
of Patents should have regard to when determining the grant of compulsory licenses for the 
non-working of patented inventions. It states in relevant part as follows: 
(d) that patents granted do not impede protection of public health and nutrition 
and should act as instrument to promote public interest specially in sectors of 
vital importance for socio- economic and technological development of India;  
(e) that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government in 
taking measures to protect public health.11 
While these sub-provisions of Section 83 in particular have great textual similarities to the 
Objectives (Article 7) and Principles (Article 8.1) of the TRIPS Agreement, the precise 
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objective of mentioning them so late in the Indian Patent Act still remain ambiguous. While 
they appear to be ideally relevant only to the Controller in determining an application for a 
compulsory licence, Section 83(d) suggests that patents already granted are presumed to not 
impede the protection of public health and nutrition. If such is the case, it must also follow that 
there should be some assessment of a patent’s potential impact on public health at the time the 
patentability of an invention is examined. However, the assessment of an invention’s impact on 
public health is not mentioned in any of the provisions dealing with patentability. While an 
invention’s impact on public health in determining its patentability is not strictly relevant, or 
largely vague at best, it was puzzling to find that the Supreme Court quoted Section 83’s general 
principles in its judgment in Novartis.12 The Court did not mention why it did this given that the 
case was totally unrelated to compulsory licences, other than merely stating that ‘it might not 
be out of place to take note of Section 83’ when explaining the development of India’s patent 
system.13  
 
Consequently, although it is still premature to state that the Section 83 considerations relating 
to the protection of public health and nutrition constitute general principles of the Indian patent 
system, it is at least apparent that public health is given some prominence under the Indian Act. 
While the precise contours of this prominence are yet to be fully understood, it suffices to note 
for the current purposes that Section 83 enhances India’s stance in demonstrating the heightened 





The test of ‘necessity’ borrowed from its textual reference in TRIPS Article 8.1 is meant to 
scrutinize the ‘necessity’ of the national measure to pursue the policy objective. It was argued 
in Chapter 4 that ‘necessity’ in the context of TRIPS Article 8.1, and therefore in the context of 
a ‘justification’ in Article 27.1, should entail a more flexible analysis than under the General 
Exceptions of GATT/GATS. As TRIPS concerns intellectual property laws that are not directly 
related to public health and other societal interests that must be balanced as per Objectives 
(Article 7) of the Agreement, ‘necessity’ in this context is meant to examine a measure’s 
capability to contribute towards a stated policy objective within the jurisdiction of a given WTO 
Member. This must be determined by weighing and balancing a number of factors that include 
                                               
12 See Novartis v. OUI (SC), n. 1, para. 73. 
13 Ibid. 
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the importance of the public interest, the level of contribution of a measure and the availability 
of alternatives. 
 
WTO jurisprudence demonstrates that the more important the public policy is, the more likely 
that a measure would be considered ‘necessary’.14 While the protection of public health has 
always been considered to be the most important public policy in the context of the covered 
agreements of the WTO that concern goods and services, this was specifically acknowledged 
in the context of TRIPS in Australia- Plain Packaging where the Panel noted that the 
preservation of human life and health is ‘both vital and important in the highest degree’.15 This 
is buttressed by the fact that the protection of public health and nutrition is explicitly mentioned 
in TRIPS Article 8.1 which indicates that it should be one of the more significant policies 
objectives that could be pursued in the context of a justification in TRIPS Article 27.1. 
 
The second factor relates to Section 3(d)’s level of contribution towards the protection of public 
health. In the context TRIPS Article 27.1, this involves an examination of the design, structure 
and application of a measure in order to determine if it has contributed or, more importantly, is 
capable of contributing towards the public policy objective. Hence, India should be able to 
demonstrate Section 3(d)’s ability to contribute towards the protection of public health. 
 
In a report that criticized the impact that Section 3(d) would have on incremental 
pharmaceutical innovation, the US-INIDA Business Council stated that, contrary to its 
legislative intentions, Section 3(d) would harm public health by inhibiting the development of 
better versions of existing drugs that would suit the local conditions of the country.16 However, 
India’s counter-argument is that Section 3(d) was never meant to prevent the patenting of 
incremental pharmaceutical inventions.17 It only serves to ensure that genuine incremental 
developments are granted patent monopolies. As the Supreme Court stated in Novartis, Section 
3(d) serves to check if an incremental invention is true and genuine.18 The manner in which the 
Indian courts and Patent Offices have interpreted the elements of Section 3(d) demonstrate the 
                                               
14 See Appellate Body Report, Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, para. 164; Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Products Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 172. 
15 Panel Report, Australia- Plain Packaging, n. 7, para. 7.2587. 
16 See US-India Business Council, The Value of Incremental Pharmaceutical Innovation: Benefits For Indian 
Patients and Indian Business, 2009. 
17 See T. James, Patent Protection and Innovation: Section 3(d) of the Patents Act and Indian Pharmaceutical 
Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Performance, 2009. 
18 See Novartis v. UOI (SC), n. 1, para. 103. 
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circumstances in which such incremental pharmaceutical inventions are to be considered true 
and genuine.  
 
A new form of a known substance should enhance the therapeutic effectiveness of the known 
substance. A patentee must demonstrate this with comparative data comparing the invention 
and the closest form of the known substance.19 Improvements relating to other properties of a 
pharmaceutical substance would not necessarily be sufficient to enhance the therapeutic 
effectiveness of a substance.20 These strict checks serve to ensure that patents are not granted 
for pharmaceutical inventions that entail minor modifications of already known substances, as 
it would otherwise hinder generic competition. The previous Chapter discussed a number of 
cases in which patents have been denied due to the lack of such enhancements. While Novartis 
is one such fine example, it also demonstrates how Section 3(d) contributes towards the 
protection of public health. As the Supreme Court noted in its judgment, the monthly treatment 
of Novartis’s Glivec was a near Rs. 120,000, whereas the generic version only cost around Rs. 
8,000.21 Thus, the denial of a patent for Glivec significantly enhanced access to the anti-cancer 
drug by thousands of patients. Since then, the Courts and Patent Offices in India have struck 
off several applications on this basis, resulting in the same outcome of more competition and 
affordable prices. It is submitted that in the context of patent law, this is perhaps one of the 
finest examples of a measure that is capable of contributing towards the protection of public 
health. The prevention of patents for incremental pharmaceutical inventions that do not enhance 
the therapeutic effectiveness of known drugs effectively render the known drug and its 
advanced versions to be accessible by the public without any monopolistic pricing. There is a 
significant level of evidence to show that this has been the outcome in cases where Section 3(d) 
has been applied and this would suffice to demonstrate its contribution and the capability of 
contribution towards the protection of public health. 
 
The final factor in this ‘necessity’ analysis concerns the availability of alternatives. As the 
Appellate Body has highlighted in the context of GATT Article XX, a respondent does not have 
the burden of showing that it did not have any other alternatives. It is the complainant who 
bears the initial burden of showing the availability of a less ‘discriminatory’ alternative which 
the respondent could negate by demonstrating that it was not so.22 Hence, India does not have 
                                               
19 See In the Matter of Patent Application No. 293/MUMNP/2008; In the Matter of Patent Application No. 
2076/DEL/1997. 
20 Novartis v. UOI (SC), n. 1, para. 187. Also see In the Matter of Patent Application No. 2485/DEL/1998 
21 Novartis v. UOI (SC), n. 1, para. 82. 
22 See Appellate Body Report, China- Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 319. 
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the initial burden of showing that it did not have any alternatives unless a complainant identifies 
a less inconsistent alternative. One of the chief criticisms that has been levelled against Section 
3(d) is that the concept of inventive step or non-obviousness is sufficiently capable of dealing 
with the problems of ever-greening. For example, the United States uses the lead compound 
theory in which structural similarities between a known compound and an invention raises a 
presumption of obviousness, unless the invention contains unexpected or surprising results. 
This presumption is made, however, only when there is some motivation that would have led a 
person of ordinary skill in the art to select and modify the known compound (i.e. a lead 
compound) in a particular way to achieve the claimed invention.23 As none of the other WTO 
Members, now to exclusion of Philippines, have adopted special rules like India to address 
ever-greening concerns in the field of pharmaceuticals, the inventive step requirement is most 
likely to be suggested as the alternative in this context.   
 
In addressing such alternatives, it is important to bear in mind as the Appellate Body reiterated 
in EC-Asbestos, that the suggested alternative should meet the same desired level of protection 
of the policy in issue.24 This was reiterated in the context of TRIPS by the WTO Panel in 
Australia – Plain Packaging. In determining if Australia had other alternatives to its Tobacco 
Plain Packaging (TPP) measures, the Panel noted that any suggested alternative should protect 
public health to the same extent that Australia had sought to achieve by its TPP measures.25 This 
is a consequential effect of the fact that determining the desired level of protection falls within 
the exclusive ambit of a Member’s autonomy. Moreover, any suggested alternative should not 
be merely theoretical in the light the development standards of the respondent Member. 
 
Accordingly, India would need to demonstrate that the inventive step requirement would not 
protect public health by preventing ever-greening to the same extent as Section 3(d) or that it 
is only a theoretical possibility in the light of its standard of development. It is submitted that 
India is likely to succeed in both these counter-arguments. As mentioned above, while countries 
like US tend to prevent ever-greening through certain presumptions in the analysis of an 
invention’s inventive step, such rules are not as clear and specific as Section 3(d). For example, 
the presumption based on the lead compound theory is only made in specific circumstances that 
                                               
23 See J. Lief and P. Schuyler, ‘Pharmaceutical Patents after KSR: What Is Not Obvious?’, Journal of Commercial 
Biotechnology, vol. 15, no. 1, 2009, p. 44; A. Trask, ‘“Obvious to Try”: A Proper Patentability Standard in the 
Pharmaceutical Arts?’, Fordham Law Review, vol. 76, no. 5, 2008, p. 2625; G. Liang, ‘The Validity Challenge to 
Compound Claims and the Unpredictability of Chemical Arts’, Wake Forest J. Bus. & Intell. Prop. L., vol. 13, 
2012, p. 38.   
24 See Appellate Body Report, EC- Asbestos, n. 14, para. 168. 
25 Panel Report, Australia- Plain Packaging, n. 7, para. 7.2600. 
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relate to the teachings in the prior art. Further, rebutting such a presumption is not too 
burdensome as, for example, even advancements that increase the bioavailability of a drug are 
considered to be sufficient. This is not necessarily the case under Section 3(d). It makes a 
presumption that certain derivatives mentioned in its Explanation are the same as the known 
substance, irrespective of the teachings in the prior art. This could be rebutted only by evidence 
relating to ‘therapeutic efficacy’. As already observed, this stringent examination discounts the 
enhancement of any other properties in a pharmaceutical substance including bioavailability, 
unless there is evidence to show that an increase in bioavailability also enhances the therapeutic 
effect of the drug.  
 
These factors demonstrate the high level of protection of public health that India seeks to 
achieve by Section 3(d), which is greater and distinct to the objectives that could be met by 
concepts such as non-obviousness. As the Supreme Court has noted, Section 3(d) is evidently 
an extra hurdle for certain types of pharmaceutical inventions and is purely aimed at protecting 
public health. This is buttressed by the fact that India barely has over ten years of experience in 
granting pharmaceutical product patents. In the light of its poverty and vast population, the 
harm that would have been caused to its public health would have been substantial if it had to 
wait until its Courts and Patent Offices acquainted themselves of how to apply the patentability 
criteria to complex fields of technology. Hence, the reliance on the inventive step requirement 
to address ever-greening concerns might have been limited to a mere theoretical possibility in 
India.  
 
Consequently, in the light of the vital policy of protecting public health, its capability to do so 
and the unavailability of alternatives, it submitted that India would be in a good position to 




The final requirement that India would need to establish is the requirement of even-handedness. 
It was highlighted in Chapter 4 that such a requirement finds its genesis in the chapeau 
conditions of the General Exceptions in GATT/GATS and similar justificatory concepts in the 
substantive non-discrimination obligations under the other covered agreements. It serves to 
examine whether a WTO Member genuinely pursues its stated public policy objective by 
scrutinizing whether the Member has addressed similar concerns in other fields of technology 
without limiting itself to one field of technology. Hence, in the context of Section 3(d), the 
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enquiry is whether there were other fields of technology with similar concerns relating to ever-
greening, and if so, whether India applied similar rules to those fields of technology. 
 
As highlighted above, Section 3(d) is also meant to apply to agro-chemicals. However, its 
application to agro-chemicals has not attracted as much attention as it has done in the context 
of pharmaceuticals. While this is perhaps because the rule tends to have a greater impact on 
pharmaceuticals than on agro-chemicals, it is submitted that India could prove the even-
handedness of Section 3(d) even if it did not extend it to the latter. This is because the ever-
greening concerns are most dramatic in the field of pharmaceuticals than in any other field of 
technology. The public health concerns that it triggers are so unique that it makes the problem 
of ever-greening in this field nearly incomparable to similar concerns in any other field of 
technology. India tackling ever-greening concerns in the light of public health will also be 
justifiable in the light of the WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health that 
specifically highlighted that TRIPS ‘does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health’.26 Consequently, India would be able to demonstrate that no 
other field of technology has necessitated such regulation than in the field of pharmaceuticals, 
thereby satisfying the final requirement of ‘even-handedness’ in its potentially successful 
demonstration of a ‘justification’ within the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 
27.1. 
 
B. THE BRAZILIAN ‘PRIOR CONSENT’ REQUIREMENT 
 
• THE DISADVANTAGEOUS TREATMENT OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
Article 229-C of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law No. 9.729/1996 explicitly requires ‘prior 
consent’ to be obtained from Brazil’s health and sanitary agency (ANVISA) before granting 
patents for pharmaceutical products or processes. Therefore, as highlighted in the previous 
Chapter, in a complicated yet observable fashion, the grant of pharmaceutical patents does not 
fall within the exclusive competence of the Brazilian Patents and Trademarks Office (INPI). 
Although the precise competence of the ANVISA in this patent granting process has been 
unpredictable for a number of years, it appears to have been limited by a relatively recent Inter-
                                               
26 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, Doha, 2001, para. 4. 
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Agency Ordinance27 and Administrative Rule.28 According to these developments, ANVISA is 
entitled to verify the object of a patent application in the light of public health.29 ANVISA is 
entitled to with-hold consent only when a patent application discloses a product or process that 
presents a health risk.30 Such a health risk is deemed to be present, for example, when the 
pharmaceutical product or process results in a substance that is banned in Brazil.31 ANVISA’s 
Administrative Rule further states that it could issue technical opinions regarding the 
patentability of pharmaceutical products or processes that are of interest to Brazil’s Public 
Healthcare System (Sistema Único de Saúde).32 The Inter-Agency Ordinance notes that when 
the Patent Office disagrees with ANVISA’s technical opinion, the Patent Office should state 
the technical grounds for such disagreement.33 
 
Notwithstanding this apparent curtailment of ANVISA’s power relating to its ability to examine 
the patentability criteria of pharmaceutical inventions, it has not completely alleviated the 
concerns of its critics. In its Special 301 Submission to the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) in 2018, PhRMA stated that: 
This “dual examination” is incompatible with Brazil’s obligations under the 
“anti- discrimination” provisions of Article 27.1 of the WTO Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).34  
Recognizing that the recent developments have sought to reduce ANVISA’s technical opinions 
to non-binding opinions, PhRMA notes that there is still much ambiguity as to what constitutes 
‘health risks’ which is still a basis on which ANVISA is entitled to withhold its ‘prior consent’.35 
Hence, PhRMA has argued that Brazil’s dual examination system must be removed completely. 
Even the USTR in its Special 301 Report of 2017 noted that this ‘duplicative review’ process 
‘lacks transparency, exacerbates delays and prevents patents being examined by the Patent 
Office’.36 Noting that there have been developments in 2017, the report further states that US 
will review these developments and closely monitor the impact of ANVISA’s new role.37 
                                               
27 Inter-Agency Ordinance No. 1/2017 of 12 April 2017. 
28 RDC 168/2017 of August 2017. 
29 Ibid., Article 2; Inter-Agency Ordinance, n. 27, Article 4.  
30 Ibid., Article 4(1); Inter-Agency Ordinance, n. 27, Article 4(1). 
31 Ibid., Article 4(2). 
32 Ibid., Article 7. 
33 Inter-Agency Ordinance, n. 27, Article 6. 
34 Special 301 Submission 2018, n. 4, p. 137. 
35 Ibid. 
36 2017 Special 301 Report, n. 3, p. 66.  
37 Ibid. 
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Similarly, the European Commission in its report on intellectual property protection in non-EU 
countries has stated that: 
Another continued grave concern for EU stakeholders is the scrutiny of 
ANVISA in pharmaceutical patent applications before they have been 
examined by INPI, although steps have been taken to supposedly realign the 
procedures with international standards.38 
Therefore, many concerns still linger regarding Brazil’s ‘prior consent’ mechanism. The 
palpable reason for these concerns to have lasted beyond the 2017 developments is that Article 
229-C of the Industrial Property Law itself has remained unchanged. The text still states that 
the patentability of pharmaceutical products and processes depends on the prior consent of 
ANVISA. None of the apparent curtailments of its competence are reflected in the Industrial 
Property Law. Whatever the mandate of ANVISA might be in this process, it is still a rule that 
applies only to pharmaceutical inventions and imposes an additional hurdle to obtain patent 
protection for those inventions. Therefore, this de jure rule would generate a presumption that 
it is disadvantageous to pharmaceuticals. 
 
Brazil may attempt to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the 2017 developments 
have limited ANVISA’s influence under this mechanism, and is therefore, not disadvantageous 
to pharmaceuticals. As these developments only took place in 2017, it is clearly too soon to 
evaluate how the new rules have impacted or would impact the functioning of ANVISA. While 
this will be clearer in time to come, it is submitted that the new rules are facially still too 
ambiguous to give Brazil any real possibility to rebut such a presumption if a TRIPS violation 
complaint is brought against it in the near future. As PhRMA has noted in its submissions to 
the USTR, the concept of ‘health risk’ has barely been defined under the new rules. There is 
nothing to prevent ANVISA from interpreting the concept of ‘health risk’ more broadly to 
include types of pharmaceutical substances other than those prohibited in Brazil, and thereby 
withhold its consent for a wide-array of pharmaceutical inventions. This concern is not wholly 
speculative, as ANVISA has had a history of denying consent for certain types of incremental 
pharmaceutical inventions alleging that patents for such inventions are detrimental to public 
health.39 This is aggravated by the fact that both, the Inter-Agency Ordinance and ANVISA’s 
                                               
38 Report on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property, n. 5, p. 25. Emphasis added. 
39 See ANVISA, Technical Note, Clarifications Patent Applications for Pharmaceutical Products and Processes, 
2004, in which ANVISA stated that it would deny ‘prior consent’ for pharmaceutical inventions that concern new 
therapeutic uses and new forms of known substances on the basis that they were harmful to public health. 
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Rule, still expressly state that ANVISA is entitled to analyze patent applications ‘in the light of 
public health’.  
 
It will also be recalled that ANVISA is entitled to provide technical opinions regarding the 
patentability of pharmaceutical inventions that are of interest to Brazil’s Public Healthcare 
System (SUS). A pharmaceutical product or process is considered to be of interest to SUS when 
it relates to a product that has been listed by the Ministry of Health as being relevant for SUS 
or relates to the treatment of a disease has been similarly listed by the Ministry. As the rules 
currently stand, the Patent Office could hold differently only by showing technical grounds for 
its own opinion. There is still much ambiguity as to what technical grounds may serve justify 
the Patent Office from having its own conflicting opinion relating to the patentability of such a 
pharmaceutical invention.  
 
Even if the above arguments are potentially too premature, there is another more pressing 
reason why Brazil is unlikely to rebut the presumption that Article 229-C is disadvantageous to 
pharmaceuticals. Whatever the impact of ANVISA’s patentability assessment might be in the 
future, there is still a duplication of the patentability assessment of pharmaceutical inventions 
that are of interest to Brazil’s Public Healthcare System. As ANVISA’s examination is not 
limited by any time-frames, Article 229-C would necessarily add delays to the patent granting 
process for those pharmaceutical inventions as they do not fall within the exclusive competence 
of the INPI. This could potentially affect a wide array of pharmaceutical inventions as Brazil 
may decide on its own as to which pharmaceuticals are vital to its SUS. This duplication of the 
patentability assessment would also prevent Brazil from claiming that it is ‘mere’ differential 
treatment as the entire replication of the patentability assessment cannot be regarded as an 
interpretation or application of the patentability criteria set-out in TRIPS Article 27.1. On the 
contrary, such a duplication results in a replication of the interpretation and application all the 
patentability criteria that would lead to policy inconsistencies between the ANVISA and the 
INPI. Thus, it is submitted that Brazil is unlikely to be able to rebut the presumption that Article 







• ANALYSIS OF A JUSTIFICATION 
 
v A Legitimate Policy Objective- Public Health 
 
The rising costs of drugs that followed the introduction of the new Brazilian patent regime was 
the principal reason for the creation of Article 229-C. It was created to ensure ‘better technical 
standards’ in the patentability assessment of pharmaceutical inventions and reduce the impact 
that pharmaceutical patents were having on its Public Healthcare System by preventing the 
grant of unworthy pharmaceutical patents.40 The rationale was that by denying unworthy patents 
in this fields, the prices of drugs will be reduced through generic competition, which would also 
reduce the financial impact that patents were having on the Healthcare System. Therefore, 
Brazil would claim that Article 229-C seeks public health protection by reducing the cost of 
pubic health, which is one of the most vital policy objectives that could be pursued by a WTO 




As noted in the previous Part of this Chapter, the ‘necessity’ of a measure must be examined in 
the light of the importance of the policy objective, the level of contribution of the measure and 
the availability of other alternatives. It was noted that that these factors should be weighed and 
balanced in order to determine if a measure is capable of contributing towards a stated policy 
objective within the jurisdiction of a given Member as the public interests mentioned in 
TRIPS’s Objectives and Principles are by themselves progressive long-term objectives that 
could barely be achieved within a short period of time.  
 
Although the policy objective that Article 229-C pursues is vital to the highest degree, it is 
submitted that Brazil is to face a number of set-backs in demonstrating the other elements of 
‘necessity’ in this context. The duplicative patentability assessment and non-binding nature of 
the current scheme is such that the design, structure and operation of Article 229-C makes it 
incapable of making any contribution towards the protection of public health. Although 
ANVISA is entitled to provide technical opinions relating to the patentability of pharmaceutical 
inventions that are of interest to its SUS, there is nothing that currently identifies any specific 
public health concern that ANVISA should examine in relation to such inventions. It is merely 
                                               
40 See Inter-Ministerial Explanatory Statement No. 92/99 for Provisional Act No. 2006/99. 
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meant to duplicate the entire patentability assessment in the hope that it would be more stringent 
than that of the INPI. It is also unlikely that ANVISA would be able to develop its own more 
restrictive patentability standards to address any public health concerns as the history of the 
power struggle between the ANVISA and the INPI shows that this was precisely what the Inter-
Agency Ordinance in 2017 sought to prevent.  
 
Even if ANVISA adopts restrictive patentability standards and gives a technical opinion as to 
why a pharmaceutical invention that is of interest to SUS should not be patented, the INPI is 
now entitled to proceed to grant such a patent by indicating technical grounds for the difference 
in opinion. The INPI may demonstrate that the policy adopted by ANVISA does not correspond 
to the patent policy of the INPI. Consequently, the duplicative patentability assessment that 
results from Article 229-C is such that it only adds delay to the process without any 
commensurable benefit to public health. It is submitted that this shows the lack of any genuine 
relationship between Article 229-C and the protection of public health. Moreover, the lack of 
any commensurable benefit to public health and the delays caused by this mechanism to the 
patenting process renders Article 229-C to be potentially counter-productive in the protection 
of public health. As such delays would necessarily impede the effective patent life of these 
pharmaceutical inventions that are of interest to Brazil’s SUS, it would deteriorate the 
incentives to develop the very pharmaceuticals that are vital to its Public Healthcare System.  
 
As to the alternatives that Brazil could have utilized to protect public health by ensuring better 
technical standards in the granting of pharmaceutical patents, a complainant is likely to suggest 
that the proper application of the usual patentability criteria would have been a better 
alternative. This is particularly so as ANVISA is not entitled to scrutinize any particular public 
health concern relating to pharmaceutical inventions that are of interest to its SUS in a manner 
that contradicts the patent policy of the INPI. Hence, INPI is already in a position to perform 
the same task as ANVISA. Two Government bodies performing the same task is problematic 
particularly in this context, as the history of the power struggle between ANVISA and INPI 
show that there could be fundamental differences with regard to the policies that they are likely 
to adopt. In the light of the fact that Article 229-C is incapable of making any contribution 
towards the protection of public health in Brazil, it appears that providing better teeth to the 
Patent Office through better technical expertise, training and infrastructure would have been a 
better alternative that was available to Brazil. 
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Consequently, while much depends on how the 2017 developments relating to ANVISA’s 
mandate would actually function in practice and how the INPI would perceive ANVISA’s 
technical opinions, the current state of the scheme shows that these issues are potentially fatal 
to showing a genuine relationship between Article 229-C and the protection of public health. 
For these reasons Brazil is unlikely to be able to demonstrate its ‘necessity’, and therefore, a 




If the operation of the new work-flow introduced in 2017 subsequently recognizes more 
competence on the part of ANVISA to scrutinize the patentability of pharmaceutical inventions 
that are of interest to its SUS by adding certain particular public health dimensions to the patent 
examination so as to satisfy the notion of ‘necessity’ that the concept of ‘justification’ in Article 
27.1 demands and ANVISA’s opinions are recognized by the INPI, it is submitted that Brazil 
would not have an issue in satisfying the condition of even-handedness. This is because Article 
229-C would then ensure better technical standards and prevent unworthy pharmaceutical 
patents by examining particular public health dimensions of such inventions. Given the 
detrimental impact that the non-observance of technical standards in the field of 
pharmaceuticals could have on a WTO Member’s public health, it is submitted that Brazil’s 
pre-occupation with pharmaceuticals in this respect would be considered to be ‘even-handed’. 
 
C. AUSTRALIAN PATENT TERM EXTENSION SCHEME 
   
• TRIPS ‘PLUS’ MEASURES AND THE RULE AGAINST ‘DISCRIMINATION’ 
 
The Australian Patent Term Extension scheme provides for the extension of the term of patents 
that claim ‘pharmaceutical substances’ for a maximum added period of five years. Prior to 
examining whether such a scheme is consistent with the non-discrimination obligation in 
TRIPS Article 27.1, an issue that requires preliminary examination is whether measures that 
confer rights that go beyond TRIPS’s minimum standards should abide by the non-
discrimination obligation. TRIPS Article 33 requires WTO Members to grant a minimum of a 
twenty-year term of patent protection that is calculated as from the date of filing of a patent 
application. The Agreement does not specify any obligation to compensate patentees for the 
reduction of the effective patent life caused by regulatory processes. Hence, patent term 
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extension schemes potentially extend the term of a patent beyond the minimum term required 
by TRIPS Article 33 making them TRIPS ‘Plus’ measures. Whether such measures that go 
beyond TRIPS’s own minimum standards should comply with the non-discrimination 
obligation in Article 27.1 is informed by TRIPS Article 1.1 that sets-out out the nature and 
scope of TRIPS obligations. It states in relevant part: 
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more 
extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.41  
Carvalho identifies that the only condition for TRIPS Plus measures is that of non-
contravention specified in TRIPS Article 1.1.42 The precise test of non-contravention has not 
been clearly specified in the Agreement, except for the fact that it should be assessed in the 
light of the ‘provisions of the Agreement’. Speaking in the context of bilateral TRIPS Plus FTA 
obligations that inhibit TRIPS flexibilities, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan argues that the 
condition of non-contravention is not violated when they merely contravene a flexibility that a 
WTO Member may have exercised under the Agreement.43 To support his argument, he makes 
a distinction between mandatory and optional TRIPS flexibilities, only the contravention of the 
former that attracts the non-contravention rule in TRIPS Article 1.1. It is similarly submitted 
that the non-contravention rule comes into operation when a TRIPS Plus measure contravenes 
a mandatory minimum standard that imposes an obligation on a WTO Member. This includes 
the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1 as WTO Members are bound to ensure 
that their patent rules do not discriminate, inter alia, between fields of technology with regard 
to the availability and enjoyment of patent rights. This reasoning is supported by Carlos Correa 
who states that the non-discrimination obligation in Article 27.1 is an example of a minimum 
standard that is potentially contravened by a Member who grants more extensive protection to 
one field of technology. In his words: 
A more extensive patent protection that discriminates according to the field of 
technology, the place of invention or whether the infringing products are 
                                               
41 Emphasis added. 
42 N. de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patents and Test Data, Fourth edition, Kluwer Law International, 2014, 
p. 13. 
43 H. Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 
117. 
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locally produced or imported may also be deemed a violation of Article 27.1 
and, hence, of Article 1.1.44 
As Correa rightly points out, when a TRIPS Plus measure is inconsistent with non-
discrimination obligation in Article 27.1, this necessarily violates the non-contravention 
obligation in Article 1.1. Thus, TRIPS Plus measures that extend the term of patents beyond 
the mandated twenty-year term should comply with the non-discrimination obligation in Article 
27.1.  
 
However, a more difficult issue that particularly relates to measures that extend the term of 
patents is whether they actually amount to TRIPS Plus measures in the above-mentioned 
manner. This is because there are instances when it is unclear as to what such measures actually 
extend. Such measures will not fall within the ambit of TRIPS if such extensions cannot be 
regarded as conferring a patent term that goes beyond TRIPS Article 33. If it does not fall 
within the ambit of TRIPS in this manner, it would also not constitute ‘more extensive 
protection than required by this Agreement’. Therefore, such a measure need not satisfy the 
condition of non-contravention in TRIPS Article 1.1. This in turn depends on whether what is 
actually extended is the entire patent or whether it is something more specific and narrower 
than the whole patent. How problematic this determination could be can be observed in the 
context of Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPC) in the European Union.45 SPCs grant a 
maximum of an added five-year period of protection only in respect of the therapeutic 
indication for which the pharmaceutical product has received regulatory approval.46 Therefore, 
although Article 5 of the Regulation states that the certificate ‘shall confer the same rights as 
conferred by the basic patent and shall be subject to the same limitations and the same 
obligations’, there is clearly an ambiguity as to whether the SPC mechanism provides a sort of 
extension that goes beyond TRIPS Article 33.47  
 
It is submitted that the Australian scheme does not run into such difficulty. As discussed in the 
previous Chapter, the Australian scheme extends the whole patent provided that it claims a 
pharmaceutical substance. Although Section 78 of the Act limits the rights of a patentee during 
this extended period with reference to the pharmaceutical substance and the therapeutic uses of 
                                               
44 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, 
Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 26. 
45 Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009. 
46 Ibid. Article 2 and Article 4. 
47 See F. Porcuna, ‘The Extension of the Exclusive Right to Pharmaceuticals under the European Law: The 
Supplementary Protection Certificate’, Pharmaceuticals, Policy and Law, vol. 13, 2011, p. 61. 
 180 
that substance, it is a fact that the entire patent is extended. Therefore, there is a greater case for 
the Australian scheme to be considered as a TRIPS Plus measure that falls within the ambit of 
TRIPS Article 1.1 and requires compliance with the non-discrimination obligation in Article 
27.1. 
 
• THE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS  
 
The first step for a complainant is to demonstrate a prima facie case of preferential treatment 
of pharmaceuticals. This would be the case if the complainant could show that an added 
privilege has been conferred upon the field of pharmaceuticals that relates to the availability or 
enjoyment of patent rights. Reversing the circumstances in which the disadvantageous 
treatment of a field of technology could be presumed, preferential treatment could be presumed 
when a national measure explicitly confers an advantage affecting the availability or enjoyment 
patent rights that goes beyond the minimum standards mandated by TRIPS. As highlighted in 
the previous Chapter, the Australian patent term extension scheme is only available to patents 
that claim ‘pharmaceutical substances’48. By conferring a maximum five-year extension of the 
entire patent, it goes beyond TRIPS Article 33 that only requires the patent term to be no less 
than twenty years as from the date of filing of the patent application. This treatment relates to 
the enjoyment of patent rights as it extends the term of such patents, which would have 
otherwise lapsed in Australia after twenty years that is calculated from the date of filing of the 
application.49 Therefore, the fact that no similar advantage is conferred upon any other field of 
technology raises a presumption that pharmaceutical patents are accorded preferential treatment 
and a prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 27.1. 
 
The burden then shifts to Australia to either demonstrate that its measure does not actually 
confer any preferential treatment or that such treatment could be ‘justified’. Given that its 
extension scheme constitutes a TRIPS Plus privilege that confers rights that go beyond TRIPS’s 
minimum standards, it is unlikely that Australia could rebut the presumption of preferential 
treatment. Therefore, Australia would need to establish a ‘justification’ to defend a finding of 
inconsistency. 
 
                                               
48 See Patents Act 1990(Cth), Section 72. 
49 See Patents Act 1990(Cth), Section 67. 
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• ANALYSIS OF A JUSTIFICATION 
 
v Legitimate Policy Objectives- Technological and Economic Development 
 
The first limb that Australia would need to establish is that its scheme pursues a legitimate 
policy objective. It will be recalled that the objective of the Australian scheme is to provide an 
‘effective patent life’ to pharmaceutical inventions by compensating them for the market delays 
they face due to the regulatory approval process. As the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1997 
Amendment Bill that introduced the current extension scheme states: 
Extensions of up to five years on the standard 20 year term are available for 
pharmaceutical patents … in recognition of the exceptionally long 
development time and regulatory requirements involved in developing and 
commercialising a new drug. The aim is to provide an ‘effective patent life’, or 
period after marketing approval is obtained during which companies are 
earning a return on their investment, more in line with that available to 
inventions in other fields of technology.50 
 
The Australian legislators also intended that such extensions would create an environment that 
is more attractive to foreign direct investments by pharmaceutical corporations that would in 
turn benefit its economy.51 Therefore, there are two distinct but related objectives of the 
extension scheme. The first is to ensure an effective patent life for pharmaceutical patents and 
to provide incentives that are ‘more in line’ with other fields of technology. Secondly, to attract 
investments and develop Australia’s economy. These two objectives could be respectively 
identified as technological and economic development. Given the significant level of discretion 
on the part of the WTO Members to determine which policy objectives that they may 
legitimately pursue in terms of Article 8.1, it is submitted that both these objectives are 





                                               
50 See Ministry for Industry, Science and Tourism, Explanatory Memorandum for Intellectual Property Laws 





The next limb that Australia would need to establish is that its extension scheme is ‘necessary’ 
to meet either or both its policy objectives of technological and economic development. The 
importance of the policy objective, the measure’s level of contribution and the availability of 
alternatives form part of this analysis to determine if the national measure in issue is capable of 
contributing towards the stated policy objective within the jurisdiction of that Member.  
 
A few points deserve to be mentioned with regard to the importance of the objectives that are 
pursued by the Australian extension scheme. The promotion of technological development is 
one of the most vital objectives in the context of TRIPS. While this may not be as intense as 
the protection of public health in the context of the WTO as a whole, it necessarily fits within 
the top hierarchy of the policies in the context of the TRIPS Agreement as TRIPS identifies 
technological development as one of the basic objectives of intellectual property protection. 
This is evident in its Objectives (Article 7) which provides that the protection of intellectual 
property rights must promote, transfer and disseminate technology. As technological 
development is the objective of its own minimum standards, it is difficult to think of any other 
covered agreement of the WTO in which technological development must be considered to be 
as vital as under the TRIPS Agreement.   
 
The objective of economic development is identified as an important policy objective to a 
certain degree in TRIPS Article 8.1 which explicitly provides that WTO Members may adopt 
measures to promote ‘socio-economic and technological development’. The importance of 
economic development should be understood in the context of the WTO system and its broader 
objectives that have been identified in the first Recital of the Preamble to the Agreement 
Establishing the Word Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). It provides as follows: 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to 
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so 
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in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different 
levels of economic development,52  
Accordingly, economic development is fundamental to meet the WTO’s objectives of raising 
the standards of living, ensuring full employment, maintaining a steady growth of real income 
and expanding the production and trade of goods and services. As TRIPS is one of the covered 
agreements within the WTO’s multilateral system, the pursuance of such economic 
development even in the context of intellectual property protection must be regarded as an 
important policy objective. 
 
The level of contribution that the Australian measure makes towards each of these objectives 
deserves some detailed discussion. One of its objectives is to provide and maintain adequate 
incentives to the pharmaceutical industry in order to promote technological development of this 
field. Nevertheless, one of the reasons that influenced the Industrial Property Advisory 
Committee (IPAC) to recommend the total abandonment of the extension scheme in 1984 was 
its reasoning that the grant of such extensions in the latter part of a patent term is too remote to 
influence R&D investment decisions made in the early stages of the innovation process.53 In 
other words, the IPAC did not find it logical that something bestowed at the end of a patent 
term could enhance the incentives to engage in R&D and contribute to technological 
development in this field. The Productivity Commission made similar observations in its Report 
in 2016, although it did not go to the extent of stating that the scheme is incapable of it. The 
Commission found, however, that the scheme had not made any substantial contribution to the 
technological development of Australia’s pharmaceutical industry to the extent that was 
actually desired at the time of its creation.54 This was because it had found that only 4.3% of the 
total pharmaceutical patent applications made between 2001-2014 were actually made by 
Australians. The vast majority of the applications were still being made by foreigners.55 Hence, 
its pragmatic observation was that although the scheme is capable of contributing towards 
greater technological development, there is still a lack of evidence to demonstrate that it has 
already made any substantial contribution.  
 
                                               
52 Emphasis added. 
53 See Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia, AGPS, 1984, p. 
39. 
54 Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, Intellectual Property Arrangements, Canberra,  2016, p. 295- 296, 
[hereinafter referred to as ‘Productivity Commission’]  
55 Ibid., p. 290. 
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It was also noted that the scheme seeks to promote economic development by attracting foreign 
investments. The Pharmaceutical Patents Review Report (PPR) made some interesting 
observations in this respect. It examined investment data between 1991- 2011 and found that 
there had not been any noticeable increase in investments by pharmaceutical corporations after 
the current extension scheme was introduced in 1998.56 It noted that as at 2011, R&D in 
Australia only represented a mere 0.3% of the global pharmaceutical R&D, whereas countries 
like US, Japan and UK represented 53%, 14% and 8% respectively.57 It pointed out that the 
reason for this is that the patent term extension scheme is by itself insufficient to attract 
investments. There are several other factors such as R&D costs involved in a particular 
jurisdiction, the skills available and the location of the headquarters of the parent corporation 
that play a prominent role in this process.58 The Productivity Commission Report (2016) also 
made similar observations after examining the returns submitted by patentees in terms of 
Section 76A of the Patents Act. It will be recalled that the notification system in this section is 
the only form of supervision to determine whether the extension scheme was contributing to 
R&D in Australia, and therefore, the development of its economy. While the Commission found 
that only a handful of patentees actually submitted R&D information under this provision, only 
39% (36 of 92 returns) reported any R&D expenditure in Australia. It also found that of those 
who chose to invest in Australia, their actual expenditure was very low averaging to a mere 
$3.9 million a year.59 The Commission also interestingly noted that the scheme is in fact more 
likely to influence foreign corporations in planning the launch of a product in a given market 
rather than at the stage of R&D, again showing that it is rather difficult by itself to attract foreign 
investments.60 
 
What transpires, therefore, is that there is clearly a lack of evidence to show that the Australian 
scheme has made any significant contribution towards any of its objectives. The current 
literature and data show that the scheme’s actual contribution is anything but astounding. 
However, it is incorrect to conclude that the absence of such evidence necessarily renders the 
patent term extension scheme to be incapable of contributing towards technological and 
economic development. It is submitted that the more reasonable observation that could be made 
in the light of these statistics is that the measure has not yet met the desired levels of contribution 
that had been originally intended. The level of contribution is just one of the factors in this 
                                               
56 T. Harris, D. Nicol and N. Gruen, Pharmaceutical Patents Review Report, Canberra, 2013, pp. 64-80. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., p. 67. 
59 Productivity Commission, n. 54, p. 295. 
60 Ibid. 
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holistic analysis as to whether a measure is capable of contributing towards a stated policy 
objective within the jurisdiction of a given WTO Member. It just might be that notwithstanding 
these low levels of contribution, the patent term extension scheme is the only realistic option 
available to Australia to pursue these objectives in this context. 
 
The final factor in this ‘necessity’ analysis is whether Australia could be considered to have 
had any other alternative to pursue its objectives. It will be recalled that the Productivity 
Commission proposed two recommendations to amend the current scheme in 2016. The 
objective of those recommendations was to reduce the impact that the scheme had on the 
Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS).61 The first of these recommendations was 
that the clock to calculate the extended term should begin to run only upon the lapse of 255 
working days after making the application for regulatory approval.62 Secondly, it recommended 
that the scheme should be limited to patents that claim Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients 
(APIs).63  
 
Although these recommendations were influenced by patent term extension schemes in other 
jurisdictions, most notably Singapore, the Australian Government did not adopt them because 
they had a fundamental problem: they did not meet the desired level of technological and 
economic development that Australia had sought to achieve. This is notwithstanding the fact 
that there was hardly any evidence to show that the current scheme had made any significant 
contribution in these respects. This is evident in the Government’s response to the Productivity 
Commission Report which reiterated that regulatory processes reduce the effective patent life 
of all pharmaceutical patents and that the failure to grant extensions in the current manner would 
erode the incentives to introduce new pharmaceutical products to the Australian market.64 The 
reasons why these recommendations fell below the desired level of technological and economic 
development can be deduced from the submission made by Medicines Australia to the 
Department of Industry Innovation and Science consequent to the Productivity Commission 
Report. It highlighted that restricting term extensions only to patents that claim APIs would 
affect the incentives to engage in R&D relating to follow-on inventions of existing drugs.65 It 
                                               
61 Ibid., p. 298. 
62 Ibid., p. 306. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Government Response to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into 
Intellectual Property Arrangements, August 2017, https://archive.industry.gov.au/innovation/Intellectual-
Property/Documents/Government-Response-to-PC-Inquiry-into-IP.pdf, (accessed 28 January 2018), p. 11. 
65 See Medicines Australia, Submission to the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science on the Productivity 
Commission’s Final Report on Intellectual Property Arrangements in Australia, February 2017, 
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also stated that only taking into account a delay that exceeds 255 working days would not reflect 
the costs and time spent in conducting the clinical trials mandated by the regulatory 
requirements.66 Hence, the Commission’s recommendations were inconsistent with the very 
rationale that underpinned the current system.  
 
The desired level of protection of the policy objectives that is sought by the Australian scheme 
makes it difficult to identify an alternative in this context. Although similar extension schemes 
are found in the patent systems of many Members of the WTO, they are far from being uniform. 
They differ significantly with regard to their scope and duration because of the different levels 
of protection of similar objectives that they seek to achieve. 67 Thus, it would be difficult for a 
complainant to successfully identify a reasonable alternative in this context. 
 
It is in the light of these factors that the ‘necessity’ of Australia’s scheme must be holistically 
determined. Although there is currently a lack of evidence to demonstrate that the extension 
scheme has made any significant contribution towards technological or economic development 
in Australia, its ability to satisfy the ‘necessity’ threshold in this context should not be ruled 
out. This determination should acknowledge the fact that demonstrating how the extension of 
a patent term contributes or could contribute to technological and economic advancement is not 
a straightforward task. This is because R&D and investment decisions are commonly influenced 
by a myriad of factors in any given jurisdiction. In fact, there is barely any evidence to even 
show that the twenty-year term that is mandated by TRIPS contributes to greater technological 
and economic development than the shorter terms that existed before the TRIPS Agreement. 
For example, Grootendorst and Matteo who examine the effect of TRIPS’s twenty-year term 
on pharmaceutical R&D expenditure in Canada argue that although the duration of a patent may 
positively influence R&D decisions in favour of a particular jurisdiction, this is often set-off by 
external factors such price controls that affect the pharmaceutical patent or product.68 Hence, the 
lack of evidence to show that the Australian patent term extension scheme has actually 
contributed towards these policies must considered pragmatically.  
 
                                               
https://medicinesaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/sites/52/2010/02/20170207-sub-Medicines-Australia-
submission-on-PC-Inquiry-into-IP-Arrangements-Final-Report.pdf, (accessed 29 January 2018), p. 7. 
66 Ibid. 
67 For a comparative analysis of the current schemes see Law Library of Congress, Patent Term Extensions and 
Adjustments, Global Research Center, 2016, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/patent-terms/index.php, (accessed 16 
January 2018).  
68 P. Grootendorst and L. Matteo, ‘The Effect of Pharmaceutical Patent Term Length on Research and Development 
and Drug Expenditures in Canada’, Healthcare Policy, vol. 2, no. 3, 2007, p. 63. 
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Many WTO Members including EU, France, Germany, Israel and Japan have enacted similar 
schemes that grant patent term extensions for pharmaceutical patents. While they differ with 
regard to their specificities, there is barely any concrete evidence in any of those jurisdictions 
to show that such schemes have by themselves made significant contributions towards 
technological or economic development that are usually the objectives of such schemes. The 
current data in Australia show that pharmaceutical R&D and foreign investments have 
increased during the past few years, but they do not show that this is purely attributable to its 
patent term extension scheme. Nonetheless, as Grootenhorst and Matteo have noted, the term 
of a patent is one of the factors that influence R&D decisions particularly in the field of 
pharmaceuticals, although this is often set-off by other factors. Thus, it is submitted that even 
if the contribution that the Australian scheme is capable of making towards technological and 
economic development has been set off by other factors, its ability to constitute one of the 
influencing factors to the pharmaceutical industry in making its investment decisions suffices 
to demonstrate its capability to contribute towards these objectives and satisfy the test of 




The principal concern that the Australian patent term extension scheme seeks to address is the 
diminution of the effective term of pharmaceutical patents caused by the regulatory approval 
process. However, pharmaceuticals are not the only products that face marketing delays due to 
such regulatory processes. As the Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) noted in 
1984, inventions relating to automotive emissions, building and sanitary systems, 
telecommunications and even agrochemicals similarly face significant regulatory delays in 
marketing their products.69 Hence, the majority of the IPAC was of the opinion that it was 
illogical to single out the detriment caused to pharmaceuticals and grant extensions solely on 
that basis. 
 
It was noted, however, that this majority opinion was not followed by the then Government, 
nor by any subsequent Government to date. The reason for this can be deduced from the 
Explanatory Memorandums that introduced the extension schemes in 1989 and 1998. In the 
former, the Government noted that the scheme is meant to acknowledge the time necessarily 
taken to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical products.70 In the light of the IPAC’s 
                                               
69 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, n. 53, p. 39. 
70 See 1997 Explanatory Memorandum, n. 50, p. 2. 
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observation that the detriment suffered by pharmaceuticals could not be singled-out, this 
statement in the memorandum was a clear indication that the Government perceived the 
detriment caused to pharmaceuticals to be greater than that caused to any other product 
category. The same reasoning can be found in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1998 Bill 
that introduced the current scheme. It stated that the scheme is meant to recognize the 
‘exceptionally long development time and regulatory requirements’ involved with a new drug.71 
 
The fact that pharmaceuticals are so singled-out by many WTO Members who currently grant 
similar patent term extensions suggests that there is some justifiable reason for this. It is 
submitted that the reason can be traced to the time and costs associated with innovation in the 
field of pharmaceuticals. In its report in 2016, the Productivity Commission noted that 
development costs are ‘significant’ in the pharmaceutical industry.72 Referring to the previous 
Pharmaceutical Patents Review Report (2013), the Commission stated that: 
The data and clinical trials that inform approval processes can be costly. The 
PPR noted that nearly half — $700 million of the estimated $1.5 billion — of 
R&D costs are spent on clinical trials. Regulatory approval costs are increasing 
due to the growing size (number of patients) and complexity of clinical trials 
(increasing the cost per patient).73 
It further stated: 
The multi-stage development and regulatory approval process also impacts on 
the time it takes to get pharmaceutical products to market. Medicines Australia 
submitted that the time to market is ‘between 10 and 15 years’.74  
Medicines Australia had further submitted to the Commission that the average cost to develop 
a single drug was a near US$2.6 billion. Although the Commission noted that there was some 
doubt regarding the accuracy of these figures given the confidential nature of the data used in 
this determination, a factor that evidently increased costs were the substantial risks inherent in 
the field of drug development. It noted that many drugs fail during the stage of clinical trials 
and never make it to the market. Medicines Australia had stated that almost 93% of potential 
therapeutic molecules never make it beyond the clinical stage.75 Consequently, unlike the IPAC, 
                                               
71 Ibid, p. 3. 
72 Productivity Commission, n. 54, p. 287. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., p. 289. 
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the Commission did not doubt that these factors rendered pharmaceuticals to require some form 
of special treatment.  
 
Therefore, although there are other fields of technology that face regulatory delays, the times, 
costs and risks involved in the innovation of pharmaceuticals show that regulatory delay affects 
the pharmaceutical industry more severely. This is reinforced by the fact that, to the knowledge 
of the author, none of the WTO Members currently grant such extension schemes to any other 
field of technology. Thus, until other fields of technology could demonstrate that the regulatory 
process affects them in an equal manner, it is submitted that Australia’s preoccupation with the 





This final Chapter discusses a range of important implications that potentially flow from the 
more developed interpretation of the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology 
that has been revealed in this thesis and highlights some important developments in relation to 
the TRIPS Agreement that serve to buttress the argumentation in this work. Accordingly, it 
consists of four Parts. Part A scrutinizes the practical implications relating to the circumstances 
in which a complainant may demonstrate a prima facie case of inconsistency with the rule 
against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology and the implications on a respondent who 
may seek to rely on the autonomy that this thesis has argued to have been preserved within the 
concept of ‘justification’. Part B discusses the theoretical implications that this interpretation 
of the rule relating to ‘fields of technology’ could have on the interpretation and application of 
the concept of ‘discrimination’ with regard to the other grounds in Article 27.1 and the National 
Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment obligations of the TRIPS Agreement. Part C 
discusses how the only TRIPS amendment to date and the WTO Panel Report in Australia- 
Plain Packaging lends support to the main reasoning in this thesis as to how the concept of 
‘justification’ ought to operate in the context of the non-discrimination obligation relating to 
fields of technology. Finally, Part D entails an overall conclusion and explains how this 
‘unravelling’ of the non-discrimination obligation highlights the balance that is mandated 
between WTO obligations and the autonomy of the WTO Member States to pursue important 
national interests. 
  
A. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE RULE CONCERNING 
FIELDS OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
• TRIGGERING A CLAIM  
 
The rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology constitutes a general prohibition of 
‘discrimination’ of a field of technology that affects the availability and enjoyment of patent 
rights. There are no standards of comparison between the fields of technology, nor any de 
minimis level of disadvantageous/preferential treatment that a complainant needs to 
demonstrate. What is required of a complainant is the demonstration of the 
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disadvantageous/preferential treatment of a field of technology that affects the availability or 
enjoyment of its patent rights. Demonstrating a prima facie case would be straightforward 
where a national measure explicitly imposes additional criteria for the patentability of 
inventions or imposes explicit limitations or advantages on the scope of patent rights of 
inventions that belong to a field of technology. A respondent may rebut such a presumption by 
showing the legitimate exercise of its autonomy under Article 27.1, Article 30 or Article 31. 
The examination in the previous Chapters of three national measures that explicitly confer such 
treatment on pharmaceutical inventions demonstrates that members are likely to impose such 
explicit conditions/limitations on patent rights when the concerns relating to a group of 
inventions are so significant that they warrant the enactment of legislative provisions that are 
specifically directed towards such inventions. 
 
Where, on the other hand, the disadvantageous/preferential treatment is not so explicit and is 
allegedly caused by a national measure that is not explicitly linked to a particular group of 
inventions, this assessment demands a deeper analysis. Such is the realm of de facto 
‘discrimination’ of TRIPS Article 27.1. In this context, it specifically refers to two types of 
national measures: (a) those that facially only appear to confer differential treatment on certain 
types of inventions but serve in practice to subject them to disadvantageous/preferential 
treatment, and (b) those that appear to confer disadvantageous/preferential treatment on all 
inventions but serve in practice to affect only a certain group of inventions. It must be noted, 
however, that although WTO Members may choose to subject certain fields of technology to 
de facto disadvantageous/preferential treatment in order to pursue vital policy interests, this 
might not be common in the context of patent law as WTO Members are more inclined to 
address vital concerns in a given field of technology by explicitly imposing additional hurdles 
for their patentability or by explicitly imposing restrictions/advantages that affect their patent 
rights. 
 
In order to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency in such de facto circumstances, a 
complainant would need to adduce satisfactory evidence to support its claim that a measure that 
is not explicitly disadvantageous/preferential to a particular field of technology, in fact accords 
disadvantageous/preferential treatment to that field of technology. While the type of evidence 
to demonstrate this should necessarily relate to the application of a given measure, the level of 
proof required would depend on the particular facts of the case. As Chapter 4 of this thesis 
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highlighted, the WTO Panel Report in Canada- Pharmaceuticals1 and the final arbitral award 
in Eli Lilly v. Canada2 show that a complainant has a higher evidentiary burden when 
establishing a prima facie case in such a context. This higher evidentiary burden that the 
tribunals have seemed to require reflect a constant problem that WTO tribunals have had to 
deal with relating to the de facto application of the substantive non-discrimination obligations 
(National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment) under the covered agreements: to 
ensure that these obligations are not thwarted while simultaneously ensuring that they are not 
interpreted too broadly so as to inhibit the autonomy of the Members that has been preserved 
under the covered agreements. In a similar vein, these tribunals seemed to have acknowledged 
that the de facto application of the rule against ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology should 
not inhibit two important forms of autonomy that Members have under the TRIPS Agreement, 
and that this must be reflected in the level of proof necessary to demonstrate a prima facie case 
in such a context. Accordingly, where a de facto an allegation concerns availability of patent 
rights, the level of proof required should recognize the autonomy of the Members to interpret 
and apply the usual patentability criteria that have been set-out in TRIPS Article 27. Similarly, 
the level of proof required when such an allegation relates to the enjoyment of patent rights 
should acknowledge the autonomy of the Members to make limited exceptions and grant 
compulsory licences that have been preserved in TRIPS Article 30 and Article 31.  
 
The need to preserve such autonomy particularly in the context of the de facto application of 
the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology in TRIPS Article 27.1 is supported 
by the WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. It will be recalled that it was 
declared that TRIPS is not meant to prevent Members from taking measures to protect public 
health.3 Although this Declaration was made in the context of compulsory licences and public 
health, it is submitted that it highlights the significance all the other policy spaces that have 
been preserved in the TRIPS Agreement that permit the Members to pursue vital public policies 
such as public health and that this should not be inhibited even by the de facto application of 
the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1. Therefore, while the standard of 
review to demonstrate a prima facie case of ‘discrimination’ of a field of technology is the same 
whether the allegation is de jure or de facto, a complainant will bear a greater and more 
                                               
1 See Panel Report, Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, para. 7.105, where the 
Panel states that it has not been proved that the ‘adverse effects’ of the regulatory review exception was limited to 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
2 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award, 16 March 
2017, para. 439. 
3 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, Doha, 2001, para. 4. 
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significant initial evidentiary burden in the case of the latter before any burden shifts to the 
respondent. 
 
• AUTONOMY WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF ‘JUSTIFICATION’ 
 
A respondent who may wish to rely on the concept of ‘justification’ that has been 
comprehensively examined in the previous Chapters of this work should be able to demonstrate 
that its measure is ‘necessary’ to pursue a legitimate policy objective and that such treatment is 
applied in an even-handed manner within its jurisdiction. The following sub-sections examine 
the practical implications that the scrutiny of each of these elements in the context of this 
obligation potentially have on a respondent who may seek to rely on this concept.  
 
v Legitimate Objectives 
 
The legitimacy of the purported exercise of the autonomy that is acknowledged by the concept 
of ‘justification’ fundamentally rests on whether the respondent could demonstrate that it 
pursues a policy objective that could be traced to TRIPS Article 8.1. The protection of public 
health and nutrition are explicitly mentioned in Article 8.1 and necessarily constitute legitimate 
objectives in this context. The significance of protecting public health is further buttressed by 
the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Article 8.1 also 
preserves a significant level of discretion on the part of a member to legitimately pursue a wide 
array of other policy objectives provided it is of the opinion that it is of vital importance to its 
‘socio-economic and technological development’. Therefore, it was observed in the context of 
the Australian patent term extension scheme that even the pursuance of technological and 
economic development by addressing industry concerns over marketing delays caused by 
regulatory processes constitute legitimate policy objectives within the concept of ‘justification’ 
in this context.  
 
This discretion on the part of a Member to determine which policies it may legitimately pursue 
in terms of Article 8.1 was acknowledged by the WTO Panel in Australia- Plain Packaging 
where it noted that:  
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… Article 8.1 express the intention of drafters of the TRIPS Agreement to 
preserve the ability for WTO Members to pursue certain legitimate societal 
interests…4 
While the Panel noted that the protection of public health is evidently one such societal interest, 
it stated that the societal interests that a Member may legitimately pursue have not been 
exhaustively set-out in Article 8.1.5 Consequently, one of the most fundamental implications of 
the concept of ‘justification’ within the non-discrimination obligation is the apparent breadth 
of the policy objectives that a respondent may legitimately pursue to ‘justify’ the 
disadvantageous/preferential treatment that it accords to a field of technology.   
 
v The Test of Necessity 
 
The test of ‘necessity’ in the context of a ‘justification’ in Article 27.1 is borrowed from Article 
8.1. It was noted that a concept of ‘justification’ that is created in the context of the non-
discrimination obligation in Article 27.1 to acknowledge the autonomy preserved in Article 8.1 
cannot disregard the textual reference to such a concept in Article 8.1. This involves the 
‘weighing and balancing’ of several factors including the importance of the policy, the 
measure’s level of contribution and even the availability of alternatives if any have been 
suggested by a complainant. However, it was argued that the threshold of ‘necessity’ in this 
context is rather unique because of the nature of intellectual property law rules and the nature 
of the policies that fall within the ambit of Article 8.1. The TRIPS Agreement acknowledges 
that the balance that Article 8.1 is meant to achieve between intellectual property protection 
and other societal interests as highlighted in TRIPS Article 7 (Objectives) is progressive and 
cannot be achieved in the short term. Therefore, it was argued that ‘necessity’ in this context 
would be satisfied if a respondent could demonstrate the capability on the part of a measure to 
contribute towards the stated policy objective within its own jurisdiction. Consequently, the 
lack of proof that a national measure has already contributed towards the policy objective would 
not be fatal in this context.  
 
The examination of the potential consistency of certain national measures in the previous 
Chapter also demonstrated that the scrutiny of such capability should appreciate the fact that a 
                                               
4 Panel Report, Australia- Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, 
WT/DS456/R and WT/DS467/R, para. 7.2404. 
5 Ibid., para. 7.2406. 
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measure could have such capability only by forming part of a host of other national measures 
that pursue similar objectives in a given jurisdiction. This is because intellectual property law 
measures are unlikely to have a direct impact on the policies traceable to Article 8.1. Hence, 
the lack of evidence to demonstrate any direct nexus between the national measure and its 
impact on the stated policy should not be fatal to this analysis. Hence, it was argued that the 
Australian patent term extension scheme would potentially satisfy this test of ‘necessity’. 
Although there is a lack of evidence to show that the current scheme has already contributed to 
any technological or economic development in Australia, such extensions are recognized to be 
one of the many factors that influence R&D in the pharmaceutical sector that demonstrate the 
capability of the scheme to contribute to technological and economic development.  
 
However, it was also noted that in order to benefit from these flexibilities inherent in this 
‘necessity’ assessment, a respondent needs to be able to demonstrate that the design, structure, 
and application of its measure is such it has the ability to make some contribution towards the 
policy objective. Therefore, however important a measure’s objective may be, such an inability 
on the part of a measure would prevent the flexible analysis of ‘necessity’ from coming into 
operation. Hence, in the context of the Brazilian measure that requires ‘prior consent’ from the 
sanitary agency (ANVISA) when patenting pharmaceutical inventions, it was argued that the 
duplicative patent assessment carried out by ANVISA without any binding effect of its findings, 
coupled with its inability to add any public health dimension to the patentability assessment 
potentially renders the mechanism to be incapable of ensuring a more stringent patentability 
assessment of pharmaceutical inventions in order to protect public health. Consequently, a vital 
implication of this is that WTO Members should be cautious in structuring their technology 
specific patent law measures as they should be able to demonstrate such structural ability of 
their measures if they intend to benefit from the unique ‘necessity’ threshold within the concept 
of ‘justification’ in the non-discrimination obligation. 
 
Another layer is added to this ‘necessity’ analysis if a complainant is able to identify an 
alternative that is available to the respondent that it could have utilized to pursue its policy 
objective. A valid alternative in this context is one that does not accord any 
disadvantageous/preferential treatment to the field of technology or accords such treatment to 
a lesser degree and yet meet the respondent’s desired level of protection. It was noted that such 
alternatives should not be merely theoretical to a respondent in the light of its standard of 
development. Hence, one of the basic implications, which is also prevalent in other areas of 
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WTO law, is that the less developed a respondent is, the more likely that it would be able to 
demonstrate that an alternative is not reasonably ‘available’. 
 
Moreover, it was noted that a respondent is entitled to demonstrate that an alternative does not 
meet the desired level of protection that it has sought to achieve by its own measure. It was 
apparent in the previous Chapter that examined the potential consistency of the Indian Section 
3(d) requirement and Brazilian ‘prior consent’ mechanism that a complainant is likely to 
suggest that a national measure is essentially superfluous where it confers disadvantageous 
treatment upon a field of technology in the context of the availability of patent rights in order 
to pursue a policy objective. This is because a complainant is likely to point out to a minimum 
patent law standard of the TRIPS Agreement as an ‘available alternative’ that already addresses 
the public policy concern that the respondent has sought to address. For example, in the case of 
India’s Section 3(d) requirement, it was noted that the alternative likely to be suggested is the 
‘inventive step’ requirement that is used in other jurisdictions to address the problem of ever-
greening in the field of pharmaceuticals. Similarly, in the case of the Brazilian ‘prior consent’ 
requirement, it is likely to be the correct application of the patentability criteria that is meant to 
ensure that only deserving inventions are granted patents in any field of technology.  
 
However, the examination of whether a respondent’s measure is in fact superfluous in the light 
of a suggested TRIPS minimum standard must give sufficient regard to the level of protection 
of the policy objective that the respondent seeks to achieve. It was noted that this level of 
protection sought by a respondent would be greater than a TRIPS alternative if the measure 
addresses a specific concern in a specific field of technology in a more concrete fashion than 
the TRIPS alternative would generally be capable of. In other words, the reasons for the pre-
occupation with one field of technology must be evident in the design and structure of the 
national measure that shows that it addresses a specific concern in that field of technology. This 
does not mean that a respondent must show that its measure is necessarily better at achieving 
the policy objective, but that it is capable of doing something that cannot ordinarily be done by 
a TRIPS suggested alternative. 
 
Hence, it was argued that India would potentially be in a better position to demonstrate that the 
‘inventive step’ requirement is not an adequate alternative to Section 3(d) as the latter seeks to 
protect public health by addressing ever-greening concerns in three distinctive ways that 
demonstrate the heighted level of public health protection that India seeks to achieve. Firstly, 
as the Indian Courts have held, Section 3(d) is a patent eligibility standard rather than a 
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patentability standard. Therefore, the modus that India uses to address ‘ever-greening’ is very 
different to the way in which the ‘inventive step’ requirement could do it. Secondly, it specifies 
what renders a new form of a known substance to become patentable: it is the enhancement of 
the known efficacy of that substance. ‘Efficacy’ has been interpreted to mean ‘therapeutic 
efficacy’ in the case of pharmaceuticals. Consequently, a new form of a known pharmaceutical 
substance should be better at curing diseases compared to its previous known form. Thirdly, it 
sets out a presumption that new forms of known chemical substances shall be regarded to be 
the same as the known substances unless there is a significant difference in relation to their 
efficacy. These features show that Section 3(d) addresses ever-greening concerns more 
distinctly compared to the ‘inventive step’ requirement that generally requires an inventive 
advancement compared to the prior art.  
 
It was argued that such a distinctiveness is not present in the case of the Brazilian ‘prior consent’ 
mechanism. As highlighted in the previous Chapter, the current mechanism relating to Article 
229-C of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law does not permit its health authority (ANVISA) 
to add any public health dimension to the patentability assessment of pharmaceutical inventions 
even when they are of interest to its Healthcare System. Further, the recent 2017 developments 
in Brazil demonstrate that ANVISA is not entitled to adopt any policy that would be 
inconsistent with that of the Patent Office (INPI). This would potentially prevent Brazil from 
demonstrating that Article 229-C pursues any heightened level of public health protection than 
that which could ordinarily be achieved by applying the usual patentability criteria that are 
meant to examined by the Patent Office. These factors should necessarily be acknowledged by 
any member who intends to utilize its autonomy within the concept of ‘justification’. 
 
v The Assessment of Even-Handedness 
 
Even-handedness is the final requirement that a respondent should demonstrate to establish a 
legitimate ‘justification’. As highlighted in the previous Chapters, it serves to ensure that a 
respondent has exercised its right to ‘justify’ the disadvantageous/preferential treatment of a 
field of technology in good faith. It does this by acknowledging that a respondent Member is 
entitled to address public interest and industry-oriented concerns in a given field of technology, 
but that it should have addressed similar concerns in other fields of technology. It was argued 
that traceable to the need to acknowledge the economic and developmental disparities among 
the WTO Members, particularly in the context of patent law, is the need to recognize that the 
same public interest concern in a given field of technology could have a variable impact among 
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the WTO Members when left unregulated. These repercussions to a given WTO Member might 
be so severe that such a concern in a given field of technology might be incomparable to any 
similar concerns in other fields of technology. The public interest concerns surrounding the 
field of pharmaceuticals are fitting examples. The poorer and less developed a Member is, the 
slightest imbalance between patent rights and public interests in favour of the former could 
have a disastrous impact on the public health of its citizens. Such were India’s concerns relating 
to ever-greening when it was introducing legislation to recognize product patents for 
pharmaceutical inventions. It foresaw that ever-greening would have a substantial impact on its 
public health by increasing the prices of drugs and putting them beyond the reach of a majority 
of its citizens without any corresponding therapeutic benefit to the public. These concerns were 
such that, except for some limited discussion relating to similar practices in the field of agro-
chemicals, the Indian legislature did not think that it was comparable to the problem of ever-
greening in any other field of technology. Thus, a WTO tribunal is entitled to examine if a 
member’s pre-occupation with one field of technology is genuine under this notion of ‘even-
handedness’. However, one of the most pragmatic implications of the WTO Ministerial 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health that highlighted the significance of the 
protection public health is that it is foreseeable that public interest concerns in the field of 
pharmaceuticals would almost always render them incomparable to similar concerns in other 
fields of technology. 
 
Therefore, what fundamentally transpires from this discussion of the implications is that 
although a complainant could demonstrate a prima facie inconsistency with this obligation 
where a national measure explicitly imposes a restriction or privilege that relates to the 
availability or enjoyment of patent rights of a field of technology, this is equalized by the 
concept of ‘justification’ that acknowledges a significant degree of autonomy on the part of the 
Members to justify such treatment. 
 
B. THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
• THE OTHER GROUNDS OF DISCRIMINATION IN ARTICLE 27.1 
 
It will be recalled that TRIPS Article 27.1 prohibits ‘discrimination’ with regard to the 
availability and enjoyment of patents rights on three grounds: the place of invention, the field 
of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced. This thesis scrutinized 
the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology. It examined the concept of 
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‘discrimination’ and the concept of ‘justification’ that the Panel recognized in Canada- 
Pharmaceuticals from the perspective of fields of technology. Consequently, it did not address 
what constitutes ‘discrimination’ as to the ‘place of invention’ or of ‘products whether imported 
or locally produced’. Nonetheless, given the manner in which TRIPS’s unique tripartite non-
discrimination norm has been phrased in Article 27.1, the most palpable theoretical implication 
that deserves discussion relates to what extent the interpretation of the rule against the 
‘discrimination’ of fields of technology could inform the interpretation of the obligation in 
relation to the other grounds in Article 27.1. This is particularly important in the light of the 
fact that the Panel in Canada-Pharmaceuticals formulated the concept ‘discrimination’ in 
Article 27.1 as the ‘unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment’,6 thereby 
highlighting that this formulation is applicable to all the grounds in Article 27.1 and not only 
to fields of technology. Hence, although this thesis built on this formulation from the 
perspective of fields of technology, the interpretation of the rule relating to fields of technology 
must be capable of providing some useful insights as to how the non-discrimination obligation 
must be understood in the context of the other grounds in Article 27.1. 
 
The telling commonality between the three grounds of discrimination is that they all apply in 
the context of the availability and enjoyment of patent rights and are not directly concerned 
with the right-holders themselves. However, an observable distinction between ‘fields of 
technology’ and the other two grounds is that the latter effectively serve to protect foreigners 
from being discriminated. As highlighted in Chapter 2, one of the most pressing concerns that 
has been caused by the ambiguity relating to the concept ‘discrimination’ with regard to 
‘products based on their place of production’ is whether it prohibits local working requirements 
of patented inventions. A strict interpretation of ‘discrimination’ in such a context would 
potentially mean that all local working requirements that provide for the grant of compulsory 
licences due to the lack of or insufficient working of patented inventions would be inconsistent 
with this obligation. Nonetheless, it will be recalled that the non-discrimination obligation in 
its final form was introduced as a ‘compromise solution’ when the negotiators could neither 
agree on the permissibility of local working requirements under the TRIPS Agreement, nor on 
the adoption of a more streamlined Paris Convention’s Stockholm style compulsory licensing 
mechanism that permitted compulsory licenses for non-working only upon the lapse of four 
years from the date of the patent and subject to the ability of a patentee to justify its inaction by 
                                               
6 Panel Report, Canada- Pharmaceuticals, n. 1, para. 7.94. 
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legitimate reasons.7 Such a compromise would be reflected only if this facet of the non-
discrimination norm is also capable of acknowledging the legality of some form of local 
working requirements, at least according to the conditions set out in the Paris Convention.  
 
Thus, the Panel in Canada- Pharmaceuticals rightly indicated that the concept of ‘justification’ 
is even applicable in these circumstances. The rationale is similar to that identified in this thesis 
in relation to ‘fields of technology’. Just as much as the Objectives and Principles in TRIPS, 
together with the context relating to WTO’s substantive non-discrimination norms, highlight 
the need for a concept of ‘justification’ within the rule relating to fields of technology to 
preserve the autonomy of the Members recognized in TRIPS, there is a similar need under the 
other grounds of discrimination in Article 27.1. Thus, as the Panel appears to have suggested 
in Canada- Pharmaceuticals, the interpretation of ‘discrimination’ based on the other grounds 
in Article 27.1 should recognize the ability on the part of a respondent to ‘justify’ the 
disadvantageous/preferential treatment in those contexts.  
 
The substantive content of a concept of ‘justification’ and how it ought to operate within the 
grounds of ‘place of invention’ and ‘place of production’ would necessarily require further 
scrutiny in interpreting those obligations. However, it is foreseeable that the type of measures 
that a respondent may seek to ‘justify’ in the context of ‘place of invention’ and ‘place of 
production’ would often relate to technology transfer, the scrutiny of which would largely 
depend on economic factors. While the nature of those economic factors and how they ought to 
be scrutinized would inform the concept of ‘justification’ in those contexts, the most 
fundamental theoretical implication that flows from the analysis of the concept of ‘justification’ 
within the rule relating to fields of technology is that any such determination must acknowledge 
the varying economic, developmental and technological standards among the WTO Members. 
 
This has been acknowledged to an extent by Thomas Cottier, Shaheeza Lalani and 
Michelangelo Temmerman in their examination of the TRIPS compatibility of local working 
requirements.8 They state that national rules that explicitly exclude importation as a means of 
satisfying local working requirements for all patented inventions constitute ‘discrimination’ 
based on place of production under TRIPS Article 27.1.9 They argue that this is because there 
                                               
7 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (as amended on September 28, 1979), Article 
5A(4). 
8 T. Cottier, S. Lalani and M. Temmerman, ‘Use It or Lose It: Assessing the Compatibility of the Paris Convention 
and TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Local Working Requirements’, Journal of International Economic Law, 
vol. 17, no. 2, 2014, p. 437. 
9 Ibid., p. 452. 
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may be instances when importation would suffice to meet the TRIPS objectives of technology 
transfer.10  They also state: 
… there is no discrimination where the wording of a legislated local working 
requirement captures only a particular patentee’s abusive ‘failure to work’ the 
patented invention.11  
Consequently, they argue that whether importation is sufficient to meet TRIPS’s objectives of 
technology transfer and whether the failure to work a patent is ‘abusive’ are dependent on a 
range of economic factors that should be determined in the light of the ‘heterogeneity in 
capacity’ across the Members of the WTO.12 While this is indicative of what may constitute a 
‘justification’ in the context of the ground of ‘place of production’, as they have noted, the 
economic factors should be examined in the light of the developmental and economic 
capabilities of that Member. 
 
Hence, certain features of the concept of ‘justification’ that this thesis has highlighted in relation 
to the ground of ‘fields of technology’ are already observable in the academic literature that 
deal with the other grounds of discrimination in Article 27.1. However, more detailed studies 
are required to identify the specific economic factors and how they must be examined in the 
light of the state of development of a given Member to acknowledge their divergences in the 
process of permitting them to ‘justify’ the disadvantageous/preferential treatment within the 
grounds of ‘place of invention’ and ‘place of production’.  
 
• THE NATIONAL TREATMENT AND MOST-FAVOURED NATION TREATMENT 
OBLIGATIONS IN TRIPS 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis argued that the National Treatment (NT) and Most-Favoured Nation 
(MFN) Treatment obligations in TRIPS potentially have a broader scope of application than 
the NT/MFN obligations under the other covered agreements for the following reasons. Firstly, 
they apply to ‘nationals’ in relation to an extensive concept referred to as the ‘protection of 
intellectual property rights’. The latter has been defined very broadly in TRIPS Article 1(2) and 
Footnote 3 to TRIPS Articles 3 and 4 as including matters affecting the availability, acquisition, 
scope, maintenance, enforcement and use of intellectual property rights addressed in the 
                                               
10 Ibid., p. 453. 
11 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
12 Ibid., p. 460. 
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Agreement. Secondly, they require the treatment accorded to such national to be ‘no less 
favourable’. This has been interpreted broadly by the WTO Panel in EC- Geographical 
Indications to mean that there would be less favourable treatment if ‘extra hurdles’ are imposed 
on nationals of another WTO Member to exercise their intellectual property rights.13 Thirdly, 
there are no exceptions that are applicable to these obligations.  
 
However, it was also argued that unlike the NT/MFN obligations under the other covered 
agreements, the absence of any mechanism to balance TRIPS’s NT/MFN obligations with the 
autonomy of the WTO Members to pursue vital public policies has not yet highlighted the need 
to recognize any justificatory concept in this context. This is probably because TRIPS by itself 
recognizes certain exclusions and limitations that permit a Member to pursue public policy 
objectives to some limited extent in relation to each form of intellectual property right that has 
been addressed therein.14 Further, the WTO Panel on EC- Geographical Indications attempted 
to justify its opinion as to why TRIPS’s NT obligation should not be subject to public policy 
exceptions by stating that intellectual property rights are negative rights. Thus, it explained that 
Members are inherently entitled to pursue legitimate public policy objectives as such measures 
mainly lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights and do not require an exception under 
the TRIPS Agreement.15  
 
It is submitted that this reasoning is not sufficient to completely rule out the need for a 
justificatory concept within TRIPS’s NT/MFN obligations. To begin with, it is incorrect to state 
that public policy measures mainly lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights. For 
example, the WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and TRIPS Article 
31bis clearly acknowledge that intellectual property rights have a great impact on the protection 
of public health. More importantly, in the light of the autonomy on the part of the Members that 
this thesis has shown to have been preserved in TRIPS’s Objectives and Principles, the need 
for a justificatory concept will become apparent when a Member seeks to address a concern 
outside its own jurisdiction by curtailing or conditioning the availability or enjoyment of 
intellectual property rights of nationals of another Member. While none of the Panel or 
Appellate Body Reports to date dealing with these obligations have highlighted the need for 
such a concept, it is uncertain as to how long more the WTO tribunals could ignore such a need 
                                               
13 See Panel Report, European Communities- Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (US)- WT/DS174/R, para. 7.137. 
14 For e.g TRIPS Article 13 (Exceptions to Copyright), Article 17 (Exceptions to Trademarks), Article 20 
(Encumbrances of Trademark Use), Article 30 (Exceptions to Patent Rights), Article 31(Compulsory Licensing of 
Patented Inventions). 
15 Panel Report, European Communities- Geographical Indications, n. 13, para. 7.210. 
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given that the conflict between TRIPS’s NT/MFN obligations and the autonomy of the WTO 
Members to pursue important national interests has come to the spotlight in two recent disputes.  
 
In UAE- Goods/Services/TRIPS, Qatar made a request to establish a Panel to consider certain 
measures adopted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) alleging that the latter had adopted a 
host of measures that individually and collectively affected trade in goods, services and 
intellectual property rights of its nationals in violation of GATT, GATS and TRIPS.16 In relation 
to TRIPS Articles 3 (NT) and 4 (MFN), Qatar alleged that these measures made it impossible 
for Qatari nationals to enforce and use their intellectual property rights in the UAE.17 UAE 
objected to the establishment of a Panel contending that it was forced to take such measures in 
response to Qatar’s funding of terrorist organizations and that GATT Article XXI, GATS 
Article XIVbis and TRIPS Article 73 entitled Members to take action in the interest of national 
security. Subsequently, the Dispute Settlement Body deferred the establishment of the Panel.18 
Although UAE relied on the security exceptions in TRIPS, this dispute demonstrates the 
mounting conflict between the NT/MFN obligations and Member autonomy.  
 
A similar instance where this conflict has become apparent is in China- Transfer of 
Technology.19 The European Union requested consultations with China alleging that the latter’s 
imposition of mandatory contract terms concerning the importation of technology into China 
amounted to a violation of TRIPS’s NT (Article 3) obligation. These consultations are still 
ongoing and if China’s measures are found to fall within the ambit of Article 3, it is foreseeable 
that China would seek to justify them on the basis that they aim to ensure technology transfer, 
an objective that is so vital in the context of the TRIPS Agreement. With this tug of war between 
TRIPS’s NT/MFN obligations on the one hand, and the autonomy of the WTO Members that 
has been preserved in its Objectives and Principles on the other, that is likely to manifest more 
clearly in future disputes concerning these obligations, it is foreseeable that the recognition of 
some concept that recognizes the autonomy of the Members in the context of these obligations 
is imminent. 
                                               
16 See Request for Establishing of a Panel by Qatar, United Arab Emirates- Measures Relating to Trade in Goods 
and Services and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS526/2. 
17 Ibid., para. 17. 
18 WTO Secretariat, Qatar seeks WTO Panel review of UAE measures on goods, services and IP rights, 2017, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/dsb_23oct17_e.htm, (accessed 13 August 2018). 
19 See Request for Consultations by the European Union, China- Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology, 
WT/DS549/1. 
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C. TRIPS ARTICLE 31BIS AND PANEL REPORT IN AUSTRALIA- 
PLAIN PACKAGING 
 
This part discusses two important developments in relation to the TRIPS Agreement that 
support the nature of the concept of ‘justification’ that this thesis has propounded in relation to 
the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of fields of technology. 
 
• ARTICLE 31BIS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
It has been argued that the concept of ‘justification’ in the context of the non-discrimination 
obligation serves to acknowledge the autonomy of the Members that has been preserved in the 
Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, in the context of the ground of ‘fields 
of technology’, it was submitted that a Member is entitled to ‘justify’ the 
disadvantageous/preferential treatment of a field of technology by demonstrating that it is 
necessary to pursue a legitimate policy objective and that such treatment is applied even-
handedly. The examination of whether measures such as the Indian Section 3(d) requirement 
and the Brazilian requirement of ‘prior consent’ would potentially satisfy the elements of this 
concept of ‘justification’ vitally demonstrated that the nature of the autonomy that the concept 
recognizes is most substantial in the context of public health and pharmaceuticals. It was argued 
that this is because its constitutive elements must be examined more flexibly to recognize the 
significance of public health and the varying economic, technological and developmental 
capabilities among the Members to address concerns relating to pharmaceutical inventions. The 
need for such a flexible analysis of the concept of ‘justification’ when a measure seeks to protect 
public health is reinforced by TRIPS Article 31bis. 
 
Article 31bis is currently the only amendment to the Agreement since its inception in 1994. It 
permits a WTO Member to grant export oriented compulsory licences in respect of 
pharmaceutical products to enable the exportation those products to Members with insufficient 
or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.20 This was significant, at least in principle, as 
TRIPS Article 31(f) originally required products manufactured under compulsory licences to 
be predominantly for the supply of the domestic market. By permitting the exportation of 
pharmaceutical products manufactured under its mechanism, it removed certain safeguards in 
relation compulsory licences that other fields of technology still continue to enjoy under TRIPS 
                                               
20 See Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, Article 31bis, para. 1.  
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Article 31. Although Article 31bis authorizes WTO Members to de jure disadvantage 
pharmaceutical inventions in this manner, nothing has been mentioned as to how it could be 
reconciled with the non-discrimination obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1.  
 
The Protocol to the amendment merely states that Members shall not challenge any measures 
taken in conformity with Article 31bis.21 It is not clear as to whether this is because it constitutes 
an explicit exception to Article 27.1 or because the conformity with its conditions renders such 
measures to be consistent with the non-discrimination obligation. The first of these possibilities 
is unlikely given that the ‘subject to’ clause in Article 27.1 that explicitly recognizes certain 
exceptions to the non-discrimination obligation has remained unchanged. The stronger 
argument is that Article 31bis is consistent with the non-discrimination obligation. The manner 
in which it could be so can now be understood in the light of the previous Chapters of this thesis 
that have provided a more detailed understanding of the rule against the ‘discrimination’ of 
fields of technology and its concept of ‘justification’: Article 31bis constitutes an explicit 
‘justification’ in the context of the non-discrimination obligation that recognizes the autonomy 
of the Members to protect public health. The reason for public health to be so singled out by 
Article 31bis is clear from the history relating to the amendment. 
 
At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, the Ministers noted that WTO Members 
with ‘insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector’ face difficulties 
in making effective use of the compulsory licences under the TRIPS Agreement.22 This was 
caused by the combined effect of TRIPS Article 31(f) and (h) which required any such 
authorization to be ‘predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorizing such use’ and to be subject to the payment of ‘adequate remuneration’. Thus, the 
Ministers instructed the TRIPS Council to find an expeditious solution to this problem. On the 
recommendation of the TRIPS Council, the General Council adopted a decision in August 2013 
to temporarily waive TRIPS obligations in Article 31(f) and (h) with respect to pharmaceutical 
products.23 Evidently, the General Council was not merely concerned as to how a WTO Member 
may protect its own public health. More importantly, it was concerned as to how a WTO 
Member could protect public health in the territory of another WTO Member. Subsequently, it 
adopted a decision to amend TRIPS and thereby make these waivers permanent, which came 
into force in January 2017 upon being accepted by two-thirds of the WTO Members. 
                                               
21 Ibid., para. 4. 
22 See Ministerial Declaration, n. 3, para. 6. 
23 This waiver Decision was adopted by the General Council in the light of a statement read out by the Chairman 
as reflected in paragraphs 29-31 of the minutes of the General Council meeting, WT/GC/M/82. 
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It is apparent that Article 31bis was meant to address the inability of certain lesser developed 
country Members to make effective use of the compulsory licence mechanism in the context of 
pharmaceuticals as some of them did not have any pharmaceutical manufacturing 
infrastructure. Therefore, the principal rationale for Article 31bis was the recognition that 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity varied among the WTO Members. In terms of scope, 
this concern was addressed broadly. For example, ‘pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity’ is 
determined in relation to the specific product in question.24 In other words, it is the insufficiency 
or lack of manufacturing capacity to produce a specific pharmaceutical product, rather than the 
general pharmaceutical manufacturing capability, that entitles a Member to benefit from this 
mechanism. In the light of such differences in capability among the Members of the WTO, 
Article 31bis recognized the necessity of WTO Members to issue export oriented compulsory 
licences in order to protect public health of lesser developed country Members. In this process, 
it acknowledged that the inability to use compulsory licences in the context of pharmaceuticals 
was a deeper concern than in any other field of technology in the light of its impact on public 
health. Consequently, Article 31bis is a manifestation of the flexible analysis that the concept 
of ‘justification’ is supposed to entail in the context of public health and pharmaceuticals. Not 
only does it highlight the legitimacy of pursuing public health, but it also supports the argument 
in this thesis that the analysis of the requirement of ‘necessity’ and ‘even-handedness’ should 
acknowledge the diverging economic, developmental and technological circumstances 
pertaining to the WTO Members, which has explicitly been done by Article 31bis.  
 
• AUSTRALIA- PLAIN PACKAGING: THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW MEASURES AND PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES 
 
This thesis argued that the determination of whether a measure that subjects a field of 
technology to disadvantageous/preferential treatment is ‘necessary’ to pursue a legitimate 
policy objective must be examined flexibly. It was highlighted that this is because of the 
intrinsic nature of intellectual property law measures. Their impact on public policy objectives 
such as public health, technological development is not direct and is dependent on a number of 
other factors pertaining to a given WTO Member. Thus, it was further argued that the level of 
contribution required under the concept of ‘necessity’ in this context should be satisfied when 
                                               
24 See Article 31bis para. 2(a)(iii). Also see M. Abbas and S. Riaz, ‘WTO “Paragraph 6” System for Affordable 
Access to Medicines: Relief or Regulatory Ritualism?’, The Journal of World Intellectual Property, vol. 21, no. 
1-2, 2018, p. 32. 
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the measure is shown to have the capability to contribute towards the policy even in 
combination with a host of other national measures.  
 
This flexible determination of the nexus between intellectual property law measures and public 
policy objectives was acknowledged by the WTO Panel in Australia- Plain Packaging. This is 
one of the first disputes where a WTO tribunal had to address the conflict between TRIPS 
obligations and the protection of public health. In this dispute, several complainants alleged 
that Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging (TPP) measures that imposed certain restriction on 
the use of trade marks on tobacco products were incompatible with, inter alia, the TRIPS 
Agreement. It was specifically alleged that the TPP measures imposed restrictions on the use 
of trade marks on tobacco products that constituted ‘unjustified encumbrances’ to trade mark 
use in violation of TRIPS Article 20. 
 
The Panel found that the TPP measures constituted ‘special requirements’ that ‘encumbered’ 
the use of trade marks,25 and therefore, the compatibility of the TPP measures was dependent on 
whether they were ‘(un)justified’. To identify what is ‘unjustified’ in this context, the Panel 
turned to the Objectives and Principles of the Agreement, which was the first ever instance that 
a WTO tribunal substantively dealt with these provisions. The Panel noted that each provision 
of the Agreement had to be interpreted in the light of the Objectives and Principles,26 reiterating 
the sentiments expressed by the WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.27 
The Panel even boldly declared, although subject to an appeal on this very point,28 that Paragraph 
5 of the Declaration constitutes a ‘subsequent agreement’ in terms of the Article 31(3)(a) of 
the Vienna Convention.29 It noted that Article 8.1 specifically constitutes useful context in 
interpreting the concept of ‘unjustified’ in Article 20 as it preserves the ability on the part of a 
Member to address legitimate societal interests,30 and that public health is evidently one such 
interest.31 
 
The Panel further noted that whether an encumbrance is ‘unjustified’ depends on the following: 
                                               
25 Panel Report, Australia- Plain Packaging, n. 4, para. 7.2173-7.2292. 
26 Ibid., para. 7.2398-7.2403. 
27 Ministerial Declaration, n. 3, para. 5. 
28 See Australia- Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, Notification of an Appeal by Honduras under 
Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU), and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures foe Appellate Review, WT/DS/435/23, p. 2. 
29 Panel Report, Australia- Plain Packaging, n. 4, para. 7.2409. 
30 Ibid., para. 7.2404. 
31 Ibid., para. 7.2406. 
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(a) The nature and extent of the encumbrance (bearing in mind the legitimate interests of a 
trademark owner), 
(b) The reasons for the special requirements, and 
(c) Whether the reasons provide sufficient support for the resulting encumbrance.32 
 
After identifying the nature and extent of the encumbrances that the Australian TPP measures 
had caused to the use of trade marks on tobacco products, the Panel identified that the reason 
for the TPP measures (its objective) was to ‘improve public health by reducing the use of, and 
exposure to, tobacco products’.33 The most impactful analysis relates to how the Panel examined 
if those public health concerns ‘sufficiently supported’ the encumbrances on use of the trade 
marks. In the light of the risk that tobacco had caused to public health, notwithstanding 
submissions from several parties that the TPP measures would not be effective in reducing the 
use of tobacco products, the Panel found that the capability on the part of the TPP measures to 
improve public health even in combination with other tobacco-control measures sufficed to 
satisfy this requirement. In the words of the Panel: 
… TPP measures are applied address an exceptionally grave domestic and 
global health problem involving a high level of preventable morbidity and 
mortality. The fact that these special requirements, as part of the overall TPP 
measures and in combination with other tobacco-control measures maintained 
by Australia, are capable of contributing, and do in fact contribute, to 
Australia's objective of improving public health by reducing the use of, and 
exposure to, tobacco products, suggests that the reasons for which these special 
requirements are applied provide sufficient support for the application of the 
resulting encumbrances on the use of trademarks.34  
The Panel also stated that the removal of design features on retail packaging of tobacco products 
was ‘apt’ to reduce the appeal of tobacco products and protect public health.35 As the burden 
was on the complainants to demonstrate that the encumbrance was ‘unjustified’ under Article 
20, the Panel found that they had failed to do so because there was sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the TPP measures were capable of promoting public health.  
 
                                               
32 Ibid., para. 7.2529. 
33 Ibid., para. 7.2586. 
34 Ibid., para. 7.2592. 
35 Ibid., para. 7.2593. 
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This analysis by the Panel demonstrates a fundamental acknowledgement on the part of a WTO 
tribunal that the right of a Member to adopt the type of measures that fall within the scope of 
TRIPS Article 8.1 should be recognized broadly, and that this must be reflected in the 
assessment of the nexus between intellectual property law related measures and the important 
policy objectives that such measures seek to pursue. It acknowledged that the public health 
concerns relating to tobacco were such that the restrictions imposed in the context of trademark 
law that had some capability to mitigate those concerns had to be consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement if the balance between intellectual property rights and other vital interests specified 
in TRIPS Article 7 is to be achieved. It is this broader analysis that thesis argued to form part 
of the ‘necessity’ assessment under the concept of ‘justification’ in the rule against the 
‘discrimination’ of fields of technology. Hence, Australia- Plain Packaging is clear indication 
that WTO tribunals are willing to scrutinize the consistency of intellectual property law 
measures that pursue vital public policy objectives in a more flexible manner as argued in this 
thesis, acknowledging the difficulties in demonstrating a clear nexus between such measures 
and the objectives being pursued. 
 
D. OVERALL CONCLUSION AND THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
 
The developed interpretation of the rule against the discrimination of fields of technology in 
this thesis highlights the type of autonomy that the Panel in Canada- Pharmaceuticals sought 
to recognize in its formulation of this obligation. By identifying the substantive content of the 
concept of justification in this obligation, this work intended to provide the WTO Members 
with the necessary impetus to utilize this autonomy and subject fields of technology to 
disadvantageous or preferential treatment to pursue important national policy objectives and 
meet the requisite balance with intellectual property protection that is mandated by TRIPS 
Article 7. The examination of the potential consistency of certain national measures currently 
found among the WTO Members that explicitly subject pharmaceutical inventions to 
differential treatment highlighted certain important aspects relating to the concept of 
‘justification’ that a Member should have regard to when structuring its technology specific 
patent rules in a manner that is compatible with Article 27.1. That said, it deserves to be 
highlighted that this autonomy must be exercised with a significant level of responsibility. 
Members should acknowledge that the political, economic, social and cultural circumstances 
immensely vary among the WTO Members, and therefore, the manner in which their patent 
systems could affect those circumstances within their jurisdictions vary even more. In effect, 
technology specific patent rules of one Member could hardly be transplanted into another 
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Member in toto. Thus, the adoption of any technology specific patent rule must be preceded by 
a comprehensive examination relating to the measure’s capability to contribute towards the 
intended policy objective within the Member’s jurisdiction. 
 
The ‘unravelling’ of the non-discrimination obligation relating to fields of technology 
highlights a bigger picture relating to WTO obligations. It highlights the balance that must be 
struck between WTO obligations and the autonomy of the Members to pursue important 
national interests. This is traceable to the Preamble to the WTO Agreement (Marrakesh 
Agreement) that signifies the importance of ‘sustainable’ development which lingers 
throughout the WTO’s multilateral system.36 The interpretation of the non-discrimination 
obligation in TRIPS Article 27.1 highlighted the importance of the concept of justification to 
achieve this balance. This is evident even in the jurisprudence relating to the Technical Barriers 
to Trade Agreement (TBT), where WTO tribunals have sought to achieve such a balance by 
creating concepts in the interpretation of its obligations. Therefore, the broader implication of 
this thesis relates to the significance of this balance for the proper functioning of the WTO 
system.
                                               
36 See the First Sentence of the Preamble to The WTO Agreement which provides ‘Recognizing that their relations 
in the fields of trade… in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
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